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Abstract 
 
One of the key problems facing regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) in the 
twenty-first century is a lack of compliance by flag States. Non-compliance by both contracting 
and non-contracting parties to RFMOs threatens the effectiveness of a regime which relies 
almost entirely upon cooperation and the interests of individual States to function. The political 
will of States to effectively address problems caused by non-compliance including, inter alia, 
illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, has recently been deemed wanting.   
 
This thesis is concerned with the need for better implementation of compliance enforcement 
mechanisms by RFMOs to which Australia is a party (AusRFMOs).  It examines the range of 
compliance enforcement mechanisms available to RFMOs and evaluates how AusRFMOs are 
currently tackling the problem of non-compliance.  It recognises the difficulties faced by RFMOs 
in implementing their mandate and demonstrates that policy and diplomatic avenues along with a 
range of countermeasures may be, and have been, evoked by RFMOs to tackle flag State non-
compliance.  
 
This thesis concludes that AusRFMOs could improve their compliance enforcement across the 
board.  It demonstrates that despite the widespread adoption of mechanisms such as IUU vessel 
lists, there remains a gap between the theoretical mandate of these organisations and their 
adoption of measures to enable more effective enforcement.  The thesis submits that AusRFMOs 
must better utilise their enforcement capabilities if they are to fulfil the role envisaged for them 
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and other associated international 
agreements.  It concludes that AusRFMOs should take steps to move beyond their role as 
cooperative entities towards an enforcement capacity if they are to make a real contribution to 
achieving sustainable global fisheries.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The concept of flag State jurisdiction, whereby the activities of fishing vessels are regulated by 
the State in which they are registered,1 has survived over centuries to remain the overriding 
principle of the law of the sea.  The contemporary fisheries regime, embodied in the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC),2 adopts the principle of flag State jurisdiction 
in article 91.3  While this principle is subject to a number of conditions, including those laid down 
by the LOSC,4 such conditions have proven difficult to enforce.  Today, as was the case in the 
era prior to adoption of the LOSC, the regulation of the activities of high seas5 fishing vessels 
resides first and foremost with the jurisdiction of the flag State.  
 
The notion of flag State jurisdiction originated with the theories of Hugo Grotius, first espoused in 
1608 through his publication Mare Liberum.6  Grotius posited that the world’s marine resources 
were ‘vast, limitless and inexhaustible of use’7 and as such, they could not be owned.  He 
reasoned that if no State could occupy the seas, they could not be possessed and therefore 
regulation of fish stocks would be highly impractical, if not impossible.8  As such, the rule of the 
‘freedom of the seas’,9 whereby global fisheries resources are considered free to all, was born.  
 
The freedom to fish on the high seas is granted to all States whether coastal or landlocked.10    
Upon the registration of a vessel by a certain State, that State gains exclusive jurisdiction over 
the vessel’s activities in international waters.11  Similarly, once granted the nationality of a flag 
State, a vessel is at liberty to take from the ‘common pool’ resources of the high seas.12  
However the application of this freedom has become increasingly dangerous as the exhaustible 
nature of fish stocks has been realised.13 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 If a vessel is fishing on the high seas, ‘the flag State has the exclusive responsibility for controlling the activities of the vessel.’  
See Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries (2010) 110. 
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 
16 November 1994).  
3 Ibid article 91. 
4 Ibid articles 91, 94. 
5 Article 86 of the LOSC defines the high seas as ‘...all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in 
the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.’  
6 Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas or the Right Which Belongs to the Dutch to Take Part in the East Indian Trade 
(1608), Translated by Ralph Van Deman Magoffin, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1916) (Mare Liberum) 
7 Rosemary Rayfuse, Non-flag State Enforcement in High Seas Fisheries (2004) 19. 
8 Gail Lugten, 'Galleons, Greed and Grotius' (2006)  Australia & New Zealand Law & History E-Journal 1 
<http://www.anzlhsejournal.auckland.ac.nz/pdfs_2006/Others_2_Lugten.pdf> at 12 December 2011. 
9 LOSC, above n 2, article 87(1). 
10 Ibid articles 87, 90. 
11 Ibid article 91. 
12 Justice John Middleton, 'Ship Registration and the Role of the Flag' (Paper presented at the Admiralty Education, 2007). 
Presentation available on line at < http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/how/admiralty_papersandpublications.html> 
13 Lugten, above n 8, 6. 
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In January 2011, the Twenty-ninth meeting of the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) Committee on Fisheries (COFI-29)14 was presented with a report entitled, 
“The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture - 2010” (SOFIA-2010).15  The report indicated that 
around 50 percent of global marine fish stocks are fully exploited,16 whereas around 32 per cent 
of global marine fish stocks are classified as overexploited, depleted or recovering from 
depletion.17  As a result, today, only 15 percent of global marine fish stocks are estimated to be 
underexploited or moderately exploited.18 
 
These figures demonstrate that the conception of the high seas as being ‘free to all’ has resulted 
in global marine fish stocks falling victim to the ‘tragedy of the commons’.19 It was Garrett Hardin 
who, in the 1960s, first articulated the phenomenon which occurs when many people have 
access to, ‘a desired but limited resources that nobody owns or nobody can control’20.  In a 
fisheries context, this phenomenon has resulted from individual States or individual fishers acting 
in their own self interest rather than for the common good.  Hardin proposed that in such a 
situation, all will eventually lose as the resource is depleted.21  
 
Arguably then, the very factors that provide the foundation of the contemporary law of the sea 
regime, including the freedom to fish, flag State jurisdiction and common resource allocation, are 
the same factors that have contributed to the collapse of global fisheries.  As a result, a complex 
global regulatory framework of organisations, treaties, non-binding international agreements and 
private arrangements has been created.22  This system has recently been described as a, 
‘decentralised but still relatively coherently co-ordinated system’23 of production, trade and 
governance which has become increasingly globalised in recent years.24 
 
In this challenging and complex fisheries environment, a particular group of organisations, which 
provide the subject of this thesis, operate as a mechanism through which States can cooperate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 COFI meets biennially to review issues of an international character and to discuss the program of work of FAO in fisheries 
and aquaculture. See Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations: Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, COFI: 
Committee on Fisheries (2011) <http://www.fao.org/fishery/about/cofi/en> at 15 December 2010. 
15 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2010 (Rome: 
2010). 
16 Ibid 8. SOFIA-2010 recognises stocks as ‘fully exploited’ when they are at or close to their maximum sustainable productions. 
17 Ibid.  SOFIA-2010 reports that 28 percent of marine fish stocks are estimated to be overexploited, 3 percent depleted and 1 
percent recovering from depletion. 
18 FAO, above n 15. 
19 Garret Hardin, 'The Tragedy of the Commons' (1968) 162 Science 1234. 
20 Callum Roberts, The Unnatural History of the Sea (2007) 106. 
21 Ibid 107. 
22  Martin Tsamenyi et al, 'Fairer Fishing?  The Impact on Developing Countries of the European Community Regulation on 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fisheries' (Economic Paper No 86 in the Commonwealth Economic Paper Series, 
Commonwealth Secretariat, 2009) 6. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid 4. 
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in the interest of conserving and managing marine living resources.25   These organisations, 
known as ‘regional fisheries management organisations’ (RFMOs), operate as key actors in the 
global framework of coastal states, flag states, fishing states, port states, inspecting states, 
market states, fishing fleets and companies, intergovernmental organisations and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs).26   
 
RFMOs have been defined by FAO as, ‘intergovernmental fisheries organisations or 
arrangements…that have the competence to establish fisheries conservation and management 
measures’.27   They are established via convention or agreement between States with a common 
interest in fishing a specific area on the high seas or fishing for a specific species therein.   It is 
their unique ability to develop conservation measures to which States Parties must adhere that 
sets RFMOs apart from another group of fisheries organisations which operate in respect of high 
seas fisheries:28 regional fisheries bodies29 (RFBs). On an institutional level, RFMOs provide the 
basis for international cooperation in the global effort to conserve high seas fish stocks and 
preserve the vital marine ecosystems that exist in these areas. 
 
While many RFMOs operate in a specified area of the high seas,30 others have a more specific 
mandate to regulate certain species of fish stocks on the high seas alone (see Table 1).31  To 
date, RFMOs have been established to regulate fishing for species ranging from Antarctic krill32 
in the southern ocean, to Atlantic tuna;33 with global coverage of the world’s oceans a priority for 
the FAO (see Figure 1).34  To this end, several new RFMOs have been adopted in recent years, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Michael W Lodge et al, Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: Report of an 
Independent Panel to Develop a Model for Improved Governance by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, (2007) 1.  
26 Tsamenyi, above n 22. 
27 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, adopted by consensus at the Twenty-fourth Session of COFI, Rome, Italy, adopted on 23 
June 2001 at the 102th Session of the FAO Council. 
28 Judith Swan, 'Decision-Making in Regional Fishery Bodies or Arrangements: the Evolving Role of RFBs and International 
Agreement on Decision-Making Processes' (FAO Fisheries Circular  - C995, 2004).  Available on line at 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/Y5357E/y5357e00.HTM> 
29 For a complete list of regional fisheries bodies in existence see United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the 
Sea website: <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/Links/IGO-links-fish.htm>  
30  RFMOs such as the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) for instance operate 
within an Area defined by the agreement.  For CCAMLR’s boundaries see Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources, Convention Area Map (2011) <http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/conv/map.htm> at 12 September 2010. 
31 The Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), for instance, was established to address the 
impact that overfishing was having on a particular species.  See Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, 
About the Commission (2010) <http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/about.html> at 5 September 2010. 
32 The conservation of Antarctic krill, or Euphausia superba, was a motivating factor in the establishment of the CAMLR 
Convention.  See Australian Antarctic Division, Krill: Magicians of the Southern Ocean (2010) 
<http://www.antarctica.gov.au/about-antarctica/fact-files/animals/krill/krill-magicians-of-the-southern-ocean> at 15 September 
2010. 
33 International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Introduction (2010) <http://www.iccat.int/en/introduction.htm> 
at 10 September 2010. 
34 Committee on Fisheries, 'Strengthening Regional Fisheries Management Organisations and their Performance Including the 
Outcome of the 2007 Tuna RFMOs Meeting' (Paper presented at the Twenty Seventh Session of the Committee on Fisheries, 
Rome, Italy, 5 - 9 March 2007) 2. 
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including one to regulate the deep-sea fisheries of the Southern Indian Ocean35 and another to 
span the numerous fisheries that exist in the South Pacific Ocean.36    
 
Figure 1.  Regional Fisheries Bodies and Regional Fisheries Management Organisations37 
 
This thesis is limited to an analysis of the performance of RFMOs to which Australia is a party 
(AusRFMOs).  The AusRFMOs examined in this thesis include: 
• the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR),  
• the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT),  
• the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), and 
• the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC).   
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the term ‘AusRFMO’ will also include the South Indian Ocean 
Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA) and the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisation (SPRFMO).   
 
This decision is justified in that while Australia has not yet ratified the SIOFA, Australia has 
played crucial role in the negotiation of this instrument and may extend this involvement in the 
coming years.  The SPRFMO is considered as an AusRFMO even though it has not entered into 
force for the same reasons.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement entered into force in August 2010.  Fish Information and Services, Southern 
Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement Comes into Force (2010) 
<http://fis.com/fis/worldnews/worldnews.asp?l=e&country=0&special=&monthyear=&day=&id=37823&ndb=1&df=0> at 30 
August 2010. 
36 The South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) has not yet entered into force but the agreement 
has been concluded.  See South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation, Welcome to the South Pacific RFMO 
(2010) <http://www.southpacificrfmo.org/> at 30 August 2010. 
37 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Regional Fisheries Bodies (2011) 
<http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/en> at 2 January 2010. 
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Table. 1.  Regional Fisheries Management Organisations Currently in Force38  
(RFMOs considered in this thesis highlighted in bold) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 This table is adapted from one contained in a briefing paper published by Michael Lodge.  For the purposes of this thesis, the 
International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission (IBSFC) has not been included as it has been defunct since January 2006 and the 
Asian Pacific Fishery Commission has not been included as this organisations does not have the competence to establish 
conservation and management measures.  See Michael Lodge, 'Managing International Fisheries: Improving Fisheries 
Governance by Strengthening Regional Fisheries Management Organizations' (Briefing Paper 07/01, Energy, Environment and 
Development Programme, Chatham House, 2007). 
39 2009 is the date of signature of the SPRFMO. This Agreement has not yet entered into force.  See South Pacific Regional 
Fisheries Management Organisation, Welcome to the South Pacific RFMO (2010) <http://www.southpacificrfmo.org/> at 30 
August 2010. 
Date of Entry 
Into Force 
Regional Fisheries Management Organisation Acronym 
1923 International Pacific Halibut Commission IPHC  
1946 International Whaling Commission IWC  
1950 Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission IATTC  
1952 General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean  GFCM  
1969 International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas ICCAT  
1979 Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization NAFO  
1982 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources 
CCAMLR  
1982 North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission NEAFC  
1983 North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization NASCO  
1985 Pacific Salmon Commission PSC  
1993 North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission NPAFC  
1994 Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna CCSBT 
1996 Convention on the Conservation and Management of the Pollock 
Resources in the Central Bering Sea 
CCBSP  
1996 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission IOTC  
2003 South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization SEAFO  
2004 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission WCPFC  
200939 South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation SPRFMO 
2010 South Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement SIOFA  
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In a modern fisheries context, reliance on RFMOs to recover species from the brink of extinction 
and to better regulate fish stocks for which they are responsible continues to grow.40  However 
RFMOs must function under international principles established via the LOSC including the basic 
principle of flag State jurisdiction.  In this way, RFMO effectiveness is limited by the individual 
interests of States Parties and over the years, States have demonstrated a lack of political will to 
conserve the world’s fish stocks.  As a result, RFMOs have struggled to meet expectations of 
their regulatory capacity and their effectiveness has been challenged. 
 
This chapter analyses how the international regime has evolved to impose new expectations on 
RFMOs. The first section of this chapter explores the evolution of the international fisheries 
regime to demonstrate how the role of RFMOs has changed with time.  It argues that prior to the 
introduction of the LOSC, the main function of RFMOs was to preserve or improve the fishing 
rights of individual States but that the advent of the contemporary law of the sea regime created 
a new role for RFMOs.   The second section of the chapter outlines the objective, structure and 
significance of this thesis. 
 
1.2  Fisheries management prior to the introduction of the contemporary law of the sea 
regime 
 
The inaccessible nature of global marine resources was significantly reduced with the 
development of superior fishing technology in the early 1900s.41  The transition of many vessels 
from sail to steam power ‘changed all the rules of fishing’,42 with steam-powered vessels having 
no need to wait for wind or tide conditions to be favourable in order to fish.43   With this 
introduction, individuals were able to extend their fishing practices well beyond immediate coastal 
areas and the first early examples of States realising their competing interests in a single fishery 
arose.  
 
In 1923, the International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC) was established by a Convention 
between the governments of Canada and the United States of America.44   Originally named the 
‘International Fisheries Commission’ in recognition of the non-existence of other international 
fisheries bodies,45 the IPHC sought to manage stocks of Pacific Halibut (Hippoglossus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 An example of increasing reliance on RFMOs can be seen in the September 2009 decision of European Union Member 
States not to implement an international ban on exports of Atlantic bluefin tuna.  This decision placed the survival of this 
depleted species solely within the ambit of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).  See 
World Fishing Today, Commission statement on the decision by member States not to support Monaco's proposal to ban 
international trade in Atlantic bluefin tuna (2009) <http://www.worldfishingtoday.com/news/default.asp?nyId=4079> at 24 
September 2009. 
41 Lodge et al, above n 25, 2. 
42 Roberts, above n 20, 147. 
43 Ibid. 
44 International Pacific Halibut Commission, About IPHC (2009) <http://www.iphc.washington.edu/halcom/about.htm> at 8 
August 2009. 
45 Ibid. 
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stenolepis) harvested by both Canada and the USA.  The original mandate of the IPHC was to 
permit the optimum utilisation of stocks of Pacific Halibut so that the maximum benefit could be 
derived by both States equally.46  While the preservation of the species may have been 
motivated by the economic interest of the parties concerned, the IPHC represents the first 
example of a RFMO being created to conserve depleted deep sea resources.47   
 
With growing realisation of the conflicting fisheries interests of States, the newly created FAO 
took steps to implement several regional fisheries organisations.48   In 1952, the International 
Law Commission (ILC) recommended that an obligation be imposed on States to accept, ‘any 
system of regulation of fisheries in any area of the high seas which an international authority, to 
be created within the framework of the United Nations, shall prescribe as being essential for the 
purpose of protecting the fishing resources of that area...’49   
 
In 1955, the Rome Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the 
Sea50 (the Rome Conference) developed the findings of the ILC and concluded that international 
conservation organisations should be established to assist in the conservation of marine living 
resources.51  It was at the Rome Conference that the idea that international cooperation could be 
achieved through the establishment of regional conventions regulating a specific oceanic area or 
species of fish was first explored.52   
 
The concept of regional regulation was developed at the first United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1).53  The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas (the Conservation Convention)54 was adopted at this meeting and 
later became the source of articles 116-120 of the 1982 LOSC.55  Article 4 of the Conservation 
Convention states that where the nationals of two or more countries are engaged in fishing for 
the same stocks, they shall enter into negotiations with a view to agreeing upon measures to 
conserve the living resources affected.56   
 
Further to this, article 1(2) of the Conservation Convention provides that all States, ‘have the duty 
to adopt, or to cooperate with other States in adopting, such measures for their respective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Ibid.  
47 Ibid.  
48 Gail Lugten, 'Cooperation and Regional Fisheries Management' (2000) 30 Environmental Policy and Law 251, 4. 
49 Alan E. Boyle and David Freestone, International Law and Sustainable Development (1999) 115. 
50 'Report of the International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea (1955)' (UN Doc. 
A/CONF.10/6, 1955). 
51 Lodge et al, above n 41, 2. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Tullio Treves and Laura Pineschi, The Law of the Sea: the European Union and its Member States (1997) 41. 
54 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, opened for signature 29 April 1958, 559 
UNTS 285, (entered into force 20 March 1966). 
55 Treves and Pineschi, above n 53. 
56 Conservation Convention, above n 54. 
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nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas.’57  
While the specific requirement that States cooperate through regional organisations was not 
included until the compilation of the LOSC in 1982, these provisions formed the basis for the 
contemporary fisheries regime.  
 
With the implementation of the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the mid to 
late 1970s,58  the need for States to negotiate fisheries arrangements to preserve the interests of 
distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) became apparent.59  EEZs bought 90-95% of the world’s 
fisheries under the national jurisdiction of coastal States and prompted a huge shift in the manner 
in which fish stocks were regulated.60  By 1977, most States were exploring their new boundaries 
and tension between DWFNs and coastal States increased.61  Despite these tensions, 
cooperation through the creation of RFMOs in the years leading up to the 1982 LOSC was not 
widespread.62   
 
1.3 The evolution of RFMOs under international law 
 
The contemporary conception of RFMOs as being at the heart of international fisheries 
management63 is a notion which has evolved with the introduction of significant fisheries 
agreements following the creation of the LOSC.  While the LOSC remains the most significant 
development in the modern law of the sea, it has become clear in the years following the creation 
of this agreement that its provisions have been insufficient to prevent the decline of fish stocks, 
particularly those in existence on the high seas.   
 
This section determines how and why RFMOs evolved to fill the gaps in the international regime 
by analysing the provisions of the four major hard law64 fisheries instruments,65 as well as one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57Ibid article 1(2). 
58 Lodge et al, above n 25, 2. 
59 High Seas Task Force (2006). Closing the net: Stopping illegal fishing on the high seas. Governments of Australia, Canada, 
Chile, Namibia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, WWF, ICUN and the Earth Institute at Colombia University 40. 
60 Quentin Hanich and Professor Martin Tsamenyi, 'Exclusive Economic Zones, Distant Water Fishing Nations and Pacific Small 
Island Developing States: Who Really Gets All the Fish?' (Paper presented at the Sharing the Fish Conference, Perth, Western 
Australia, March 2006). 
61 Lodge et al, above n 25, 3. 
62 Prior to the introduction of the LOSC in 1982, only five RFMOs were in existence: the General Fisheries Commission for the 
Mediterranean (GFCM, 1952), the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC, 1950), the International Convention for 
the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT, 1969), the International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC, 1923) and the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO, 1979).   
63 Lodge et al, above n 25, ‘Foreword’. 
64 “Hard law” instruments are classified by their legally binding nature.  Jon Birger Skjærseth, Olav Schram Stokke and Jørgen 
Wettestad, 'Soft Law, Hard Law and Effective Implementation of International Environmental Norms' (2006) 6(3) Global 
Environmental Politics 104. 
65 The four major hard law instruments are identified by Palma, Tsamenyi and Edeson as including the LOSC, FAO Compliance 
Agreement, UNFSA and the Port State Measures Agreement.  Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William Edeson, 
Promoting Sustainable Fisheries (2010) 57. 
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important soft law66 instrument.67  This section demonstrates that expectations that these 
organisations would, ‘rescue the bulk of the world’s fisheries from the tragedy of the commons’68 
were perhaps unrealistic in light of their limited mandates and cooperative foundation.  
 
1.3.1 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
 
The LOSC is the founding agreement of the contemporary international fisheries regime and was 
formulated in an era of growing concern over the finite nature of marine living resources.69  It 
establishes a comprehensive legal regime which requires States to cooperate in the conservation 
and management of specific stocks70 and establishes the sovereignty of flag States on the high 
seas.71  The LOSC urges all States to take action at sub-regional, regional and global levels to 
protect and preserve the marine environment.72  This foundational agreement is today regarded 
as a ‘framework Convention’ in that it articulates core legal principles but is unable to provide for 
an effective management regime.73  As a result, a plethora of hard and soft law instruments have 
been developed post-LOSC to address difficulties in the enforcement of its provisions.   
 
The freedom to fish is embodied in article 87 of the LOSC.74  This freedom is granted on the 
condition that States adhere to other provisions in the LOSC and is subject to customary rules of 
international law.75  The freedom must also be exercised, ‘with due regard for the interests of 
other States’76 and in accordance with the provisions of Part XI, Section 2 of the LOSC.   Section 
2 of Part XI contains articles 117 and 118 of the LOSC which provide, inter alia, that it is the duty 
of States to cooperate in the conservation and management of marine living resources on the 
high seas.   
 
In articles 63 and 64, the LOSC requires States to cooperate via appropriate subregional or 
regional organisations77 and appropriate international organisations.78  In articulating the duty to 
cooperate, article 118 also provides that States are to cooperate to, ‘establish subregional and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 “Soft law” refers to international norms that are non-legally binding by nature but still have legal relevance.  See Jon Birger 
Skjærseth, Olav Schram Stokke and Jørgen Wettestad, 'Soft Law, Hard Law and Effective Implementation of International 
Environmental Norms' (2006) 6(3) Global Environmental Politics 104. 
67 The IPOA-IUU will also be considered in this section.  
68 Lodge et al, above n 25, ‘Foreword’. 
69 Denzil Miller and Erik Molenaar, 'The SEAFC Convention: A Comparative Analysis in a Developing Coastal State 
Perspective' (2006) 20 Ocean Yearbook 305, 361. 
70 LOSC, above n 2, articles 63 and 64.  
71 Ibid article 91. 
72 Miller and Molenaar, above n 6969, 362. 
73 Gail Lugten, 'The Role of National Governments in Implementing Criteria and Actions for Flag State Performance' (Paper 
presented at the Expert Consultation on Flag State Performance, Rome, Italy, 23 - 26 June 2009) 24. 
74 Article 87.1.(e) establishes the freedom of fishing as being subject to conditions laid down in section 2 of the LOSC.  
75 Rosemary Rayfuse, 'Countermeasures and High Seas Fisheries Enforcement' (2004) LI Netherlands International Law 
Review 4153. 
76 LOSC, above n 2, article 87(2). 
77 Ibid article 63.   
78 Ibid article 64.  
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regional fisheries organisations’ to conserve and manage the living marine resources of the high 
seas.  
 
Despite outlining the main function of RFMOs, the LOSC fails to explain how RFMOs are to go 
about allocating the relative fishing rights of States.  This lacuna has been the cause of 
substantial disagreement within RFMOs and has even prevented the acceptance of scientifically 
sound catch quotas within certain RFMOs.79  No provision is made for the internal enforcement 
of RFMO conservation measures and as participation in RFMOs remains voluntary, there is little 
that individual RFMOs can do to ensure that their measures will have their intended effect.80   
 
1.3.2  The FAO Compliance Agreement 
 
In the decade following the creation of the LOSC, a vast gap in the regulatory regime emerged.  
As a result, in 1993, the ‘Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas’ (FAO Compliance Agreement)81 
was created.  A binding agreement, the FAO Compliance Agreement was established to 
strengthen the requirement that States only register vessels over which they are able to exercise 
effective control.82  As such, it was hoped that the FAO Compliance Agreement would solve the 
problem of ‘reflagging’ of vessels which is a key mechanism through which illegal, unreported 
and unregulated (IUU) fishing operations are carried out.  
 
The FAO Compliance Agreement specifies measures that flag States must implement to ensure 
that their vessels do not undermine the conservation and management measures of RFMOs.83  It 
provides that flag States must take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that fishing 
vessels entitled to fly their flag comply with the regulatory authority of RFMOs.84  The FAO 
Compliance Agreement also requires Parties to cooperate in the implementation of the 
Agreement, particularly with regards to information sharing.  
 
While the FAO Compliance Agreement constitutes a significant step towards clarifying the 
provisions of the LOSC, this Agreement has suffered a similar fate to that of many other hard and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 In the fishing period spanning 1997 – 2003, the CCSBT was unable to establish quota allocations for its contracting States. 
Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, Part Two, Report of the Independent Expert, September 2008.  
Available on line at 
<http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_15/PerformanceReview_IndependentExpertsReport.pdf>   
80 Pedro Pintassilgo et al, 'Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organisations' (Working Paper No 
20/2008, Coalition Theory Network Working Papers, 2008). 
81 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the 
High Seas, opened for signature 24 November 1993, 2221 UNTS 39486 (entered into force 24 April 2003). 
82 High Seas Task Force, above n 59, 54. 
83 Peter Flewwelling, Recent Trends in Monitoring Control and Surveillance Systems for Capture Fisheries (2003) 17. 
84 FAO Compliance Agreement, above n 81, article III(a). 
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soft international treaties introduced post-LOSC: insufficient ratification by flag States.85  As a 
result, the impact of its provisions has been limited. 
 
1.3.3 The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement 
 
Following the creation of the FAO Compliance Agreement, it became clear that the management 
of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks had still not been adequately addressed in the legal 
framework and that these stocks had been subjected to heavy overexploitation.86  In 1995, the 
‘Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks’ 87 (UNFSA) was formulated to promote the long-term conservation 
and sustainable use of straddling and highly migratory stocks.88  The fundamental purpose of the 
UNFSA is to implement the provisions of the LOSC relating to these specific stocks and to 
ensure that no area of the high seas remains unregulated.89  
 
UNFSA extends the ambit of RFMOs to regulate fisheries within areas of national jurisdiction as 
well as on the high seas.90  It lists the matters upon which States are to agree in order to achieve 
the long term sustainability of fisheries and in doing so, defines the desirable characteristics of 
RFMOs.91  To this end, Part III of UNFSA contains detailed provisions about the duty to 
cooperate and elaborates the manner in which this duty is to be given effect.  UNFSA provides 
that States are required to give effect to their duty to cooperate by becoming members of 
relevant RFMOs.92  It goes on to state that where no ‘subregional or regional fisheries 
management organization or arrangement’ exists to conserve a straddling or highly migratory fish 
stock, States shall cooperate to establish such an organisation.93  
 
However, UNFSA provides that this duty cannot be discharged by flag States merely through the 
creation of an RFMO.   It requires that States not only become members of RFMOs, but also that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 This low level of ratification can in part be explained by the fact that the European Community’s ratification of the Compliance 
Agreement was counted as one acceptance for its members whereas other international agreements, including the UNFSA, 
have included the individual ratifications of European Community members.  
86 Ibid. 
87 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for 
signature 4 December 1995, 2167 UNTS 88 (entered into force 11 December 2001). 
88 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Summary of the Eighth Round of Informal Consultations of State Parties to the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement (2009) <http://www.iisd.ca/vol07/enb0764e.html> at 24 August 2009. 
89 Ibid.  
90 Michael Lodge, 'Managing International Fisheries: Improving Fisheries Governance by Strengthening Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations' (Briefing Paper 07/01, Energy, Environment and Development Programme, Chatham House, 
2007) 3. 
91 Ibid.  Lodge articulates a list of items upon which States should agree including: “agreement on conservation and 
management measures to ensure long-term sustainability; agreement on participatory rights such as allocations of allowable 
catch or levels of fishing effort; agreement on decision-making procedures which facilitate the adoption of conservation and 
management measures in a timely and effective manner; and agreement on mechanisms for obtaining scientific advice and 
ensuring compliance with and enforcement of conservation and management measures.” 
92 UNFSA, above n 87, article 8(3).  
93 Ibid article 8(5). 
 	   23	  
they participate in and respect the conservation measures imposed by the RFMO concerned.94   
This requirement applies to members of RFMOs and non-members alike and establishes that 
where a State persistently fails to comply with UNFSA, it will be in breach of the duty to 
cooperate.95   
 
UNFSA is regarded as a progressive agreement in that it places RFMOs at the heart of 
international fisheries management.96  Unfortunately, many States who are parties to the LOSC 
have yet to sign on as parties to the UNFSA.97  This has been attributed to the inclusion of 
effective enforcement mechanisms coupled with a lack of contemporary political will to seriously 
address the problem of IUU fishing.98  As a result, high seas fisheries have continued to decline 
since the inception of this Agreement.99  
 
1.3.4 The Port States Agreement 
 
The most recent international agreement of significance to this thesis is the ‘Agreement on Port 
State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
FAO Port State Measures Agreement’ (PSM Agreement)100 which was formulated in August 
2009 under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution.101  Prior to the introduction of the PSM 
Agreement, different States elected to adopt different standards and conditions of entry with 
regard to their ports.102  The overall objective of the PSM Agreement is to establish common 
procedures for inspection and agreed measures against IUU fishing vessels.103  
 
The PSM Agreement does this by aiming to prevent IUU catches from being offloaded and 
entering the market.104  The PSM Agreement implements a consistent approach to: 
 
Cooperation and exchange of information among national authorities and States, requirements for prior 
entry into port, use of ports, port inspection procedures, training  of inspectors, the role of flag States, 
requirements of developing States, dispute settlement, dealing with non-parties, and monitoring and 
review of the implementation of the agreement.105 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Ibid, article 8(6). 
95 Ibid, articles 7, 8(4). 
96 Lodge et al, above n 25, “Foreword”. 
97 At the time of writing there are 159 State parties to the LOSC and only 75 State parties to UNFSA.  Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin, Summary of the Eighth Round of Informal Consultations of State Parties to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (2009) 
<http://www.iisd.ca/vol07/enb0764e.html> at 24 August 2009. 
98 Denzil Miller, Eugene Sabourenkov and David Ramm, 'Managing Antarctic Marine Living Resources: The CCAMLR 
Approach' (2004) 19(3) The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 317. 
99 Lodge et al, above n 25, “Foreword”. 
100 Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Adopted in 
November 2009 by the FAO Conference at its Thirty-sixth Session through Resolution No 12/2009, under Article XIV, 
paragraph 1 of the FAO Constitution. 
101 Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries (2010) 64. 
102 Ibid 63. 
103 Ibid 64. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
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If widely ratified, the PSM Agreement will assist RFMOs in developing procedure and 
conservation measures to combat IUU fishing. 
 
1.3.5 The International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported 
and Unregulated Fishing  
 
The ‘International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing’106 (IPOA-IUU) provides an important soft law reinforcement of the 
cooperative function of RFMOs in the specific context of a global fisheries problem.  The IPOA-
IUU defines a RFMO as, ‘an intergovernmental fisheries organization or arrangement, as 
appropriate that has the competence to establish fishery conservation and management 
measures.’107  It confirms the provisions of UNFSA by providing that States have a duty to 
cooperate with RFMOs and that this cooperation should occur directly through RFMOs to 
prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing.108  If States refuse to participate in a RFMO, they 
should ensure their vessels do not undermine measures adopted by RFMOs.109   
 
The role played by RFMOs under international law is reflected in paragraphs 78 – 84 of the 
IPOA-IUU.110  These paragraphs recognise that cooperation by all States is vital for the success 
of measures taken by RFMOs and that States that are not members to RFMOs are not 
discharged from their obligation to cooperate.111  The IPOA-IUU also requires States, acting 
through RFMOs, to strengthen and develop new ways to combat IUU fishing in conformity with 
international law.112  
 
The IPOA-IUU also provides that RFMOs should encourage non-members with a real interest in 
the fishery concerned to become members or should at least develop ways to facilitate 
cooperation by non-members in the work of RFMOs.113  It makes repeated reference to the 
manner in which the institutional mechanisms of RFMOs might be strengthened114 to encourage 
and facilitate participation by non-contracting parties.115  However, as the IPOA-IUU is voluntary 
by nature, uncooperative flag States threaten the effectiveness of its provisions.  Regardless, the 
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IPOA-IUU provides an important benchmark for States to meet through their adoption of the 
conservation measures of RFMOs, flag State measures and port State measures.116   
 
1.4  Objective of the thesis 
 
A lack of political will from flag States to conserve and manage the living resources of the high 
seas has challenged the effectiveness of RFMOs.  Non-compliance by flag States with the 
regulatory function of these organisations and their obligations under international law continues 
to prevent the sustainable management of global fisheries.  The objective of this thesis is to 
identify the compliance enforcement mechanisms that are available under the regional fisheries 
regime to combat acts of non-compliance and to determine how they are being implemented by 
RFMOs to which Australia is a party. 
 
In order to achieve this objective, the thesis asks whether RFMOs themselves are capable of 
taking action against non-compliance.  A qualitative analysis of AusRFMOs is conducted to 
identify which compliance enforcement mechanisms are currently in place as well any future 
compliance initiatives being investigated by these organisations.  Using this data, the thesis 
analyses the degree of implementation of the different mechanisms in the six RFMOs under 
examination to determine how compliance enforcement in AusRFMOs can be improved.  
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
 
This introductory chapter has provided a background to the development of RFMOs under 
international law and has highlighted how non-compliance with the international regime is 
presented as a significant challenge to the sustainability of global fisheries.  It has shown that 
there exists a heavy weight of expectation on RFMOs to facilitate cooperation from non-
contracting parties, to develop strong institutional measures to improve cooperation and to 
regulate fisheries both within and outside national jurisdictions.  It has demonstrated that in the 
contemporary law of the sea regime, the obligations of States, both members and non-members 
of RFMOs, have also grown.   
 
Chapter 2 - This chapter introduces the problem of non-compliance.  It does so by conducting a 
study of one of the key problems arising from flag State non-compliance: the problem of IUU 
fishing.  It begins by exploring the four key causes of IUU fishing including fleet overcapacity, the 
declaration of EEZs, the weaknesses of the international regime and the “common pool” nature 
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of global fish stocks.  The chapter goes on to consider the theory behind non-compliance to 
pinpoint why States choose not to comply. 
 
Chapter 3 - The third chapter identifies and categorises nine key compliance enforcement 
mechanisms available to RFMOs in an effort to highlight their range and scope.  The list 
includes: cooperative policies, policies relating to non-contracting parties, policies relating to 
cooperating parties, vessel lists, requests and negotiations, diplomatic demarches, trade-related 
measures, graded sanctions and boarding, inspection and arrest.  The membership problem is 
also considered to highlight the different types of membership and differing obligations 
associated with the level of State membership. 
 
Chapter 4 - Working from the established list of compliance enforcement mechanisms outlined in 
Chapter 3, Chapter 4 presents the results of a study into the individual mechanisms adopted by 
the six AusRFMOs under examination.  It begins by providing background information into each 
AusRFMO and then outlines the compliance enforcement mechanisms the individual RFMO has 
adopted in their founding text, in conservation measures and future compliance initiatives 
currently underway.  
 
Chapter 5 - This chapter constitutes the analytical element of this thesis in its examination of the 
findings of Chapter 4.  Chapter 5 tabulates the findings of Chapter 4 and then analyses the level 
of implementation by AusRFMOs of each of the compliance enforcement mechanisms under 
examination through the provision of a second table.  The second section of the chapter 
considers the need for more uniform implementation of mechanisms such as trade-related 
measures, graded sanctions and policies relating to non-contracting parties in AusRFMOs to 
adopt a consistent approach to non-compliance.    
 
Chapter 6 - Chapter 6 considers the problem of a lack of uniformity in AusRFMOs and the 
difficulties associated with maintaining compliance on a regional level.  It proposes that a solution 
may be found in the provisions of the LOSC and argues that the duty to cooperate, if clarified via 
international dispute resolution, may strengthen the role of RFMOs.  This chapter examines the 
potential for an advisory opinion to be bought before the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea (the Tribunal) and considers how a favourable outcome may deter non-compliance by flag 
States.   
 
Chapter 7 - The final chapter of this thesis submits some general conclusions on how 
AusRFMOs might better tackle the problem of non-compliance. It focuses on the need for 
uniformity in approach across RFMOs, wider adoption of trade-related measures and need for a 
paradigm shift to occur in relation to the enforcement capacity of RFMOs.  It is concluded that a 
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perceived lack of legitimacy associated with the conservation measures of RFMOs has 
prevented these organisations from taking significant steps towards enforcing sanctions and 
taking action against flag State non-compliance.  
 
1.6 Significance of the research 
 
This thesis contributes to the wealth of information currently being collected on the performance 
of RFMOs.  It demonstrates that there is significant inconsistency in the type and degree to which 
compliance enforcement mechanisms are currently implemented by AusRFMOs.  This thesis 
also provides a creative insight into the range of compliance enforcement mechanisms available 
to RFMOs and foresees an increase in the use of countermeasures by RFMOs as being 
essential to the future effectiveness of the regional regime.  
 
It is argued that AusRFMOs should adopt a uniform approach to trade-related measures as an 
essential element of effective compliance enforcement.  The thesis provides a legal argument 
based on international fisheries agreements in support of RFMOs having the power to implement 
and enforce sanctions under international law.  It argues that if RFMOs continue to be viewed as 
merely cooperative in function, this undermines the significant developments that have been 
made via the creation of international instruments such as the UNFSA and the IPOA-IUU.   
Finally the thesis explores the idea that international dispute resolution may assist RFMOs in 
strengthening their mandate.  
 
It is submitted that the inability of RFMOs to establish effective compliance enforcement regimes 
has prevented them from fulfilling the role envisaged for them under international law.  This 
thesis demonstrates that the next stage of RFMO development must be for a paradigm shift to 
occur to allow RFMOs to act not only as entities which encourage conservation and make 
regulations regarding this, but to enforce their regulations through whatever means appropriate. 
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CHAPTER 2 
NON-COMPLIANCE: THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED 
FISHING 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
Flag State compliance with the law of the sea is fundamental to the success of the regional 
system of fisheries governance.   Today, a lack of compliance, or more accurately, a lack of 
political will to achieve sustainable fisheries has severely limited the ability of regional fisheries 
management organisations (RFMOs) to fulfil their role under international law.117  The refusal of 
certain flag States to participate in RFMOs despite the continued, and often underhand, 
presence of their vessels in regulated waters has contributed to this problem.118   Non-compliant 
flag State practice has often limited the decision-making function of RFMOs;119 undermining both 
individual RFMO performance and the performance of the regional fisheries regime as a 
whole.120   
One of the most significant problems resulting from non-compliant State practice is the problem 
of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.  A report121 commissioned by the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and authored by Dr. Gail Lugten in 2010 found 
that IUU fishing continues to be the number one concern of regional fisheries organisations 
around the world.122  However the enforcement of, and compliance with, conservation measures 
of RFMOs requires voluntary acceptance and many flag States are unable or unwilling to enforce 
their legal duties in this respect.  As a result, the legal regime has had a limited impact on IUU 
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the Independent Expert, September 2008.  Available on line at 
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vessels flying the flags of non-compliant States on the high seas.123   
This chapter examines the challenges posed by IUU fishing as an introduction to the problem of 
non-compliance.  First, the scope of the IUU fishing problem, its causes and the impacts are 
considered.  Secondly, the chapter examines the motivating factors for States not to comply with 
the regional fisheries regime and the impact that such non-compliance has had on the ability of 
RFMOs to conserve global fisheries resources.  
2.2  Defining the IUU problem and its causes 
At a meeting convened by the FAO in 2008 entitled ‘Expert Workshop on Flag State 
Responsibilities: Assessing Performance and Taking Action’ (the FAO Expert Workshop),124 IUU 
fishing was deemed a crime that, ‘undermines the ability to ensure a level playing field for fishing 
operations’.125  The global phenomenon of IUU fishing has been of international concern since 
the early 1990s.126   The term ‘IUU fishing’ however, was not used to refer to such activities until 
a meeting of CCAMLR in 1997 where it evolved from discussions concerning illegal or non 
CCAMLR-compliant fishing activities.127   
Previously known as ‘unauthorised fishing in zones of national jurisdiction and on the high 
seas’,128 Australia bought the IUU fishing issue to FAO in 1999 which inevitably led to the 
development of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU).129  IUU fishing is now commonly defined using 
the description contained in the IPOA-IUU130, however the IPOA-IUU retains the status of a soft 
law131 instrument and controversy has arisen in recent times concerning the applicability of this 
definition for use in hard law132 international agreements.133  
The IUU fishing problem manifests itself at many different levels and stages of the fishing 
operation.  It can occur within zones of national jurisdiction, within areas regulated by RFMOs, or 
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on the high seas.134  Importantly, however, IUU fishing is not restricted to the act of fishing itself 
and if the real causes of this global problem are to be properly addressed, consideration of more 
than just vessel activities on the world’s oceans is necessary.135   
Davor Vidas136 asserts that the act of IUU fishing constitutes, ‘only one segment of the overall 
problem’137 and that included in our understanding of this term should be the sale of IUU catch 
on the international market and the overall infrastructure of the operation.138  Under Vidas’ 
definition, the ‘infrastructure’ of a fishing operation includes consideration of factors such as the 
registration of vessels to certain flag States and transfer of ownership of a vessel to disguise the 
real beneficial owner.139    
The FAO has recently condemned IUU fishing as, ‘a crime that is committed by both large and 
small operators to gain economic advantage at the expense of responsible resource users or 
operators or at the expense of the health of the resource itself.’140  While this crime was originally 
conceived of as being largely opportunistic by nature,141 IUU fishing today involves a wide range 
of economic transactions and organised syndicates of ownership to stay below the radar.142  As a 
result, the concept of IUU fishing has evolved into something much more complex and difficult to 
control than was originally thought.143  
Several important factors can be identified as having ‘caused’ the proliferation of IUU fishing both 
on the high seas and within areas of national jurisdiction.  These factors include: 
• the overcapacity of fishing fleets,144 
• the declaration of the 200 nm exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of coastal States,145 
• the inherent weakness of the international regulatory regime,146 
• the ‘common pool’ nature of the world’s fish stocks.147 
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It is important to note that although these factors will be considered separately for the purposes 
of this chapter, they are by no means independent causes in their own right and their combined 
effect on the evolution of IUU fishing should be recognised at all times.148  
Overcapacity of fishing fleets 
The term ‘overcapacity’ refers to the presence of too much fishing activity or excessive fishing 
capacity of vessels.149  With the introduction of large scale fishing vessels and advanced fishing 
technology in the 1970’s, FAO estimated that by 1990 the global fishing fleet had doubled.150  
Over the past thirty to forty years there has been a growing recognition that there are too many 
vessels and too few fish.151   In 2007, a meeting of COFI considered the need to bring the global 
fishing capacity in line with a total allowable catch (TAC) and highlighted the relationship 
between excess capacity and IUU fishing.152   
Today, the capacity of global fishing fleets harvesting bluefin tuna153 alone has reached immense 
proportions, with increases in fleet efficiency over the past decade resulting in rampant 
overfishing of this species in the Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea.154  This industry is now facing 
collapse; spurred on not only by the vast overcapacity of bluefin tuna fleets but also by the 
underreporting of catches by certain countries, poor management by RFMOs and economic 
disincentives to remedy the situation.155  
It is clear that the situation facing fishing operators in a contemporary climate is one of increased 
competition for fewer resources.156  In this way, fishing operators hoping to maintain profits in an 
environment of overcapacity may have increasingly resorted to illegal fishing as a viable 
alternative to fishing in accordance with regulatory arrangements.157   
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The declaration of the 200nm exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
Fishing on the high seas has dramatically increased since the adoption of EEZs by coastal 
States in the late 1970s and early 1980s.158  With the declaration of coastal State rights, a vast 
number of restrictions were imposed upon the fishing activities of distant water fishing nations 
(DWFNs) within areas of national jurisdiction.159  Many States were abruptly denied access to the 
fishing grounds in which they had previously made their livelihoods.  An excess capacity of both 
domestic and foreign fishing vessels soon emerged and the failure of many States to adequately 
deal with this oversupply resulted in these vessels being pushed out onto the high seas in search 
of new fishing opportunities.160    
In a devastating example of the impact of EEZ declarations on marine resources of the central 
Bering Sea, vessels that had been displaced from the US EEZ in the mid 1980s began targeting 
concentrations of pollock in an area surrounded by the EEZs of the US and Russia.161  The total 
catches taken from this area, referred to as the ‘Donut (or Doughnut) Hole’, rose from 181 000 
tonnes in 1984 to over 1 million tonnes in 1986.162  By 1993, the total catch had dropped to 2 000 
tonnes due to the impacts of overfishing.163   As there was no specific regulatory regime in place 
determining the TAC for pollock on the high seas, the actions of the displaced vessels fishing in 
this region went unchecked and pollock stocks in the region plummeted.164  
This pattern of exploitation has been played out in fisheries regimes the world over; with fishing 
operators shifting their interest from one resource to another depending upon the commercial 
availability of the stock.165    
The inherent weakness of the international regulatory regime 
As the common property of all States, fish stocks in international waters are owned by no State 
or individual.166  Under this regime, short term profit-motivated fishing practices are encouraged 
and vessel operators have increasingly resorted to illegal fishing.167  While it was hoped that 
improved cooperation and agreement between States through RFMOs would rescue global 
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fisheries from the tragedy of the commons,168 stocks continue to decline due to a lack of political 
will to resolve the problem. In the case of the ‘Donut Hole’, for instance, the Convention on the 
Conservation and Management of the Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea169 was finally 
agreed upon by the interested States two years after the collapse of the fishery.170    
The inherent weaknesses of the international fisheries legal regime are discussed in more detail 
below; however it is important to note at this point that many of the causes of IUU fishing have 
arisen as a result of the ‘consensual nature of international law.’171  Indeed, international law can 
be defined by its consensual characteristics as it exists as a result of agreement between State 
parties.172  Yet the premise of sovereign equality and consensual agreement often belie 
weaknesses within international law as States may choose not to accept obligations undertaken 
by the majority.173  In a regional fisheries context this translates to difficulties in decision making 
within RFMOs, non-compliance with the conservation measures imposed by RFMOs or simply by 
States choosing not to ‘sign up’ to the relevant RFMOs.174  
The ‘common pool’ nature of the world’s fish stocks 
Finally, the root cause of the problem of IUU fishing, and indeed the problem of managing marine 
capture fisheries as a whole, has long been recognised as the ‘common pool’ nature of the 
international fisheries regime.175  Under this regime, the freedom to fish the high seas is granted 
to all States equally and as such the individual fisher has every incentive to regard fisheries 
resources as if they were non-renewable.  In effect, any individual fisher acting to conserve and 
invest in marine resources would be making an unsound and irrational commercial decision.176  
In such a system, the over-exploitation of marine resources will occur unless all States find the 
political will necessary to exercise control over vessels registered to their flag.177   
The net of international agreements developed to eliminate the problem of IUU fishing have so 
far failed to live up to expectations due to a lack of political will to carry the provisions of these 
agreements into affect.178  While there are numerous causes which have led to the prevalence of 
IUU fishing practices, in a regime providing for effective control of the activities of vessels on the 
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high seas, it is unlikely that these causes would have had the devastating impact on marine living 
resources that we see today.179 
 
2.3   The impact of IUU fishing and its operation 
Under article 91.1 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC),180 each State 
holds the power to ‘fix the conditions for the grant of nationality to ships, for the registration of 
ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag.’ The only limitation on this principle under 
article 91.1 is that there must exist a ‘genuine link’ between the flag State and the vessel itself.181  
While there is insufficient scope at this stage for an examination of the debate surrounding the 
‘genuine link’ requirement, it is important to note that it is now generally accepted that action 
taken before the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (the Tribunal) attempting to enforce 
this requirement upon non-compliant flag States is no longer likely to succeed.182 
The problem with the indiscriminate nature of the international registration of vessels is apparent 
in the practice of certain flag States, commonly referred to as ‘flags of convenience’ (FOCs) or, 
more accurately, ‘flags of non-compliance’ (FONC),183 which choose not to regulate the activities 
of their flagged vessels on the high seas.  FONC States either do not have the sufficient capacity 
or interest in agreeing to comply with or participate in the conservation measures imposed by 
RFMOs.184    As a result, vessels registered to these States are under no obligation to fish in 
compliance with the conservation objectives of RFMOs or in a responsible manner as required 
under the LOSC.    
IUU fishing vessels are often identified as being registered to FONC States and are able to avoid 
regulation on the high seas through the actions of non-compliant flag States.185  However the 
difficulties associated with taking action against the real perpetrators of IUU fishing are 
exacerbated by a system of hidden beneficial ownership which underlies most IUU fishing 
operations.186  This system provides the real beneficiaries of IUU fishing with the elements of 
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flexibility and anonymity which are essential to the strength of these operations,187 circumventing 
the requirement that a State maintain a degree of control over ships registered to their flag.188   
 
By registering their vessel to a ‘front’ company located in a FONC State, this entity becomes the 
legal owner of the vessel while having no real vested interest in its operation.  The ‘front’ 
company holds the vessel in name only and the beneficial owner is able to hide behind the 
registered legal activity.189  At law, the connection between these two entities is invisible,190 
thereby maintaining an appearance of legitimacy and allowing the major player in the IUU 
operation to direct the activities of vessels while remaining undetected.   
The combination of both FONC registration and hidden beneficial ownership means that the real 
owners of IUU vessels are able to avoid the regulatory efforts of RFMOs and international 
agreements.191  Today, the FONC system and IUU fishing practices have become inextricably 
linked.192  In 2005, approximately 2 900 large-scale fishing vessels were flagged to one of 14 
open registry States or were listed as ‘flag unknown’.193  While the number of vessels registered 
to the 14 FONC countries decreased by 20% in 2008, there was an overall increase in the 
number of vessels listed as ‘flag unknown’.194  As a result, in 2008 the number of large-scale 
fishing vessels flagged to either a FONC State or listed as ‘flag unknown’ remained high at 2 760 
vessels.195  
A 2008 report by Gianni196 considering the failure of flag States to uphold their responsibilities 
under international law found that Cambodia, Georgia, Mongolia, North Korea, Sierra Leone and 
Togo had registered a combined total of 318 large-scale fishing vessels.197  However none of 
these vessels had been authorised to fish in any of the areas on the high seas regulated by a 
RFMO.198  Gianni comments that the consistent failure of certain flag States to meet their 
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obligations under the current regime, ‘risks rendering the flag State, or flag State sovereignty, a 
notional entity or fiction of international law.’199 
IUU fishing, however, threatens much more than the notion of flag State responsibility. By 
creating vast uncertainty in terms of quotas for fishing operators and depriving coastal States of 
food and fishing opportunities,200 IUU fishing puts the lives and livelihoods of legitimate fishers at 
risk.201  Fish caught by both legal fishers and IUU fishers are sold on the same markets and yet 
legitimate fishers must pay the extra costs of operating within regulatory regimes and in 
compliance with conservation measures.202   
Uncertain estimates of IUU fishing have resulted in increased costs, lower employment, lower 
incomes and lower export revenue for responsible fishing operators.203  Indeed, Norwegian 
scientists estimate that without illegal fishing in their waters, the 2007 quota for Northeast Arctic 
cod would be 85 per cent higher than the actual case204 demonstrating just how dramatically the 
profits of legitimate operators have been affected by IUU fishing.  Studies conducted into the rate 
of IUU fishing and the percentage of catches sacrificed to IUU operations are inherently 
questionable as IUU fishing operates outside any legal regulatory regime.205   
When this inequity is applied to developing countries, however, the impact of IUU fishing is even 
more catastrophic.206   A 2005 report entitled, ‘Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing on Developing Countries: Synthesis Report’, 207 considered the direct impact 
of IUU fishing in 10 developing countries. The report found that in one country alone (Guinea) a 
probable loss of USD $27 million in shrimp catch, $8 million in demersal fish catch and $49 
million in octopus catch was suffered at the hands of IUU operators fishing in coastal waters.208  
Overall, it was estimated that IUU fishing in the 10 countries under examination resulted in a total 
loss of $372 million to developing countries.209  When this loss is considered in terms of the food 
security and the consumption of fish protein by developing States’ coastal populations, the effect 
of IUU fishing is to effectively deprive already poverty stricken fishing communities of a vital food 
source and livelihood.  
Damage to ecosystems and global marine environments as a result of IUU fishing is, in a 
contemporary fishing climate, one of the major obstacles to be addressed in the interests of 
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achieving sustainable fisheries.210  Many commercial fishing operators target predatory species 
such as tuna; in some cases leading to an 80% reduction in tuna populations.211  The exploitation 
and targeting of specific species in this way has resulted in the overfishing of prey species as 
humans adjust their appetites to settle for the less desirable but more commercially available 
prey species.212   
Contributing to this, the thriving aquaculture industry today requires a constant supply of prey to 
be caught and ground into meal to ‘grow’ fish bred within captivity.213  Inevitably, it is not fishing 
practices alone that reduce stocks both on the high seas and within EEZs but also the impact 
that the removal of such fish has on other species that has furthered the crisis of international 
fisheries present today.  It is important to recognise at this point that the threat of climate change 
to the world’s fisheries imposes another layer of uncertainty to scientific studies into the impact of 
overfishing on marine ecosystems.214  
Information remains one of the essential tools in the fight against IUU fishing.215  By adopting a 
precautionary approach216 towards consideration of the significance of research in this area, 
conservation regulations and catch quotas will hopefully reflect the true state of the world’s 
fisheries allowing sustainable fishing practices to continue.  In any case, the ‘complex web of 
relationships in marine ecosystems’ makes predictions concerning fish populations and catch 
quotas very difficult.217   
2.4  Non-compliance 
Today there is growing support for the notion that flag State jurisdiction exists as a presumption 
under international law; one that is rebuttable subject to instances of State non-compliance.218  
This section aims to outline the key motivators behind non-compliance to determine the most 
effective manner in which RFMOs might address the problem.  It is submitted that in many 
cases, a refusal of States to cooperate has been misconstrued as a perceived lack of action on 
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the part of RFMOs219 and that for best practices to be effective, non-compliance must be 
targeted effectively.   
In this thesis, the term ‘non-compliance’ is defined as including a lack of compliance by both 
contracting parties (CPs) and non-contracting parties (NCPs) with the conservation objectives of 
RFMOs and obligations under international law.  The application of the term to States extends to 
instances of non-compliance at all stages of flag State responsibility; including the registration of 
vessels, the record of fishing vessels, and the authorisation to fish.220   In regards to non-
compliance by nationals, such instances may include taking action or inaction that undermines 
the effectiveness of international conservation and management measures. 
This central question posed in the first part of this section is: What motivates States to ignore 
regulations and act in a manner inconsistent with international law?  The key motivators behind 
non-compliant State practices are identified through consideration of why IUU fishing continues 
to occur on the high seas to date.  The causes of IUU fishing will be applied to a theoretical 
framework to explain the behaviour of non-compliant States and individuals.   
2.4.1  The theory of non-compliance in an international context 
From a sociological perspective, Tom Tyler221 argues that there are two basic principles that 
explain why States adopt and implement international laws: the ‘instrumental’ approach and the 
‘normative’ approach.222  The instrumental approach reflects the notion of the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ and recognises that States are primarily driven by self-interest.223  Compliance is 
determined by States’ expectations that sanctions will flow from a violation of regulations and 
therefore their behaviour is dictated by external factors.224  Both nationals and States under this 
view are seen as ‘utility maximising individuals’ who compare the costs of non-compliance (both 
social and economic) to the potential gain to be made from such behaviour.225  Under this 
approach, coercive measures, such as the use of force or removal of fishing privileges, represent 
the only reliable mechanism for ensuring compliance with fisheries regulations.226   
The inherent weakness of the international fisheries regime has led certain States and individuals 
to conclude, on a cost/benefit analysis, that there is more to be gained from fishing outside 
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international regulations than within them.227  The lack of prescription within the LOSC on the 
nature and scope of flag State obligations has made clear and discernable sanctions almost 
impossible to identify.  With the expectation of being apprehended and fined low, the self-interest 
of States continues to encourage non-compliance.228   
 
This reality is drawn into sharp relief through consideration of the vast overcapacity of fishing 
vessels in operation both on the high seas and within EEZs.  Excess capacity has proven an 
extremely powerful driver for IUU fishing with the economic benefits to be derived by non-
compliance great. 229  Fishers are today operating in an environment of increased competition for 
fewer resources230 and without the threat of severe and certain sanctions being imposed for non-
compliant behaviour, the ‘instrumental’ approach has motivated many States and individuals to 
avoid compliance.  
The second theory of compliance, the ‘normative’ perspective, argues that States (and nationals) 
will comply with laws that they consider to be fair, appropriate or legitimate.231 This theory places 
strong emphasis on the internal incentives of compliant behaviour.232  In this way, the personal 
morals and perceptions of the individual fisher or collective State will influence whether they 
comply with international law.233  Under this approach, the perceived ‘legitimacy’ of a law or 
regulation will be the main factor determining compliance by the State or individual.234  
Arguably, the major bar to the perceived legitimacy of international fisheries law has been the 
controversial introduction of EEZs in the late 1970s.235  This introduction stemmed from the 
desire of coastal States to regulate proximate fisheries resources, and in many cases, to gain an 
economic advantage in doing so.236  In declaring EEZs, jurisdiction over 90% of the world’s 
commercial fisheries was transferred to coastal States.237  However for those States which were 
subsequently denied access to these resources, this development was seen as a blatant reversal 
of the freedom to fish.238   
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States such as Spain, which retains a reputation for questionable fishing practices,239 have 
voiced opposition to coastal State management of these waters resulting in tension between 
coastal States and DWFNs.  As a result, the perceived ‘illegitimacy’ of the inclusion of EEZs in 
the LOSC has resulted in non-compliance by many DWFNs, with European Union companies 
among the top profiteers of IUU fishing.240  While the ‘normative’ perspective can be 
demonstrated to have contributed to non-compliance by flag States, it is argued that the 
‘instrumental’ approach, whereby State compliance is dictated by the severity and certainty of 
sanctions, is primarily responsible for the level of non-compliance with international regulations 
that is present to date. It is evident that without political will and commitment by flag States to 
provide the necessary monitoring and surveillance of vessels, there will be little compliance with 
the rules and obligations contained in international fisheries law.241  
2.4.2  The impact of non-compliance on RFMO performance 
In 2005/2006, calls for improved performance by RFMOs were made by numerous international 
organisations. Recognition of the need for better State compliance with the demands of RFMOs 
became widespread with the publication of the final report of the Ministerially-led Task Force on 
IUU Fishing on the High Seas (the High Seas Task Force) in 2005.242  This report, entitled 
‘Closing the Net: Stopping Illegal Fishing on the High Seas’, highlights the need for RFMO reform 
RFMOs and for action to be by States taken on this matter.243  The High Seas Task Force 
advocates a more systematic approach to the review of RFMO performance 244 and encourages 
RFMOs to work together through improved ‘coordination, cooperation and information 
sharing’.245   
The 2006 UNGA Resolution on Sustainable Fisheries246 also notes the need for all States and 
RFMOs to improve cooperation, communication and coordination.247  It urges RFMOs to 
strengthen and modernise their mandates and conservation measures ‘as a matter of priority’.248  
The resolution highlights the need for implementation of the precautionary approach and 
adoption of an ecosystems based approach249 by RFMOs to adopt a long term approach to the 
sustainable use of marine living resources.250  The Resolution urges States to undertake 
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performance reviews which include an element of independent evaluation and are made 
available to the public upon completion.251 
In May 2006, a Review Conference252 mandated under the United Nations Fish Stocks 
Agreement (UNFSA) Article 36 and UNGA Resolution 59/25 of 2004 was convened to propose 
means for strengthening the implementation of UNFSA.253  The Review Conference called for 
updated RFMO mandates to give effect to modern principles of fisheries management254  CPs 
were asked to encourage RFMOs to undergo performance reviews utilising transparent criteria 
so that a clear assessment of the areas needing improvement could be identified.255  The Review 
Conference was instrumental in reaffirming the need for full implementation of the role of RFMOs 
as envisaged under UNFSA256 and prompted action from several RFMOs to strengthen their 
mandates.257  
At the First Joint Tuna RFMOs Meeting258 held in Kobe in 2007, repeated calls for RFMOs to 
conduct transparent and independent performance reviews were addressed.259 Performance 
reviews were requested from each RFMO260 and a set of performance criteria was developed to 
assist RFMOs in conducting reviews.261  It was decided that performance reviews should be 
conducted as soon as practicable by all five RFMOs and that they should be based on the 
common elements of RFMO mandates, best practices of each RFMO and relevant provisions of 
international agreements.262   
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By the time the Second Joint Tuna RFMOs Meeting263 was held in June/July 2009, however, only 
three of the five tuna RFMOs had adopted and implemented the performance criteria and 
completed performance reviews.264  The reviews that were undertaken depicted a stark reality for 
the regulation of fish stocks.  A common history of failed catch quotas and low rates of 
compliance was shared by all three RFMOs under examination and all had also failed in their 
task to conserve a specific species or geographic area of the high seas.    
 
The self-assessment conducted by the Convention on the Conservation of Southern Bluefin 
Tuna (CCSBT) in 2008 revealed that the RFMO had struggled to fulfil its original mandate to 
conserve and optimally utilize southern bluefin tuna (SBT) stocks.265 The review found that the 
RFMO had been faced with significant challenges and had overcome these challenges with only 
limited success. Serious overfishing of SBT and under-reporting of SBT catches in past years 
was found to have undermined the health of the resource and ability of the CCSBT to take 
adequate management measures.266   
This reality was demonstrated in the finding that the CCSBT had failed to reach agreement over 
many years on ‘even the most basic management measures for a single fish stock – a total 
allowable catch...’267  The review states that at its core, the CCSBT is a convention for the 
management of a single fish stock: a scenario that does not reflect a modern scientific 
understanding of ecosystems management or the precautionary approach.268    
Also compiled in 2008, the performance review of the International Commission for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) found that the RFMO’s performance in respect of 
several of the species under its purview did not meet its conservation objectives.269   This was 
thought to be mainly due to a lack of compliance by Contracting Parties (CPs) who had 
consistently failed to provide accurate data in order for conservation measures to be effectively 
imposed.270  The review concluded that the ICCAT Convention needs to be modernised, ‘or 
otherwise supplemented’271 to reflect current approaches to fisheries management.  
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The most recent performance review was conducted by the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission 
(IOTC) in 2009.272  It reported high levels of uncertainty within the IOTC in regards to the status 
of stocks and low levels of compliance by CPs with IOTC conservation measures.273  In 
accordance with the findings of the CCSBT performance review, the IOTC review found that the 
RFMO did not take account of modern principles of fisheries management such as the PA or 
EBM and it did not sufficiently explain flag State obligations in respect of the Commission.274   
Gaping holes in the management regime of this organisation resulted in a finding that the RFMO 
should either be severely amended or replaced by a new instrument altogether.275  Given the 
difficulties associated with achieving consensus in decision making, it seems that the latter 
option, while drastic, appears a more likely or realistic solution to the situation. 
2.5  Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated how the complexity of the IUU fishing problem, combined with 
the weakness of the international fisheries regime, has created a significant disincentive for 
States to conserve global fish stocks.  This disincentive has resulted in many RFMOs struggling 
to fulfil their mandate to conserve and sustainably manage, with the recent performance review 
of certain RFMOs highlighting the need for greater State cooperation in this respect. 
In the modern fisheries context, regional regulation has struggled to perform in accordance with 
the expectations of international fisheries agreements.  Non-compliance by flag States both 
parties to and non-parties to RFMOs has contributed to the IUU fishing problem and threatened 
the effectiveness of these organisations.  While international attention has focussed on RFMOs 
as needing significant reform, this chapter has argued that it is State practice, rather than 
individual RFMO performance, that should remain the target of reform if sustainable fishing 
arrangements are to be secured for future generations.
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CHAPTER 3 
COMPLICANCE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
3.1  Introduction 
The inception of the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA)276 in 1995 reflects a 
commitment on behalf of the international community to strengthen, where needed, regional 
fisheries management organisations (RFMOs).277  This agreement envisages a new role for 
RFMOs by authorising contracting parties (CPs) to take enforcement action against non-
compliance and deter vessels from undermining the conservation measures of these 
organisations.278  In 2001, the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing279 (IPOA-IUU) reinforced UNFSA ideals by providing that 
States, acting through RFMOs, should take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing.280  
The IPOA-IUU also suggests that in taking such action, States should agree to adopt 
‘appropriate measures, through agreed procedures’281 which comply with international law.282   
Three years later, at a meeting of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) in 2004, it was decided that: ‘fair, transparent and non-discriminatory countermeasures 
should be adopted, consistent with international law, against countries that do not comply with 
the conservation and management measures adopted by RFMOs...’283   These examples 
highlight increasing awareness and acceptance of the use of compliance enforcement 
mechanisms in RFMOs.  
Over the last decade, the use of compliance enforcement mechanisms has been stressed as 
both legally legitimate and necessary for the sustainable management of the world’s oceans.  
However, as recently as March 2009, the Twenty-eighth Session of the FAO Committee on 
Fisheries (COFI) found there was a continuing need for more effective management to fulfil 
global nutritional, social and economic sector objectives.284  COFI concluded that an effective 
approach had not yet been established to enable RFMOs to take the action necessary to 
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facilitate enhanced flag State responsibility and enable international obligations to be met.285  
With many States reluctant to delegate jurisdiction over the actions of their vessels on the high 
seas to a regulatory authority, there is a clear need for a paradigm shift in the way States commit 
to their regional obligations.286   
However, the availability and adoption of enforcement mechanisms by RFMOs has increased in 
the last decade.287  Options ranging from policy-based approaches designed to encourage 
cooperation from non-compliant States, to more ‘hard-line’ trade-related measures have been 
adopted as a means for improving RFMO performance.288  To date, many RFMOs have 
implemented measures to target non-compliance by both CPs and non-contracting parties 
(NCPs) and all RFMOs have adopted specific measures that place obligations on flag States.289   
However in 2007, a report issued by Chatham House outlining best practices for RFMOs290 (the 
Chatham House Report) found that inconsistencies in compliance enforcement still exist between 
RFMOs, challenging the effectiveness of this regime.291   The success of compliance 
enforcement measures, such as trade-related measures, depends upon the uniform adoption of 
such regulations by all RFMOs, as well as the cooperation of flag States.292  Unfortunately, the 
majority of RFMOs still lack an effective enforcement regime293 and an integrated approach 
remains to be seen.294   
This chapter begins with the proposition that there exists the means, legal standing and need for 
RFMOs to take action to ensure compliance from flag States. As outlined at the 2008 ‘Expert 
Workshop on Flag State Responsibilities: Assessing Performance and Taking Action’ (the FAO 
Expert Workshop),295 there is a distinct need for more legal research to be conducted in this area 
to identify possible actions that can be taken by RFMOs.296   The chapter responds to the need 
for increased utilisation and acceptance of compliance enforcement mechanisms.   By dividing 
possible compliance enforcement mechanisms that can be taken by RFMOs into three 
categories (including policies, diplomacy and countermeasures) this section aims to clarify the 
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application and effect of these measures and provide new insights into the different paths 
RFMOs might take to implement enforcement mechanisms.   
3.2  Limitations 
Compliance enforcement is pivotal to the success of the individual RFMO.297  This thesis is 
limited to discussion of enforcement action that can be brought by RFMOs against flag States.  
Under international law, flag State jurisdiction grants States, not individual vessels, the 
jurisdiction to fish the high seas.298 As such, if there is a breach of an obligation that has been 
accepted by the flag State via their RFMO commitment, it is the flag State and not the vessel that 
will be liable.  As a result of flag State jurisdiction, there is often more to be gained in terms of 
fisheries management by targeting the actions of the non-compliant flag States rather than 
targeting the actions of the individual vessel fishing the high seas.299   
However, that is not to say that the actions of the flag State are separate from those of the vessel 
it has authorised to fish the high seas.  In some cases, in order to effectively penalise the flag 
State for not controlling the actions of their vessels on the high seas, it is necessary to consider 
enforcement action that can be taken against an individual vessel.300  As a result, this chapter 
considers specific examples of enforcement actions that target vessels for the impact that such 
action has on compliance by flag States.  
3.3  The membership problem 
In considering compliance with RFMO conservation measures, another difficulty presents itself: 
the problem of RFMO membership.  Today, several categories of RFMO membership exist. 
These include the CP and NCP and what will be referred to for the purposes of this thesis as a 
Cooperating Non-Party (CNP).  Differing levels of membership imply different responsibilities for 
the flag State in respect of the relevant RFMO and its conservation measures.  Legally, CPs are 
obliged to adhere to the conservation measures that they accept upon becoming a party to a 
RFMO.301  In this way, enforcement action can be bought against a CP in the event of non-
compliance.  In the case of NCPs, however, RFMOs have no legal standing to enforce their 
conservation measures against non-compliance.302    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 Denzil Miller and Marie Jacobsson, 'Fisheries Management and Good Governance: Global, Regional and National 
Legislation and Regulation' in J Sundberg (ed), Fish, Trade and Development (in press) . 
298 Rosemary Rayfuse, Non-flag State Enforcement in High Seas Fisheries (2004) 21. 
299 Davor Vidas, 'IUU Fishing or IUU Operations? Some Observations on Diagnosis and Current Treatment' in D D Caron and H 
N Scheiber (eds), Bringing New Law to Ocean Waters (2004) 3. 
300 For example, ‘non-compliant vessel lists’ (formerly referred to as vessel ‘black-lists’) target individual vessels, however they 
are also a powerful mechanism for pressuring flag States to comply; particularly RFMO member States.   
301 Miller and Jacobsson, above n 297. 
302 R. Quentin Grafton et al, Handbook of Marine Fisheries Conservation and Management (2010)160. 
 36 
In an attempt to overcome this problem, UNFSA provides that all States, regardless of their 
membership of the relevant RFMO, have an obligation to ensure their vessels comply with the 
conservation and management measures adopted by that RFMO.303  In addition, the 1993 
Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures 
by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (the FAO Compliance Agreement) provides that States 
should take measures to ensure that their vessels do not engage in activity which undermines 
the effectiveness of RFMO conservation measures.304  Unfortunately, since its inception, 
ratification or accession to the FAO Compliance Agreement has been low,305 a situation which 
has challenged the application of this agreement.  As a general rule, however, the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (the LOSC)306 also imposes a customary obligation upon all 
State parties to cooperate in the conservation and management of high seas resources.307   
The difficulty that arises is that international agreements only apply inter partes.308  This means 
that only States that agree to the provisions of UNFSA and the FAO Compliance Agreement 
have an obligation to adhere to the conservation measures of RFMOs even when they are not a 
CP.  Logically, it is unlikely that a State that has failed to become a member of a RFMO would 
agree to the provisions of either of these agreements.  As a result of the voluntary nature of high 
seas conservation attempts, there is some debate as to the extent to which RFMOs have the 
jurisdiction to create compliance mechanisms which apply to NCPs.309  Despite this, certain 
RFMOs have adopted conservation measures which aim to penalise non-compliant NCPs310 and 
there are examples of NCPs demonstrating an acceptance of their responsibility to RFMOs by 
ordering their vessels to comply with these measures.311   
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Finally, CNPs hold a different status altogether within the RFMO framework.  To encourage 
compliance, many RFMOs have invited NCPs to accept ‘cooperating non-member’ status.312  It is 
up to the individual RFMO to determine matters such as how CNPs will participate in the 
organisation (including their attendance at annual meetings), procedures for attaining CNP status 
and which conservation measures will apply to CNPs.  There is great variation in the approach 
that different RFMOs adopt with respect to CNPs, with certain RFMOs only recognising CNPs for 
their participation in specific conservation measures.313   
However in a report entitled ‘Practice of RFMOs Regarding Non-Members’,314 Daniel Owen315 
states that all RFMOs require CNPs to confirm their commitment to ‘respect the Commission’s 
conservation and management measures’.316  As a general rule, he argues, all the conservation 
and management measures of the RFMO in question are to be complied with by CNPs.317   
Where a measure refers only to members, there may be some difficulty determining how it will 
apply to CNPs but this, Owen suggests, will come down to a matter of wording.  Arguably, for the 
purposes of compliance enforcement, CNPs hold the same status as CPs unless the wording of 
a conservation measure suggests otherwise.  In summary, and for the purposes of practicality, 
this chapter considers compliance enforcement mechanisms that could theoretically be adopted 
by an RFMO to combat non-compliance by flag States with varying degrees of RFMO 
membership.  
3.4  Tactical measures 
This section is based on the diagram of RFMO compliance enforcement contained in Figure 2 
(see below).  As Figure 2 demonstrates, there are several avenues that RFMOs might pursue to 
improve rates of compliance by flag States; including policy approaches; diplomatic action; and 
countermeasures.  Under each of these categories, a range of actions can be employed by the 
RFMO to encourage or require compliance by the flag State.  Certain approaches, such as 
cooperative policies, function by pre-empting instances of non-compliance by flag States while 
others, such as trade-related measures and graded sanctions, allow a RFMO to respond to a 
specific or continuing instance of non-compliance.  As such, the course of action an RFMO 
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adopts to combat non-compliance will depend upon whether the non-compliance is a perceived 
threat or an actual occurrence. 
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Figure 2.  A flow chart of RFMO compliance enforcement.  RFMOs 
may take actions against flag State non-compliance by utilising 
policies, diplomacy and countermeasures in the interest of 
achieving sustainable fisheries and environmental protection. 
	  
* This figure was formulated in conjunction with Dr. Denzil Miller.  The author would like to recognise and thank Dr. Miller for his contribution. 
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While the list of nine compliance mechanisms examined in this section is not exhaustive, 
attention is drawn to the need for compliance enforcement in RFMOs to occur across all three 
categories on a tactical level.  Improved flag State control is one of the foundations of 
responsible fisheries management318 and by categorising examples of compliance enforcement 
mechanisms this chapter provides a unique insight into the range of compliance enforcement 
mechanisms and their differing applications.  While it is recognised that it difficult for RFMOs to 
address failures by specific flag States,319 and that the problem of political will remains as strong 
as ever; the fact remains that if regional management is to gain strength, RFMOs must be able to 
respond quickly and accurately to non-compliant behaviour.320 
3.4.1 Policies and approaches 
RFMO policies and their approach towards both CPs and NCPs are essential to the 
effectiveness of the regional system of fisheries management.321  Without guidelines to 
determine how the individual RFMO will deal with CPs and NCPs differently, there can be no 
common and consistent approach to the manner in which the organisation conducts itself.  As 
such, policies and approaches play a large role in determining how individual RFMOs will tackle 
the problem of non-compliance by different parties.  While RFMO policies and approaches 
govern a vast array of matters, including transparency and new and exploratory fisheries,322 this 
section is specifically concerned with the manner in which an RFMO, by adopting a strict 
approach, can minimise non-compliance.   
3.4.1.1 Cooperative policies 
Cooperation is the foundation of regional fisheries management.323  It is through cooperation that 
RFMOs seek to enforce their mandate and implement their regime.  By encouraging both CPs 
and NCPs to cooperate with the objectives of an RFMO, the instances of non-compliance will be 
minimised.  In the alternative, a lack of cooperation from flag States reduces the control 
exercised by a RFMO, particularly when trying to impose restrictions on a flag State that is not a 
party to the relevant RFMO.   
The importance of cooperation arises as a result of the duty to cooperate contained in the LOSC.  
The LOSC determines that States are ‘to cooperate to establish subregional or regional fisheries 
organisations’324 in the interests of conservation, and therefore one of the purposes of an RFMO 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 FAO Expert Workshop, above n 124. 
319 Denzil Miller, 'Regional Fisheries Management Organisations and Implementation of Flag State Performance Criteria and 
Actions' (Paper presented at the FAO Expert Consultation on Flag State Performance, 23 - 26 June 2009). 
320 FAO Expert Workshop, above n 124. 
321 Implementation of the IPOA-IUU, above n 312. 
322 A Willock and M Lack, Follow the Leader: Learning from Experience and Best Practice in Regional Fisheries Management 
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323 Lodge et al, above n 289, 1. 
324 LOSC, above n 306, article 118. 
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is to act as a forum for negotiations between States on conservation matters. 325  As such, many 
RFMOs have formulated policies directly relating to cooperation between and amongst CPs, 
NCPs and CNPs.   
The manner in which policy can be used to encourage cooperation can be demonstrated by the 
conservation measures of the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources (CCAMLR).  The CCAMLR has sought to overcome the threat posed by NCPs to its 
effectiveness by adopting a ‘Policy to Enhance Cooperation between CCAMLR and Non-
Contracting Parties’.326  This policy codifies the duty to cooperate contained in the LOSC and 
extends awareness of the need for NCPs to accede to the convention.  The aim of the Policy is 
to encourage and build the capacity of NCPs to cooperate and to keep them informed of 
developments in conservation measures.327  The Policy requires the Chairman of the CCAMLR 
to write to NCPs to, inter alia, ‘invite and encourage non-Contracting Parties to attend as 
observers at meetings of the Commission’328 and ‘request non-contracting Parties to prevent 
their flag vessels from fishing in the Convention Area in a manner which undermines the 
effectiveness of measures adopted by CCAMLR’.329   
In another example of how cooperative policies can target non-compliance, certain RFMOs have 
moved to make policies more effective by including provisions that provide positive incentives for 
cooperation. The framework provisions of the Commission for the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) and the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) expressly 
refer to ‘cooperation quotas’ implying that if States choose to cooperate their catch quotas will be 
increased.330   
In other cases, the treaty establishing a RFMO can refer to the benefits to be derived from 
cooperation.  It is the policy of both the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(WCPFC) and the South East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (SEAFO) that non-parties ‘shall 
enjoy benefits from participation in the fishery commensurate with their commitment to comply 
with … conservation and management measures in respect of the relevant stocks’.  In this way, 
cooperative policies can encourage compliance from NCPs and reduce the incentive for States 
to operate outside RFMO regimes.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325 Tore Henriksen, 'Revisiting the Freedom of Fishing and Legal Obligations on States Not Party to Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations' (2009) 40(1) Ocean Development & International Law 80 , 87. 
326 The Policy to Enhance Cooperation between CCAMLR and Non-Contracting Parties was Adopted at CCAMLR-XVIII and 
amended at CCAMLR-XXV.  Available on line <http://www.ccamlr.org/Pu/e/cds/policy-to-enhance.pdf> 
327 Lodge et al, above n 289, 64. 
328 Policy to Enhance Cooperation, above n 326. 
329 Ibid. 
330 Henriksen, above n 325. 
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3.4.1.2  Non-contracting parties 
One of the primary challenges facing RFMOs and their ability to implement conservation 
measures effectively is the problem of incomplete membership.  Many States continue to operate 
outside of the relevant fisheries regimes, threatening the conservation and management goals of 
RFMOs.331  Significant damage can result from the activities of NCPs, with the conservation 
measures of the ICCAT, for instance, frequently undermined by ships registered in non-member 
States.332  In fact, it is estimated that about 10 percent of the total catch in ICCAT fisheries is 
undertaken by vessels flagged to non-member States333 which can thereby diminish incentives to 
comply with the RFMO.   
As such, many RFMOs have designed compliance policies and approaches targeting the 
activities of NCPs, their nationals and their vessels.  For instance, the Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission (IOTC) has a scheme to promote compliance by the vessels of NCPs whereby any 
evidence that such vessels have been fishing contrary to IOTC regulations should be reported to 
the authorities. Similarly, CCAMLR’s Resolution 14/XIX urges all NCPs not participating in the 
CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme (CDS) to implement it fully.  By implementing a single 
approach towards the actions of NCPs, RFMOs are able to achieve consistency and promote a 
consistent message to non-compliant States, their vessels and nationals.  
3.4.1.3  Contracting parties 
While the control or regulation of NCPs is one of the key objectives of any RFMO, achieving 
compliance by those parties that have agreed to implement RFMO mandates is not a given. 
Indeed, the performance reviews of certain AusRFMOs recently noted low levels of compliance 
by contracting parties as one of the major problems facing the effectiveness of the individual 
RFMO.334  As such, achieving compliance by those parties that have committed to implementing 
conservation measures as well as empowering those States to achieve compliance from their 
nationals is crucial to the functionality of all RFMOs.  
In an example of a policy approach directed at CPs, the Commission for the Conservation of 
Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) recently implemented their ‘Resolution on action plans to ensure 
compliance with Conservation and Management Measures’.  This Resolution requires CPs and 
CNPs to submit an action plan to the Secretariat concerning, inter alia, how the State will certify 
catch data and information on ecologically related species. Further to this the CCAMLR has 
adopted Conservation Measure 10-08 requiring CPs to take measures to deprive IUU fishing 
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operators of the benefits obtained from their behaviour. This approach requires that the flag State 
act to achieve compliance by nationals and vessels with the conservation mandate of the RFMO. 
3.4.2  Diplomatic measures 
As outlined in Figure 2, the second tactical measure to be examined for its ability to enable 
RFMOs to take action against non-compliance, is that of diplomacy.  While significant difficulties 
have arisen as a result of the law of the sea being founded in the notion of the freedom to fish,335 
it is arguable that this situation has also strengthened the ability of diplomatic pressures to 
control the actions of States.  Meetings of RFMOs are replete with examples of States 
undertaking diplomatic negotiations which continue intersessionally to allow States to reach 
agreement on conservation measures.336   
However, the diplomatic ambitions of a State or group of States can also be made apparent 
through the creation of IUU vessel lists or the issuing of a diplomatic demarche.  While such 
tensions do not always resolve themselves in favour of conservation, diplomacy is certainly an 
important, if not the most important, tool available to empower RFMOs and CPs to enforce 
compliance.  
3.4.2.1  IUU vessel lists 
Today, it is common policy for an RFMO to compile an annual list of vessels they have found to 
be engaged in IUU fishing in their area of competence and undermining their conservation 
measures.337  The CCAMLR was the first RFMO to adopt a scheme for an IUU vessel list at its 
twenty-second annual meeting in 2003.338  Since then, numerous other RFMOs339 have adopted 
similar schemes.  
On a tactical level, the compilation of these lists could be considered to be a policy approach, 
however for the purposes of this chapter, they are analysed for their effectiveness as a 
diplomatic measure aimed at naming and shaming those flag States whose vessels appear on 
lists compiled by the RFMO.   If the flag State of a listed vessel is a CP, the pressure imposed 
upon the non-compliant flag State at both meetings of the RFMO and intersessionally is 
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considerable and such pressure can often lead to the State taking action to remove the vessel 
from their register.340   
However this does not resolve the problem of IUU vessels that are flagged to NCPs.  As a result 
many RFMOs have compiled separate lists of IUU vessels of CPs and NCPs.341  There are many 
kinds of activities that will lead to inclusion on IUU vessel lists.  According to the Chatham House 
Report these can include: 
• being sighted engaged in illegal activity, 
• fishing with a vessel not registered on a required register, 
• landing after being denied port access, 
• landing or transhipment pursuant to relevant measures, 
• fishing without quota, catch limit or effort allocation, 
• failing to report or record catches (or making false reports), 
• fishing during closed seasons or in closed areas, 
• using prohibited fishing gear, or 
• transhipping to vessels on the IUU fishing list.342 
Generally, these are all activities considered to be ‘serious violations’ under UNFSA. 343  
The quality of information included in the IUU vessel lists of different RFMOs has been found to 
vary greatly.344  However, it appears that there is considerable commonality amongst RFMOs 
when it comes to determining what actions should be taken against vessels appearing on these 
lists.345  In terms of compliance enforcement, it is the effect that IUU vessel lists have on the 
actions of States that is of the greatest significance. While technical measures such as denying 
port access and prohibiting chartering of the vessel might occur, the public notoriety associated 
with listing is sometimes enough to prompt the flag State itself to penalise the non-compliant 
vessel in question.346   
Regardless of the penalties that flow from an IUU listing for the vessel, it is clear that the IUU 
vessel lists represent an important diplomatic tool that can be utilised by RFMOs in order to 
promote compliance by both CPs and NCPs.  
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3.4.2.2  Requests and negotiations 
Due to the voluntary nature of RFMO membership, these organisations function largely via 
diplomatic negotiations and the issuing of requests to achieve compliance with conservation 
measures.  By enacting measures to promote membership, an RFMO may encourage NCPs with 
a real interest in a fishery to join or at least accede to the convention and apply its conservation 
and management measures.   
The IPOA-IUU provides that where the actions of individual States fail to achieve participation, 
RFMOs themselves should facilitate cooperation through the ‘implementation of measures 
adopted by the relevant organisations.’347  The ability of an RFMO to achieve comprehensive 
membership of all States with a potential to influence the fishery in question is a prerequisite for 
effective management.348  A specific RFMO might issue a request for cooperation from a vessel 
or flag State to cease non-compliant behaviour by providing a deadline by which time compliance 
is to be achieved.349  Alternatively, it may request a State to recall its vessel to port so that 
enforcement action might ensue.350   
However, it is more common for the RFMO itself to engage in requests and negotiations whereby 
such action will encourage a specific NCP to become a CP.  The CCSBT, for instance, used its 
Japanese contacts to place diplomatic pressure on Korea to become a CP to the commission.351  
Such efforts, however, do not always go rewarded and despite continued pressure, Indonesia 
remains outside of the CCSBT.352 
In a positive example of how negotiations can instigate compliance, in 1997, CCAMLR requested 
Namibia and Mauritius to attend its next meeting as observers following negotiation efforts 
instigated by France, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.353  These negotiations were 
aimed at encouraging these States to close their ports to illegal trade in Patagonian Toothfish.354  
Three years later, in June 2000, Namibia acceded to the CCAMLR and in 2001 they became a 
permanent member.355    
However, achieving this level of success in respect of NCPs as a result of negotiations is not 
always successful.  Both the ICCAT and the CCSBT have undertaken lengthy negotiations with 
NCPs promising that in becoming CPs, these States will be allocated a certain quota in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
347 IPOA-IUU, above n 279, paragraph 83. 
348 Willock and Lack, above n 322, iv. 
349 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Review of Fisheries in OECD Countries (2005), 20. 
350 Ibid. 
351 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Strengthening Regional Fisheries Management Organisations 
(2009) 34. 
352 Ibid. 
353 Rachel Baird, 'Coastal State Fisheries Management: A Review of Australian Enforcement Action in the Heard and McDonald 
Islands Australian Fishing Zones' (2004) 9(1) Deakin Law Review 91. 
354 Ibid. 
355 "Report of the CEP Observer to CCAMLR XIX and SC-CCAMLR XIX", 23 October to 3 November, 2000, Information Paper 
IP-26, Australia.  Available on line at <http://cep.ats.aq/cep/MediaItems/ml_376387248032407_ip026e.pdf> 
 46 
fishery in question.356    Unfortunately, these States have often held off on becoming CPs until 
they are offered a substantial quota in the fishery or, in choosing not to join, have continued to 
fish in the region despite their lack of membership.357  
3.4.2.3  Diplomatic demarches 
Although similar to diplomatic action instigated through negotiations and requests, diplomatic 
demarches by definition, involve a formal representation or warning made to a public authority.358  
The formal nature of this exercise distinguishes it from the negotiation process and while 
diplomatic demarches are traditionally sent by a State or group of States to another State, 
RFMOs (as a collaboration of States) are also able to issue diplomatic demarches to States that 
have engaged in non-compliant behaviour.   
The use of diplomatic demarches to persuade States to fish responsibly is well established.359  In 
1998, Australia and France sent a joint demarche to Mauritius in regards to a vessel illegally 
fishing in the CCAMLR conservation area.360   Australia and France requested that the Salvora, 
an IUU vessel, not be allowed to unload its catch without an investigation into its fishing 
activities.361  In this instance, Mauritius agreed to intervene if the Salvora offloaded its catch at a 
specific port and in this case, the demarche achieved its intended outcome.362   The success of 
this measure resulted in a ruling in the Mauritius Supreme Court that the Salvora had caught 
Toothfish in the French exclusive economic zone (EEZ) resulting in the vessel being unable to 
land its catch.363   
However, there are also cases where RFMOs themselves have issued diplomatic demarches.  In 
the case of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), the Commission encountered 
problems with non-compliance when, in 2002, it issued a total closure of all purse seine364 
fisheries.  While it was understood that CPs complied with the closure, vessels from Bolivia and 
Colombia (both NCPs) continued to fish using purse seine nets.365  The IATTC then issued 
diplomatic demarches to both these States to no avail.  A greater level of success, however, was 
achieved by the IATTC when the vessels of several NCPs were found to be targeting yellowfin 
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tuna in its area of competence.  In this case, the vessels withdrew from the area as a result of a 
‘series of diplomatic demarches’366 which persuaded the flag States to exercise control over their 
vessels.  
3.4.3  Countermeasures 
International law concerning countermeasures is founded in the concept of flag State 
responsibility.367  Where an obligation, owed to the international community as a whole, is 
breached, State responsibility may be invoked to allow for action to be taken against the 
offending State.  Under normal circumstances, such action would lie in contravention of 
international law; however, when countermeasures are taken in conformity with certain 
requirements, coercive action can be justified.368  However countermeasures are viewed as 
exceptional measures, the scope of which is limited to ‘the cessation of the internationally 
wrongful act.’369 
In the context of international fisheries law, countermeasures could allow a flag State to take 
action against another State which might have failed to comply with its obligation to cooperate 
with other States in the conservation of marine living resources. 370  However there are certain 
conditions restricting what types of action may be taken.   
In 1997, it was decided by the International Court of Justice in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
case that countermeasures must: 
a) be taken in response to an unlawful act; 
b) be preceded by a demand for compliance by the injured State/s; 
c) be proportionate, and; 
d) have the purpose of inducing the ‘wrongdoing state to comply with its obligations under 
international law’.371 
As one commentator observes, countermeasures must be reversible372 and they must not 
involve the threat or use of force.373  As a result of the above requirements, the State or group of 
States taking action must be considered ‘injured’.  This occurs when an obligation is owed to a 
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group of States or to the international community as a whole and a breach of that obligation can 
radically change the position of all other States.374   
In the context of RFMO actions, CPs who are acting in compliance with conservation measures 
may be considered ‘injured’ by the actions of a non-compliant flag State allowing IUU vessels to 
fish.  Rosemary Rayfuse375 argues that countermeasures must be owed to all CPs of an RFMO 
at least and that within RFMOs, calls for compliance are increasingly being voiced at annual 
meetings.376    
The potential for an RFMO to take countermeasures against uncooperative flag States was 
considered as a viable option for RFMOs to achieve compliance at a 2008 United Nations Food 
and Agriculture (FAO) workshop on flag State responsibilities.377  In addition, Roberto Cesari378 
of the European Commission argues that the most effective way to gain flag State cooperation is 
through the adoption of countermeasures such as trade related measures.379  He contends that 
such measures, so long as they are transparent, non-discriminatory and compatible with the 
regulations of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), represent a tool to pressure flag State who 
are not cooperating, ‘to increase their own control on their vessels, and to oblige their operators 
to comply with the conservation and management measures of the RFMOs in question.’380 
3.4.3.1  Trade-related measures 
Trade-related measures are probably the largest remaining category of countermeasures 
available to induce other States to comply with international law.381  Article 68 of the IPOA-IUU 
envisages that States should cooperate through RFMOs to adopt, ‘appropriate multilaterally 
agreed trade-related measures consistent with the WTO that may be necessary to prevent, deter 
and eliminate IUU fishing for specific fish stocks or species.’382 This agreement defines what 
types of actions might constitute trade-related measures in an RFMO context as multi-lateral 
catch documentation and certification requirements and import and export controls or 
prohibitions.383  As a result of such clarification, trade-related measures may be said to consist of 
port State measures which prevent the landing, transhipment or processing of fish unless the 
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vessel has established that they were taken in a manner consistent with conservation and 
management measures.384  
As a result of the restriction that trade-related measures impose on the fundamental legal 
principle of free trade, the rules and articles of the WTO are of integral importance to the legal 
application of these measures.  In an early case that challenged US environmental protection 
legislation, Mexico and other countries385 asked for a panel of the WTO to decide whether the US 
had the right to ban imports of tuna that had been caught in a manner that did not meet US 
dolphin protection standards.386  The panel concluded that the US could not prevent the imports 
of tuna simply because of the way it was produced and that the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT)387 rules did not allow one country to take trade action for the purposes of 
enforcing its domestic legislation in another country.388  As this was an early case, however, it 
was not decided under the present system of WTO dispute settlement and the report of the panel 
does not have the status of a legal interpretation. 
In November 1998, the Shrimp-Turtle Case389 came before the WTO.  This case was brought by 
India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand against a ban imposed by the US on imports of shrimp 
which had been caught without the use of ‘turtle excluder devices’.390  On an appeal by the US, 
the four countries succeeded based on a finding of the WTO that in implementing this measure, 
the US had failed to provide for the non-discriminatory allocation of technical and financial 
assistance.391   However this finding fails to reflect the positive outcome of this decision for the 
protection of the marine environment.   
Finally, in December 2000, the European Community (EC) initiated a case against Chile before 
the WTO for prohibiting the unloading and transit of swordfish cases taken from the high seas 
bordering Chile’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), when taken in contravention of Chile’s 
conservation rules.392 This highly controversial case involved not only a challenge to high seas 
sovereignty but also a challenge to the jurisdiction of the WTO, with Chile asserting that the 
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appropriate dispute settlement body in this case would be the International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea (the Tribunal).393   
As a result, both cases before both the Tribunal and the WTO were suspended and the 
fundamental environmental issues at hand remain undecided.  Ultimately, the decision in this 
case has fallen to the two parties, with a memorandum of understanding finally being 
implemented in December 2009.394  This understanding provides for access of EC vessels to 
Chilean ports in exchange for commitments on cooperation in the management of stocks.395 
While it is clear that not every breach of a flag State obligation will be serious enough to warrant 
the imposition of trade-related measures, if a flag State undermines the effectiveness of an 
RFMO conservation measure it appears that trade action on the part of that RFMO would 
currently be consistent with international law.396  The IPOA-IUU specifically calls on States to 
exercise trade-related measures against non-compliant States and so long as certain conditions 
are met it increasingly appears that trade-related measures are legitimate under both WTO 
regulations and other forms of international law. In addition, article 20(7) of UNFSA authorises 
CPs, individually or in concert, to take action to deter vessels not complying with relevant RFMO 
measures until such time as appropriate action is taken by the vessel’s flag State.397 
3.4.3.2  Graded sanctions 
One of the primary findings of the Chatham House Report was that a model RFMO should 
ensure compliance by providing punishments for non-compliant vessels and States.398   This 
notion is reiterated in the FAO Compliance Agreement which is a legally binding agreement 
clarifying the importance of punitive sanctions.  It states that sanctions are applicable in respect 
of vessels which act in contravention of the provisions of the Agreement.   
The FAO Compliance Agreement states that such sanctions shall include refusal, suspension or 
withdrawal of the authorisation to fish the high seas for serious violations.  It provides that 
sanctions are to be ‘of sufficient gravity as to be effective in securing compliance...and to deprive 
offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities.’399  Excluding the use of trade- 
related measures, however, other such penalties that might be available to RFMOs to achieve 
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compliance include the use of fines, reduced fishing opportunities, vessel confiscations, denying 
non-compliant States access to national fisheries.400   
Certain RFMOs continue to resist the use of sanctions or penalties to address non-
compliance.401  At a meeting of the Tuna RFMOs in 2007,402 one of the key challenges for the 
five RFMOs was identified as being the application of penalties and sanctions of ‘adequate 
severity’ to deter IUU fishing by both CPs and NCPs.403  In 2009, the ‘Second Joint Meeting of 
Tuna RFMOs’ noted the need for tuna RFMOs to establish a comprehensive system of non-
discriminatory sanctions to address the actions of States that repeatedly fail to comply with their 
obligations.404  It was decided that this system should include incentives to encourage 
transparent recognition of overfishing and reinforced sanctions for unreported overfishing.405 
However, certain RFMOs have taken steps towards imposing penalties in instances of non-
compliance.406  The ICCAT, for instance, provides that a CP that is deemed to have seriously 
undermined conservation measures will be subject to a review process which might impose 
penalties against the offending State.407  Given the range and scope of sanctions available to 
RFMOs, it is submitted that RFMOs should continue to implement policies which provide for such 
measures to be taken to combat IUU fishing. 
3.4.3.3  Monitoring and inspection 
The final compliance enforcement mechanism examined in this section is the potential for 
RFMOs to adopt strict monitoring and inspection requirements to address vessels failing to 
comply with their conservation measures on the high seas.  As provided for in paragraph 80.8 of 
the IPOA-IUU, the inspection and arrest of non-compliant vessels falls within the ambit of RFMO 
mandates408 and that this is an area in which many RFMOs require further development.409   
Rayfuse explains that not all RFMOs have adopted monitoring and inspection schemes and that 
no RFMOs provide for a positive right of arrest, detention or prosecution in the event of non-
compliance.410  Rayfuse contends, however, that where States violate their obligations to 
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cooperate with an RFMO by failing to effectively control a vessel, then any CP may be entitled to 
act by boarding, inspecting or, if necessary, arresting the vessel concerned.411 
3.5 Conclusion 
Historically, a lack of enforcement capability has prevented RFMOs from enforcing their 
conservation measures on both CPs and NCPs.  This chapter has argued that a perceived lack 
of legitimacy surrounds the notion of RFMOs effectively enforcing their mandate.  The 
fundamental international law concepts of State sovereignty and the freedom of the high seas 
continue to present as a threat to the enforcement capabilities of RFMOs, 412 however RFMOs 
are slowly coming to accept the need for the use of trade-related and other measures to control 
the actions of States and vessels on the high seas.   
This analysis has been conducted in recognition of the practical difficulties facing RFMOs in the 
contemporary fisheries regime, but has aimed to draw attention to the fact that RFMOs are not 
as ‘toothless’ as they once were and that legally speaking at least, the avenues for compliance 
enforcement continue to grow.   Many RFMOs have already identified possible improvements to 
existing measures which can assist them in combating IUU fishing and with increasing 
awareness and recognition of the options analysed above, it is hoped that a ‘culture of 
compliance’ will develop amongst RFMOs and States alike.413 
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CHAPTER 4 
COMPLIANCE ENFORCEMENT IN AUSRFMOS 
4.1 Introduction 
Breakdowns in cooperation within and between regional fisheries management organisations 
(RFMOs) pose a significant threat to the effectiveness of high seas governance.  A 2007 joint 
workshop of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) reported that RFMOs lacking the 
resilience to cope with uncooperative States are likely to flounder over time.414  This situation is 
also documented in recent RFMO performance reviews.415  The joint OECD-FAO Workshop 
identified a gap in the effective implementation of conservation measures by RFMOs and found 
that this situation requires urgent attention by States.  The Workshop concluded that there was 
more scope for effective cooperation between States, particularly in the area of enforcement.416 
This chapter identifies the measures currently in place in RFMOs to which Australia is a party 
(AusRFMOs) to promote compliance and ensure the objectives of the Convention or Agreement 
are being met.  This Chapter breaks down its assessment of the compliance enforcement 
capacity of AusRFMOs into three categories.  First, the founding Convention or Agreement is 
considered.  Second, the formal and informal conservation measures or ‘regulations’417 
established by the RFMO to improve compliance and give effect to their mandate are listed.418  
Finally, future compliance initiatives being undertaken by the RFMO in the field of compliance 
enforcement are outlined.  
By identifying the mechanisms currently in place and those being developed by each of the 
AusRFMOs under examination, this Chapter provides a detailed, comprehensive and 
contemporary account of the compliance enforcement capacity of AusRFMOs.  To provide 
context and insight into the individual challenges faced by each RFMO, each account begins with 
a summary of the key compliance issues faced by the RFMO as articulated in performance 
reviews.   
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4.2  Compliance enforcement  
An act of non-compliance can be committed by both Contracting Parties (CPs) and non-
Contracting Parties (NCPs) to an RFMO.  The term ‘compliance enforcement’ is used to describe 
the body of measures RFMOs can adopt to penalise non-compliance or provide incentives to 
comply with conservation measures.   
Compliance enforcement is distinct from another body of regulations developed by RFMOs which 
will be referred to generally as ‘scientific regulations’.  Compliance enforcement mechanisms can 
function by anticipating non-compliance and deterring this activity, or by addressing the breach 
by imposing punitive or trade-related action after non-compliance has occurred.  Examples of 
compliance enforcement mechanisms are outlined in Chapter 3 (see Chapter 3, Figure 2).  
RFMOs utilise both legally binding and non-legally binding measures to regulate the activities of 
States, vessels and nationals.  For the purposes of this thesis, legally binding measures are 
referred to as ‘formal’ measures whereas non-legally binding measures are referred to as 
‘informal’ measures.   The terminology adopted by RFMOs to distinguish between formal and 
informal measures varies significantly.  For the purposes of consistency and clarity, this chapter 
considers the formal and informal measures of each AusRFMO separately to highlight the 
differences in application of each.   
4.3  Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
Background 
The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (the CAMLR 
Convention)419 was established on 7 April 1982 in response to, inter alia, fears that the krill 
fishery would become the next in a line of species to be overfished in the Antarctic.420  As a key 
ecological species, scientists were concerned that if stocks of krill were to become depleted, the 
entire Antarctic marine food chain could be compromised.421   
At its Twenty-sixth meeting in 2007, CCAMLR decided to undertake a performance review during 
2008.422  The practice of RFMOs submitting to performance reviews was initiated at a meeting of 
tuna RFMOs in Kobe, Japan in January 2007423 and in the case of CCAMLR, the review was 
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carried out by a panel of nine people appointed by the Commission. The purpose of the review 
was to evaluate CCAMLR’s performance against specific criteria.424  In general, the review noted 
that in recent years, there has been a good degree of compliance by CPs and that levels of 
compliance have actually increased with time.425  While there continue to be breaches by CPs, 
many of these appeared to be of a ‘technical nature’ rather than physical acts of illegal fishing for 
instance.426  
The CCAMLR performance review went on to state that despite the combined effect of 
CCAMLR’s provisions relating to illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing,427 this practice 
continues to be a significant problem, specifically in respect of localised areas in CCAMLR 
waters.428  In reality, the report notes, the failure of certain parties to discharge conservation and 
management obligations indicates a major problem when it comes to cooperative regional 
fisheries management in CCAMLR.429  The performance review proposes that CCAMLR should 
ensure that it continues to improve the efficiency, reach and use of compliance enforcement 
tools.430  
4.3.1  CCAMLR objectives 
As outlined above, the CAMLR Convention was formulated in 1982.  Over the years, CCAMLR 
has updated or developed many of the original provisions of the CAMLR Convention through the 
adoption of conservation measures to improve or promote compliance with conservation 
objectives.  The CAMLR Convention provides the organisation with the jurisdiction to adopt 
conservation measures and states what the effect of these measures will be.  Article IX(6) of the 
CAMLR Convention states that conservation measures, ‘shall become binding upon all Members 
of the Commission’ within 180 days unless a CP notifies the Commission that it is unable to 
accept the measure.  While not a compliance enforcement mechanism per se, this provision is 
significant as without its inclusion the obligation for States to comply would not be recognised by 
the CCAMLR.  
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429 Ibid 65. 
430 Ibid 74. 
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Under article X of the CAMLR Convention, the Commission is required to draw the attention of a 
NCP to any activity undertaken by its nationals or vessels which affects the implementation of the 
objectives of the CCAMLR.  Under article X(2), the Commission shall do the same in regards to 
CPs and draw their attention to any activity which affects the compliance by the CP with its 
obligations under the Convention.  The obligation to make States aware of acts of non-
compliance is a common compliance enforcement tactic among RFMOs as often the mere 
recognition of such behaviour can place political pressure on a State to better control its actions 
or those of a vessel or national.    
Under the CAMLR Convention, CPs are also under a direct obligation to ensure that they take 
‘appropriate measures’431 within their competence to ensure compliance with the provisions of 
the CAMLR Convention and CCAMLR conservation measures under article XXI.  The CAMLR 
Convention foresees the imposition of sanctions by States in response to non-compliance by 
their flagged vessels or nationals.432  Article XXI requires States to report on the taking of any 
such action to the CCAMLR, presumably to ensure that non-compliant activities do not go 
unrecognised or unreported.   
4.3.2  Conservation measures 
Formal measures imposed by CCAMLR are referred to by the Commission as ‘Conservation 
Measures’, with each measure allocated a number and a title.433  Informal measures, however, 
may be referred to either as ‘Regulations’ or ‘Policies’.  For instance, CCAMLR has a Resolution 
to the effect that States must require, as a condition of granting a vessel a license to fish for 
Patagonian toothfish,434 that vessels only land catches in ports that are fully implementing the 
CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme (CDS).  While this measure appears to be a strict 
compliance enforcement mechanism, as a Resolution, this requirement is not binding on CPs or 
NCPs.  
4.3.2.1 Formal measures 
In a measure aimed at promoting compliance by the vessels of NCPs, CCAMLR’s Conservation 
Measure 10-07 provides for the development of an ‘IUU vessel list’ to name and shame non-
compliant vessels and their flag States.  As outlined in Chapter 3, IUU vessel lists are a key 
compliance enforcement mechanism adopted by many RFMOs to tackle the problem of IUU 
fishing.  Conservation Measure 10-07 provides that at each annual meeting, the Commission 
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identify NCPs whose vessels are engaged in IUU fishing in the Convention Area.435  On approval 
of a vessel list, the Executive Secretary of the CCAMLR is required to place the list on the public 
section of the CCAMLR website and communicate the list to other RFMOs.436 
Further to the formal CCAMLR IUU vessel list, Conservation Measure 10-02437 was passed in 
2010 to require all CPs to ensure their vessels are licensed to fish in the Convention Area. This 
measure provides that a CP may only issue a licence to fish if it is satisfied of its ability to 
exercise its responsibilities under the Convention. Conservation Measure 10-02 specifies the 
monitoring requirements a flag State must be able to exercise over its vessels.  
The taking of action that is consistent with international law to address non-compliance is a 
common thread among CCAMLR conservation measures.  However, a clause is often included 
to ensure that there is no abuse of the use of sanctions, penalties or other trade-related 
measures.  Conservation Measure 10-07 provides that CPs should not take any trade-related 
measures or other sanctions against vessels as a result of their inclusion on this list.  This 
provision is without prejudice to the rights of States to take proper action consistent with 
international law.438  This provision foresees the potential for States to incorrectly use the IUU 
Vessel List as an indication of proof of non-compliant activities by those vessels listed.  
Under Conservation Measure 10-07, CPs are still able to cooperate to adopt trade-related 
measures, consistent with their obligations to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), to prevent, 
deter and eliminate IUU fishing.  It states that such measures may be used, to support 
cooperative efforts to ensure that trade in Patagonian toothfish does not encourage IUU fishing 
or diminish the effectiveness of CCAMLR’s conservation measures.439  Additionally, 
Conservation Measure 10-05 states that the Commission is committed to taking steps, consistent 
with international law, to ensure that fish was caught in a manner consistent with CCAMLR 
conservation measures.  
Conservation Measure 10-08 also recognises the right of flag States to take action in response to 
acts of non-compliance by CP nationals. It states that CPs shall take measures to effectively 
deprive any participants in IUU fishing of the benefits obtained from their behaviour. Furthermore, 
Conservation Measure 10-03 entitled ‘Port inspections of vessels carrying toothfish’ provides that 
in the event that a vessel has fished in contravention of CCAMLR conservation measures, the 
CP will cooperate with the flag State of the vessel to take appropriate action and, if necessary, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435 CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-07, ‘Scheme to promote compliance by non-Contracting Party vessels with CCAMLR 
conservation measures’ paragraph 2.  
436 Ibid paragraph 23. 
437 CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-02, ‘Licensing and inspection obligations of Contracting Parties with regard to their flag 
vessels operating in the Convention Area’, paragraph 1. 
438 CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-07, above n 435, paragraph 26. 
439 Ibid. 
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apply sanctions to the vessel.440  Finally Conservation Measure 10-04 was adopted in 2010 to 
require CPs to ensure that their flagged vessels are equipped with automated satellite-linked 
VMS.441 
4.3.2.2 Informal measures 
The informal measures adopted by CCAMLR are generally aimed at expressing agreement 
within the Commission on matters of significance.  Many of CCAMLR’s informal measures, or 
‘Resolutions’, are aimed at urging non-compliant States, vessels or nationals to comply with 
CCAMLR provisions.  For instance, Resolution 14/XIX urges all CCAMLR Acceding States442 
and NCPs not participating in the CDS to implement it as soon as possible.  Resolution 15/XXII 
builds from this to urge all CPs to require that their vessels should land catches in States that are 
fully implementing the CDS.  Resolution 19/XXI contains a more general provision that urges all 
CPs and NCPs to take measures or cooperate to ensure that their nationals do not engage in or 
support IUU fishing.  
The difference in wording adopted in CCAMLR formal and informal measures is due to the 
difference in the strength of these provisions.  Informal measures can only ‘request’, ‘urge’ or 
‘encourage’ States to act in a certain manner, whereas formal measures can require States to 
comply with their provisions. Resolution 25/XXV,443 for instance, urges all CPs to pursue 
diplomatic and other action, in accordance with international law, to encourage NCPs to 
recognise CCAMLR conservation measures. Such diplomatic action, as explored in Chapter 3, 
could be achieved via the imposition of diplomatic demarches, requests or entering into 
negotiations with the flag State/s concerned.444   
Finally, the ‘Policy to Enhance Cooperation between CCAMLR and Non-Contracting Parties’ (the 
CCAMLR Policy) is a unique approach adopted by the CCAMLR to improve compliance. Neither 
a regulation nor a conservation measure, the CCAMLR Policy requests the Executive Secretary 
to, inter alia: 
• invite and encourage NCPs to attend as observers at CCAMLR meetings, 
• encourage NCPs to accede to the Convention, and 
• encourage NCPs to participate in the CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
440 CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-03, ‘Port inspections of vessels carrying toothfish’, paragraph 3. 
441 CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-04, ‘Automated satellite-linked Vessel Monitoring Systems’. 
442 The CCAMLR has 9 acceding States including: Bulgaria, Canada, Cook Islands, Finland, Greece, Mauritius, Netherlands, 
Peru and Vanuatu.  Full membership list available on line at <http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/ms/contacts.htm#States> 
443 CCAMLR Resolution 25/XXV, ‘Combatting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the Convention Area by the flag 
vessels of non-Contracting Parties’.  
444 Rosemary Rayfuse, 'Countermeasures and High Seas Fisheries Enforcement' (2004) LI Netherlands International Law 
Review 41. 
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4.3.3  Future compliance initiatives 
The first CCAMLR Workshop for the Development of a Compliance Evaluation Procedure 
(DOCEP) was held in Norway in July 2009.445  This meeting was attended by 10 Member 
Countries and was designed to develop an action plan for possible responses of the CCAMLR to 
non-compliance.446  The objective of the meeting was to develop a model for the standard 
evaluation of performance of vessels with conservation measures in force. 447  In developing this 
model, DOCEP recognised that flag State compliance was often directly linked to the compliance 
of vessels with conservation measures.  
The main outcome of the meeting was the development of a matrix to assess the impact and 
frequency of non-compliance activities of CCAMLR vessels.448  The matrix allows DOCEP to 
assign a non-compliance status of negligible, minor, major, serious or critical to the conservation 
measures of CCAMLR in order to determine the urgency of action being taken.449  DOCEP notes 
that this process was similar to the listing of IUU vessels by the CCAMLR, however, the 
information arising from the Workshop had significant potential to assist CCAMLR’s decision 
making processes.450  The draft matrix developed by DOCEP was discussed and endorsed at 
CCAMLR XXVII.451   
In 2010, work on the outcomes of the performance review continued with the Scientific 
Committee, the Standing Committee on Implementation and Compliance (SCIC) and the 
Commission forming working groups to report back on progress made under each of the review 
recommendations.452  The Commission noted good progress regarding the performance review 
in relation to flag State duties, port State measures and monitoring, control and surveillance.453 
Also in 2010, the Commission noted intersessional work conducted by DOCEP and noted that in 
2011, DOCEP would continue to work intersessionally via electronic means.454  A proposal by 
the European Union concerning the adoption of a trade-related measure was again considered at 
CCAMLR-XXIX,455 however the proposal was stalled by several countries.456   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
445 Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Report of the Twenty Eighth Meeting of the 
Commission, Hobart, Australia, 26 October - 6 November 2009, paragraph 8.37.  Available on line at 
<http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/cr/09/all.pdf> 
446 Ibid. 
447 Ibid, Appendix VI. 
448 See for example the DOCEP case study of Conservation Measure 26-01in Appendix VII of Commission for the Conservation 
of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Report of the Twenty Eighth Meeting of the Commission, Hobart, Australia, 26 October - 
6 November 2009.  Available on line at <http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/cr/09/all.pdf>  
449 Ibid paragraph 34. 
450 Ibid paragraph 40. 
451 Ibid paragraph 8.38. 
452 Andrew Wright, Executive Secretary, Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 
<Andrew_Wright@ccamlr.org> “CCAMLR Meet” (27 October 2010) (personal e mail). 
453 Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Report of the Twenty-ninth Meeting of the 
Commission, CCAMLR-XXIX, Hobart, Australia, 25 October - 5 November 2010, 67. 
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4.4  Indian Ocean Tuna Commission 
Background 
The Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC 
Agreement)457 was adopted by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in 
November 1993.  Entering into force in 1996, the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) retains 
a special relationship to the FAO in that it is legally an article XIV body of the FAO and does not 
function via an independent secretariat in the traditional RFMO approach. While this relationship 
is unique, it has been reported to have caused significant problems for the IOTC in a budgetary 
context and in terms of participation by relevant flag States.458 
The IOTC is responsible for the Indian Ocean and adjacent seas north of the Antarctic 
Convergence to the extent that it is necessary for the purpose of conserving and managing 
migrating tuna stocks.459  In addition to the range of tuna stocks under the purview of the 
Commission,460 the Secretariat also collates data on non-target, associated and dependent 
species which may be affected by tuna fishing in the Indian Ocean.461 
The primary objective of the IOTC is to ‘promote cooperation among its Members with a view to 
ensuring, through appropriate management, the conservation and optimum utilisation of stocks 
covered by this Agreement and encouraging sustainable development of fisheries...’462  However 
the fulfilment of this objective has proven difficult for the IOTC and its CPs.463  The IOTC 
Performance Review recognises the need for improvement in regards to compliance, an issue 
which affects both CPs and NCPs.464  
The compliance concerns facing the IOTC are highlighted throughout the Report of the 
Performance Review Panel.465  This review demonstrates low levels of compliance with IOTC 
measures are commonplace and limited action has been taken to remedy the situation.466  
Currently, the IOTC IUU Vessel List applies only to NCPs and there are currently no sanctions or 
penalties available to address non-compliance.  
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The IOTC Compliance Committee was established in 2002 and is designed to report to the 
Commission on the status of compliance by CPs with conservation measures.467  However, the 
performance review panel suggests that the ability of the IOTC Compliance Committee to 
address and monitor non-compliance is limited.  The review panel proposed that mechanisms to 
sanction non-compliance should be developed and the IUU vessel list be amended to allow for 
the inclusion of vessels flagged to CPs.  
4.4.1  IOTC objectives 
The IOTC Agreement includes several references to the need for the IOTC to promote 
cooperation amongst CPs.   Such provisions provide an important basis for promoting productive 
relationships between CPs which is an essential tool in improving compliance.  Article IV of the 
IOTC Agreement provides that CPs shall cooperate to encourage any State which is entitled to 
become a CP to accede to the Agreement.  Furthermore, article V states that the IOTC shall 
‘encourage, recommend and coordinate’468 information sharing activities and recognise the need 
for equitable participation of all CPs.  
The IOTC Agreement also makes reference to the need for CPs to ensure that they take action 
under national legislation to ensure that penalties are implemented for violations of conservation 
and management measures.469  It is specifically stated that such measures are binding upon CPs 
under paragraph 1 of article IX.  Significantly, under article X(3), CPs are also required to 
cooperate in the establishment of an appropriate system to review the implementation of 
conservation and management measures and monitor fishing activities. 
4.4.2  Conservation measures 
The IOTC adopts the terminology of ‘resolutions’ rather than ‘conservation measures’ to describe 
the measures it adopts to regulate the activities of its CPs.470  These resolutions are binding on 
CPs in the same manner that conservation measures are binding on CPs of the CCAMLR, 
however in the IOTC, CPs are not bound if they make a specific objection to the resolution.471   
The informal measures adopted by the IOTC are referred to as ‘recommendations’ which, in light 
of the fact that they are non-binding, rely upon the voluntary actions of States to be upheld.472 
4.4.2.1  Formal measures 
The IOTC has adopted a series of measures aimed at enhancing cooperation with both CPs and 
NCPs.  Resolution 98/05, for instance, provides that the Chairman of the IOTC should send a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
467 IOTC Performance Review, above n 458, 36. 
468 IOTC, above n 457, article V. 
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470 IOTC, above n 461. 
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472 Ibid. 
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letter to all NCPs known to have vessels fishing in the IOTC Area to urge them to become CPs.  
Such an approach is important compliance enforcement measure to maintain relationships 
between the IOTC and interested parties.   
Resolution 01/03 is more direct in targeting the vessels of NCPs and refers to the establishment 
of a scheme to promote compliance. Under this resolution, evidence that NCP vessels are fishing 
contrary to IOTC regulations should be reported to the authorities and the flag State made aware 
of the situation. Such vessels are to be inspected and all landings and transhipments by the 
vessel should be prohibited by all CP ports.   
Resolution 07/01 is aimed at promoting compliance by nationals of CPs and cooperating NCPs.  
It provides that relevant agencies of CPs should cooperate to investigate allegations concerning 
the engagement of their nationals in IUU fishing and that they should take action in this respect.   
Finally, Resolution 10/11 on on port State measures to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing came into effect on 1 March 2011 and makes provision for 
CPs to report information including a list of designated ports and information about the 
designated competent authority in each port State.  
The IOTC has created several resolutions concerning the need for improved vessel control of 
IUU fishing vessels.  Resolution 99/02 calls for specific action to be taken against the fishing 
activities of large scale ‘flag of convenience’ longline vessels.  This is to occur via CPs denying 
such vessels a license to fish and refusing landing and transhipment by such vessels.  
Resolution 09/03 provides for the creation of a list of vessels presumed to have carried out IUU 
fishing in the IOTC Area.  IUU vessel lists are noted in Chapter 3 to be a key compliance 
enforcement mechanism in their ability to ‘name and shame’ the perpetrating States and vessels. 
Other associated and supporting resolutions include Resolution 99/03 which provides for a 
control and inspection scheme to be set up under the IOTC as well as Resolution 06/03 which 
establishes a vessel monitoring system in the IOTC Area to standardise the systems adopted by 
CPs.   
Significant steps were taken at the meeting of the IOTC in Busan, Korea in 2010 to address non-
compliance.473  At this meeting, the IOTC adopted Resolution 10/10 on trade-related measures 
which, importantly, provides a legally binding measure to allow the IOTC to take measures 
against CPs who repeatedly fail to discharge their obligations as well as NCPs who fail to 
discharge their obligations under international law.   
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This resolution allows the Compliance Committee to propose to the IOTC to adopt non-
discriminatory WTO-consistent trade-related measures against non-compliant States.   It 
provides that in the case of CPs, actions such as the reduction of existing quotas or catch limits 
should be carried out before consideration is given to trade-related measures which should be 
considered only where other actions have proven unsuccessful or would not be effective.   
 
Resolution 10/09 was also agreed in 2010 to change the manner in which the IOTC Compliance 
Committee conducts its business.  Concerned about the level of flag State compliance, the 
Commission agreed that amongst other responsibilities, the IOTC Compliance Committee should 
develop a scheme of sanctions to provide greater direction in dealing with issues of non-
compliance.  This measure also serves to clarify the obligation of all CPs to ensure the proper 
implementation of ‘IOTC legislation’.474 
 
4.4.2.2  Informal measures 
With the upgrading of Recommendation 03/05 to a Resolution, the IOTC has only one informal 
measure or recommendation.  Recommendation 03/04 concerns the enhancement of 
effectiveness of IOTC measures to eliminate IUU activities in the IOTC Area.  This 
recommendation recognises that the Commission has endorsed the cooperative management 
frameworks that have been concluded between the Seychelles, Vanuatu and Japan.  It further 
notes that the Commission urges these three States to implement the frameworks properly and 
to continue to report on an annual basis concerning their progress in this regard.   
4.4.3  Future compliance initiatives  
The full implications of Resolution 10/10 on trade-related measures is yet to be seen and parties 
are keen to note that such measures must only be utilised as a last resort.  It is foreseen that in 
the future, the elements of Resolution 10/10 will be incorporated in the scheme of sanctions that 
the Compliance Committee will develop under Resolution 10/09.  Such an approach has been 
effective in other RFMOs such as ICCAT and it is hoped that this measure will result in increased 
compliance with IOTC Resolutions. 
At the 2010 meeting of the IOTC, another important conservation measure dealing with 
compliance was forwarded by the European Community.  The proposal was made with regard to 
the introduction of a Catch Documentation Programme (CDP) to supersede the current IOTC 
Statistical Document Programme for Bigeye Tuna.475  This CDP would apply to yellowfin, bigeye 
and skipjack tunas only.  No consensus could be reached on this proposal; with some CPs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
474 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation, 'Collection of Resolutions and 
Recommendations by the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission' (2010) 188.  Available on line at 
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concerned that as the Programme only applied to three specific tropical tuna species, it would 
create confusion in the CPs exporting fish to the European market. 476  
 
The report of the 8th Session of the Compliance Committee provided an update on the progress 
made following the 2008 IOTC Performance Review.477  The update provides that the revised 
terms of reference for the Compliance Committee should assist in following up on infringements 
by CPs and that the Compliance Committee will also develop a scheme of incentives and 
sanctions to encourage compliance by all CPs.478  The development of a strict system of market 
related measures is noted as high priority by the Compliance Committee.479 
4.5  Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna  
Background 
The Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) arose out of a 
voluntary agreement between Australia, New Zealand and Japan which was established in the 
1980s.480  In the early 1990s, the three States decided to formalise this agreement and in 1993 
they signed a Convention creating the CCSBT.481  The CCSBT has its headquarters in Canberra, 
Australia and today, numerous other States which have been active in the fishery for southern 
bluefin tuna have joined the Commission.482 
The CCSBT has also admitted the Philippines, South Africa and the European Community as 
CNPs, a status which is regarded as a transitional measure to achieving full membership of the 
Commission.  These States have also been admitted to the Extended Commission and Extended 
Scientific Committee of the CCSBT, which perform the same tasks as the Commission and have 
the same Secretariat as the Commission.483   
In July 2008, the CCSBT underwent a self-assessment of its performance.484  This assessment 
is now accompanied by the report of an independent expert issued in September of 2008 which 
was designed to offer recommendations of its own concerning the performance of this 
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organisation.485  The report of the independent expert noted the concerns of the organisation that 
it had not managed to prevent serious overfishing of southern bluefin tuna (SBT), or to prevent 
under-reporting of catches.486   
In addition, the independent expert also noted that the CCBST had only just begun to seriously 
tackle compliance and enforcement issues.487  It highlighted the fact that in 2008, the 
Commission did not have a suite of measures in place relating to compliance and although most 
CPs require vessels to use VMS, the CCSBT had not implemented a conservation measure to 
this effect.  It was reported that the Commission needed to work towards adopting a broader set 
of Port State measures to prevent the landing and transhipment of IUU SBT catch by both CPs 
and NCPs.488 
Since the release of the report in 2008, the CCSBT has made progress with regard to the 
findings of this report and established significant conservation measures pertaining to 
compliance. 
4.5.1  CCSBT objectives 
The primary objective of the CCSBT, as expressed in its founding agreement, is to ‘ensure, 
through appropriate management, the conservation and optimum utilisation of southern bluefin 
tuna.’489  Under article 5, the Convention provides that Parties shall take all action necessary to 
ensure enforcement and compliance with binding measures which should be developed at the 
earliest possible time to monitor all fishing activities relating to SBT.490 
The Convention of the CCSBT goes into considerable depth on the need to promote membership 
and compliance by NCPs.  To this end, the Commission should invite membership by any State 
not party to the Convention whose nationals, residents or fishing vessels harvest SBT.491  Parties 
must cooperate with each other in this regard under article 13 and should act to encourage 
accession by States ‘where the Commission considers this to be desirable.’  Upon signing the 
Convention, Parties agree to invite the attention of any NCP to any matter which might affect the 
attainment of the objective of the Convention.492 
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Under article 15(3), Parties should take appropriate measures to prevent their registered vessels 
from transferring registration to avoid compliance with the conservation measures of the CCSBT.  
Furthermore, article 15(4) provides that Parties should cooperate in taking measures to deter 
fishing activities for SBT where such action could affect the attainment of the objective of the 
Convention.   
4.5.2  Conservation measures 
 
The CCSBT has implemented both formal ‘Resolutions’ and informal ‘Recommendations’ to give 
effect to its mandate. The Recommendations of the CCSBT do not currently relate to compliance 
and as such are not considered in this section.  
 
4.5.2.1  Formal measures 
The CCSBT has implemented a ‘Resolution on action plans to ensure compliance with 
Conservation and Management Measures’493 requiring CPs and NCPs to submit an action plan 
on compliance with conservation and management measures by April 1 2010.  This plan must 
include a scheme concerning how the State will systematically verify catch data and information 
on ecologically related species to the Secretariat.   
Following the findings of the 2008 Performance Review, the CCSBT implemented a ‘Resolution 
on Establishing a Program for Transhipment by Large-Scale Fishing Vessels’ in recognition of 
the need to ensure monitoring of such transhipment in areas beyond national jurisdiction.  The 
‘Resolution on establishing the CCSBT Vessel Monitoring System’ was also formulated in 
response to the Performance Review and recognises the need for monitoring, control and 
surveillance measures to apply to all sectors of the global southern bluefin tuna fishery.   
This measure provides that all CPs and CNPs must ensure that no vessels under their registry 
carry out IUU fishing activities and also must take necessary measures to ensure that the owners 
of vessels are citizens or legal entities within the flag State itself to allow for punitive action to be 
taken.494  Further to this, the Executive Secretary is to maintain a CCSBT Record of fishing 
vessels registered to fish for SBT and to ensure this information is published publically.495  
On 1 January 2010, the CCSBT implemented a Catch Documentation Scheme (CDS) to replace 
the redundant Trade Information Scheme (TIS).  The ‘Resolution on the Implementation of a 
CCSBT Catch Documentation Scheme’496 covers all landings, transhipments, exports, imports 
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and re-exports of SBT whereas the TIS only covered international trade in SBT.497 It requires 
whole SBT to be tagged at the time of the kill and that the tag remain until the first point of 
domestic sale498 and provides that the Compliance Committee must review the resolution no 
later than its 2011 meeting.  
The CCSBT has also adopted a ‘Resolution on amendment of the Resolution on ‘Illegal, 
Unregulated and Unreported Fishing (IUU) and Establishment of a CCSBT Record of Vessels 
over 24 meters Authorized to Fish for Southern Bluefin Tuna’ adopted at the CCSBT15 in 2008’.  
While this list comprises a record of fishing vessels authorised to fish for southern bluefin tuna, it 
is not a specific list of unauthorised vessels or vessels considered to be undertaking IUU fishing 
for southern bluefin tuna.499  
While the CCSBT has also adopted an Action Plan concerning the obligation of CPs to take 
action against fishing which could adversely affect the objective of the Convention which allows 
the Commission to impose trade-related measures on SBT products.  However since the 
introduction of the CCSBT CDS, the Action Plan has essentially become redundant.500  
4.5.3  Future compliance initiatives 
At the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the Commission in October 2010, there was support from 
the Extended Commission for the development of a Compliance Plan to encourage: 
• The more effective implementation of the CDS; 
• Improvement to the transhipment monitoring program; 
• Prevention of southern bluefin tuna being recorded as other species; 
• Better reporting of by-catch and discards against national allocations; and 
• Better systems to provide information to port States to improve monitoring of southern 
bluefin tuna activities.501 
Furthermore, the implementation of five draft compliance policy statements was also raised to be 
developed for consideration at the next meeting.  The RFMO has made significant developments 
since October 2008 with the introduction of resolutions on CDS and VMS502 and it is unclear 
where the compliance enforcement capacity of the RFMO will lead in the future.  It is likely that 
the Action Plans required to be submitted by States will lead to future discussions of the 
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Commission and that developments will occur as a result of the review by the Compliance 
Committee of the CDS which must occur no later than the 2011 meeting. 
4.6  Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission  
Background 
The WCPFC seeks to ensure the long term conservation and sustainable use of migratory 
species that exist in this area of the Pacific including species such as tunas, billfish and marlin.503  
The main object of the Commission is to enhance to provisions of the Agreement amongst CPs 
by developing conservation measures to that effect.504   The RFMO was established after lengthy 
negotiations of the Multilateral High Level Conference (MHLC) which began in 1994 and 
concluded in Honolulu, Hawaii in 2000.505  In the course of these negotiations, it was decided 
that principles of fisheries management including the precautionary approach, that management 
decisions be based on the best available science and ecosystems based management should 
provide the basis of the Convention. 
Australia signed the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean506 in October of 2000 and ratified the 
Agreement in September of 2003.  As of December 2009, the Convention has 25 CPs, including 
the fishing entity of Chinese-Taipei.507  In a 2010 study designed to quantitatively assess the 
effectiveness of the world’s RFMOs, the WCPFC scored consistently high across the board and 
recieved the highest overall score out of all the RFMOs assessed.508   However the WCPFC 
continues to face significant challenges.  It has openly stated concerns that Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean fish stocks are fully subscribed and therefore opportunities for new entrants to the 
RFMO are limited. 509  The WCPFC also has yet to undertake a Performance Review.   
A proposal to conduct a Performance Review was initiated in 2007 by Australia in an effort to 
bring the WCPFC in line with recommendations made at the Kobe meetings.510  At that time it 
was agreed that the review should be deferred with Japan suggesting a review not be 
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undertaken until 2009 in light of time considerations.511 To date it appears that the review has 
been postponed for future consideration.512   
In order to overcome the difficulties associated with objections in respect of decision-making, the 
WCPFC has established a general rule that decisions made by the organisation are to be by 
consensus.  However if all efforts to reach such consensus have been exhausted, decisions can 
be made by vote.  Where a decision involves a question of procedure, a majority vote will prevail 
however where a decision involves a question of substance a three-fourths majority is required.  
4.6.1  WCPFC objectives 
The founding Convention of the WCPFC includes a comprehensive suite of provisions aimed 
achieving compliance from both CPs and NCPs.  The Agreement itself reflects deliberations on 
principles including ecosystem based management and equality amongst developing and 
developed States. Amongst these, notable provisions include those relating specifically to the 
duties and responsibilities of flag States, port State measures and trade-related measures. This 
section will briefly analyse the content of these provisions. 
Article 27 of the Convention provides that port States are under an obligation to promote the 
effectiveness of subregional, regional and global conservation and management measures. In 
this regard, a port State may not discriminate against the fishing vessel of any State; however 
they may adopt regulations to prohibit landings and transhipments where the catch has been 
taken in a manner which undermines the objectives of the WCPFC.  
This notion is reinforced in article 25(11) of the Convention which provides that CPs may take 
action to deter vessels which have engaged in such activities.  To this effect, the Commission is 
authorised, when necessary, to develop procedures which allow for non-discriminatory trade-
related measures to be taken against any State, ‘whose fishing vessels fish in a manner which 
undermines the effectiveness of the conservation and management measures adopted by the 
Commission.’  The inclusion of this provision reflects the commitment of CPs to allowing the use 
of trade-related measures to be adopted and recognises that the taking of such measures by an 
RFMO is consistent with international law.   
While the flag State obligations embodied in the Convention are many and varied, they are 
largely concerned with the commitment of States to comply and to allow easy exchange of 
information in the case of a breach of compliance.  Part V deals with the duties of flag States and 
provides that no CP shall allow vessels to be used for fishing the species covered by the 
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Convention in areas beyond national jurisdiction, unless authorised to do so.513  Furthermore, 
CPs must take measures to ensure that nationals and fishing vessels comply with the provisions 
of the Convention.514  
More specifically, CPs are required to cooperate to establish mechanisms for effective 
monitoring, control and surveillance; including the use of VMS.515  Where it has been established 
that the vessel of a CP has been non-compliant, States must ensure that the vessel ceases 
fishing activities until sanctions have been complied with.516 Finally, CPs must establish 
arrangements for making available information required to allow for the exchange of evidence in 
respect of alleged violations.517 
4.6.2  Conservation measures 
 
In the WCPFC, the formal and binding decisions made by the RFMO are referred to as 
‘Conservation and Management Measures’.  Such decisions are numbered and include the year 
of adoption.  Informal measures are referred to as ‘Resolutions’ and describe non-binding 
statements and recommendations addressed to CPs and CNPs.  The WCPFC also has a third 
category of measures referred to as ‘Other Decisions of the Commission’ and describe all other 
decisions made by the Commission.   
 
4.6.2.1 Formal measures 
The formal measures the WCPFC has implemented in respect of compliance range from 
boarding and inspection measures to IUU vessel lists.  The Conservation Measure entitled 
‘Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission Boarding and Inspection Procedures’ 
provides that each CP must ensure that vessels accept such procedures and that any evidence 
obtained should be referred to the authorities of the fishing vessel.   
Conservation and Management Measure 2009-11 entitled ‘Cooperating Non-Members’ provides 
that any NCP with an interest in the fishery may request the Commission for the status of 
cooperating non-member.518  The WCPFC Technical and Compliance Committee (WCPFC-TCC) 
will then assess whether such status may be granted by taking into account factors such as the 
State’s record of responding to IUU activity.519 
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The ‘Conservation and Management Measure for Compliance Monitoring Scheme’ was adopted 
in 2010 at the Seventh Regular Session of the WCPFC.520  This measure implements a scheme 
to ensure that CPs, CNPs and participating territories (CCMs) implement and comply with the 
WCPFC Convention.   The measure allows the Commission to respond to non-compliance in a 
manner which takes account of the reasons behind the non-compliance and its degree.  Actions 
may range from cooperative capacity-building initiatives through to penalties and other actions as 
may be necessary.521  
The ‘Conservation Measure to Establish a List of Vessels Presumed to have Carried out Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Activities in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean’ 
provides for identification of such vessels at each annual meeting.  Under this measure, CPs are 
obliged to forward to the Secretariat a list of vessels presumed to be carrying out IUU activities in 
the Convention Area.522  Once the list has been adopted, CPs must take all necessary measures 
to eliminate these activities including non-discriminatory trade-related measures or withdrawing 
the registration of fishing license of the vessels involved.523 
Lastly the ‘Conservation and Management Measure for Vessels Without Nationality’ provides that 
vessels without nationality are presumed to be operating in contravention of the Convention.  As 
such, the measure actively encourages all CPs to take action, including enacting domestic 
legislation to prevent such vessels from undermining the effectiveness of the Convention.   
4.6.3  Future compliance initiatives 
 
Being a relatively new organisation, work on compliance and management with the objectives of 
the WCPFC is still in its early stages however procedures are in place to improve monitoring and 
reporting from within the Secretariat.524  The WCPFC-TCC is in the process of considering a 
Control of Nationals Conservation Measure.525  Further, the issue of a Catch Documentation 
Scheme (CDS) has been raised by the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), the European Community 
and Japan. 
 
However in the past there has not been consensus between CPs on the matter of a CDS.  There 
is a general feeling that CDSs have become redundant and this matter has not yet been 
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resolved.526 In regards to the implementation of a Conservation Measure on trade-related 
measures there has not been any work done within the WCPFC in this regard, however, it has 
been discussed briefly by the Commission especially with regard to sanctioning acts of non-
compliance.527    
4.7  South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation  
Background 
International consultations on the proposed South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisation (SPRFMO) were initiated in February 2006 by Australia, Chile and New Zealand.528 
In May 2007, voluntary interim measures were adopted by Australia and other participants to 
manage the fishery whilst negotiations were being concluded.529  These measures were adopted 
to regulate both pelagic and demersal fisheries in the South Pacific Ocean in the interests of 
sustainably managing non-highly migratory fish and vulnerable marine ecosystems.530  The sixth 
international consultation on the establishment of the SPRFMO was held in Australia in October 
2008.531 
On 14 November 2009, the Convention on the Conservation and Management of the High Seas 
Fishery Resources of the South Pacific Ocean532 was adopted in Auckland, New Zealand 
solidifying the commitment of States signatories to managing this fishery, however, the 
agreement itself has yet to enter into force.533 Until the Convention enters into force, the 
SPRFMO remains a theoretical Agreement.534  To become a fully fledged RFMO, the SPRFMO 
required ratification, accession, acceptance or approval by eight States; of which three must be 
coastal States and three non-coastal States.535 If after three years of its adoption the Convention 
has not entered into force, it will enter into force six months after the deposit of the tenth 
instrument of ratification, accession, acceptance or approval.536 
The entry into force of the SPRFMO will close the gap in the international conservation and 
management of fisheries from the most eastern part of the South Indian Ocean through the 
Pacific towards the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of South America.537  Negotiations for the 
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SPRFMO aimed to establish an organisation in which the precautionary and ecosystem 
approaches to fisheries management would be central to the conservation and management 
measures adopted by the organisation.538  The emphasis on non-tuna species means that the 
focus of the organisation is more holistic to ensure the long-term conservation of marine 
ecosystems.539 
4.7.1  SPRFMO objectives 
As noted above, the SPRFMO Convention provides a comprehensive outline of the duties of 
States parties and provides a clear picture of the manner in which compliance is to be achieved 
within the RFMO.  The Convention begins with a statement under article 3(ix) that CPs, the 
Commission and subsidiary bodies should ensure compliance by implementing sanctions to 
deprive offenders of the benefits to be gained from their activities.  This sends a strong message 
that this RFMO is willing to take real action in the compliance enforcement measures they adopt.   
In this regard, the Convention establishes the obligations of CPs of the Commission as including 
taking all necessary measures to ensure the effectiveness of conservation measures under 
article 24.  CPs are required to report to the Commission on an annual basis to demonstrate how 
measures have been implemented and how compliance has been achieved. Each CP must take 
measures to ensure compliance by nationals or fishing vessels owned by its nationals and 
immediately investigate any alleged violations against them.  In addition, under article 8 of the 
Convention the Commission itself must: 
• develop and establish of effective monitoring, control, surveillance, compliance and 
enforcement procedures, including non-discriminatory market-related and trade-related 
measures; 
• develop processes in accordance with international law to assess flag State performance 
with respect to the implementation of their obligations under this Convention and adopt 
proposals, if appropriate, to promote implementation of such obligations; and 
• adopt measures to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing.540 
Article 11 of the SPRFMO Convention provides for the creation of a Compliance and Technical 
Committee to ‘monitor and review the implementation of, and compliance with, conservation and 
management measures adopted under this Convention and provide advice and 
recommendations to the Commission’.  The creation of this Committee is essential for the 
effective operation of the SPRFMO and mimics similar provisions in other AusRFMOs.  Where 
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the SPRFMO Convention stands out against other RFMOs is in its recognition of the special 
requirements of developing States.   
Article 19 of the Convention is dedicated to formally recognising the role of developing States 
within the SPRFMO and provides that CPs must cooperate to enhance the ability of developing 
States to conserve and manage fishery resources.  The Convention articulates that such 
cooperation should occur via the provision of financial assistance, technical assistance, transfer 
of technology and through joint venture arrangements which should be directed towards 
monitoring, control, surveillance, compliance and enforcement. This express use of terminology 
depicting the manner in which cooperation should occur is designed to assist the Commission in 
promoting future compliance by removing ambiguities.  
The Convention contains separate provisions relating directly to flag State and port State duties.  
Under article 25, concerning flag State duties, the Convention provides that CPs must take all 
necessary measures to ensure compliance by fishing vessels flying its flag and do not conduct 
unauthorised fishing within waters under national jurisdiction adjacent to the Convention Area.  
This interesting provision extends the ambit of the jurisdiction of the RFMO beyond the high seas 
to include the territorial waters of coastal States.  No similar provision is present in the other 
AusRFMOs examined in this thesis which is most likely to be explained as a consequence of the 
strict adherence of the SPRFMO to the provisions of the UNFSA.  Article 26 of the Convention 
provides that port States have a duty to take measures to promote the effectiveness of 
conservation measures; but that the State should not discriminate in form or fact.  
Provisions relating to the implementation of VMS, transhipment, the implementation of market-
related measures and IUU vessel lists are contained in article 27 of the Convention relating to 
monitoring, compliance and enforcement.  These procedures are available to the Commission to 
be applied to any ‘state, member of the Commission, or entity’ whose vessels engage in activities 
that diminish the effectiveness of the conservation and management measures adopted by the 
Commission.  In this respect, the reason for non-compliance and degree of non-compliance 
should be taken into account and where trade-related measures are implemented, they must be 
consistent with the CP’s international obligations.  
Finally, the SPRFMO contains provisions for the implementation of an observer programme in 
article 28 and provisions relating to the deterrence of non-compliance by non-parties are 
contained in article 32.  Article 32 provides that CPs shall take measures consistent with the 
Convention to deter activities of vessels flying the flags of NCPs.  Such incidences should be 
reported to the Commission in combination with detailed reporting of any actions taken. 
4.7.2  Conservation measures 
There are currently no SPRFMO conservation measures in existence. 
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4.7.3 Future compliance initiatives 
 
In another unique move, the SPRFMO contains a provision in its Convention noting the need for 
regional fisheries management organisations and arrangements to undertake performance 
reviews. In light of this provision it is likely that with entry into force, the SPRFMO would 
undertake regular performance assessments to determine the degree to which conservation and 
management objectives are being met.  Furthermore article 30 provides that the Commission will 
review the effectiveness of conservation and management measures as a priority.541 
 
The creation of a Review Panel is another interesting addition to the SPRFMO approach 
whereby this subsidiary body of the RFMO would be tasked with determining objections relating 
to discrimination against CPs.  It provides that where a CP objects to a conservation measure on 
the grounds that it is discriminatory, the alternative measures proposed by the objecting CP will 
be binding upon that party or group of parties as a substitution for the original measure. The 
Review Panel may then recommend modifications be made to the original measure if a finding of 
discrimination has been made.  
 
This procedure seeks to overcome to problems caused by objecting party States whereby a CP 
can elect not to be bound by the decisions of the Commission and can thereby avoid compliance 
requirements.  The integration of a Review Panel in the SPRFMO allows for compliance 
requirements to be imposed upon objecting CPs in future decisions of the Commission when the 
Agreement enters into force.  
4.8  Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement 
Background 
The Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement542 (SIOFA) seeks to ensure the long-term 
conservation and sustainable use of fisheries resources other than tunas in areas that fall outside 
national jurisdictions.543  This includes the management of demersal fish species including 
alfonsino and orange roughy.544  The achievement of management objectives in the SIOFA are 
provided for by the formulation of a ‘Meeting of Parties’ designed to adopt legally binding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
541 Ibid, article 30. 
542 Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement, opened for signature 7 July 2006.  Full text of the Agreement can be found on 
line at: <http://www.ecolex.org/server2.php/libcat/docs/multilateral/en/TRE144077.pdf> 
543 Article 2 of the Agreement states that its objectives are to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of fishery 
resources in the Area and to promote the sustainable development of fisheries taking into account the needs of developing 
States bordering the Area, particularly the least-developed among them and small island developing States.  
544 D.W. Japp, 'Workshop on the Implementation of the FAO Guidelines for the Management of Deep-Sea Fisheries in the High 
Seas - Implementation of the Guidelines in Areas where no Competent RFMO/A is in Place' (Discussion Paper 3, Food and 
Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, 2010) 3. 
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conservation and management measures which CPs will be required to implement and 
enforce.545 
The Agreement was adopted after a raft of negotiations concerning the regulation of the Area.  In 
2005, following a decision to split the negotiation of the South West Indian Ocean Fisheries 
Commission (SWIOFC), negotiations for a specific high seas agreement extending to the west 
coast of Australia began.546  In 2006, a Conference of the Plenipotentiaries for the Adoption of 
the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement was held at the Headquarters of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in Rome, Italy.547  At this meeting, the text 
of the agreement establishing the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA) was 
adopted and the FAO was named as the Secretariat or depository of the Agreement.548  
Instead of establishing an RFMO, the SIOFA relies on an Annual ‘Meetings of Parties’ to carry 
out its objectives, including through the adoption of legally binding conservation and 
management measures.549  In this way, the SIOFA establishes a fisheries ‘arrangement’ rather 
than a fully-fledged RFMO.  Under article 24, the Agreement is to enter into force ninety days 
from the date of receipt of the fourth instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval; of which 
two must be made by a coastal State bordering the Area.550   
Recognition of the needs of developing states bordering the region and party to the Agreement is 
one of the key objectives of the SIOFA551 and with this objective in mind the Government of 
Mauritius became the fourth State to ratify the SIOFA on 13 August 2010.  Joining the Cook 
Islands, the European Union and the Seychelles in ratifying the SIOFA, Mauritius provided the 
grounds for the Agreement to enter into force and today, the SIOFA is fully operational.552 
The creation of a RFMO for the Southern Indian Ocean has been a primary objective of the 
Southern Indian Ocean Deepsea Fisheries Association (SIODFA) since its formation in 2006.553  
While the SIOFA is yet to adopt any formal conservation measures in this area, the SIODFA is 
hopeful that the Agreement will establish effective mechanisms to monitor fishing in the region 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
545 Ibid. 
546 E.J Molenaar, 'New Areas and Gaps: How to Address Them' (Paper presented at the Conference on the Governance of 
High Seas Fisheries and the UN Fish Agreement, St John's, Newfoundland and Labrador, 1 - 5 May 2005).  Available on line at 
<http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/fgc-cgp/documents/molenaar_e.htm#RFMOs> 
547 FAO Legal Office Treaties, Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (2010) <http://www.fao.org/legal/treaties/035s-
e.htm> at 8 May 2010. 
548 Ibid. 
549 Molenaar, above n 546. 
550 FAO Legal Office, above n 547. 
551 Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission, 'Regional Fisheries Contacts: South Indian Ocean Fishery Agreement' (2010).  Available 
on line <http://www.apfic.org/modules/addresses/visit.php?cid=2&lid=110> 
552 Fish Information and Services, Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement comes into force (2010) 
<http://fis.com/fis/worldnews/worldnews.asp?l=e&country=0&special=&monthyear=&day=&id=37823&ndb=1&df=0> at 22 May 
2010. 
553 Baird Maritime, Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement comes into effect (2010) 
<http://www.bairdmaritime.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7697:southern-indian-ocean-fisheries-
agreement-comes-into-effect&catid=75:fisheries&Itemid=68> at 22 April 2010 
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and provide annual reports on fishing operations.554 It has noted that the entry into force of the 
SIOFA should remove any uncertainty and delay over introducing essential fisheries 
management measures.555  The strength of these propositions has yet to be seen given that in 
light of its newness, the SIOFA has yet to establish conservation measures in the area under its 
purview. 
4.8.1  SIOFA objectives 
The Convention of the SIOFA sets out limited compliance measures relating to CP obligations, 
the control of NCPs, boarding and inspection, transhipment regulations and the creation of a 
compliance committee.  Article 6 of the Agreement sets out the general duties and obligations of 
the ‘Meeting of the Parties’.  In particular, article 6(1)(g) provides that the Meeting of Parties 
should promote cooperation among CPs to ensure that conservation measures are adopted in a 
manner compatible with the fishery resources.   
By placing responsibility for the actions of fishing vessels and nationals on CPs, article 10(3) of 
the Agreement makes the flag State responsible for any breach of a conservation measure that 
might occur.  This is developed further in article 10(4) which provides that each CP should 
investigate an ‘alleged serious violation’ by that flag States’ national or fishing vessel and report 
to all CPs as soon as practical concerning actions taken in response to the alleged breach. 
CPs are also required to take all measures to ensure that fishing vessels comply with the 
provisions of the Agreement and that fishing vessels do not conduct unauthorised fishing in 
waters under national jurisdiction (article 11[1][a]).  The role that CPs have in assisting 
developing States to the Agreement is expanded in article 13(3)(a) and (b), both of which provide 
that CPs have a duty to ensure that they enhance the ability of developing States to conserve 
and manage fisheries resources, as well as assist them in achieving this goal.  
The Agreement contains several provisions relevant to NCPs,556 calling for cooperation, 
information exchange and the taking of internationally acceptable steps against NCPs in 
instances of non-compliance.  Outlining the role of the Meeting of Parties, article 6.1 proposes 
that the parties shall ‘in accordance with international law and any applicable instruments’ draw 
the attention of NCPs to activities which undermine the objectives of the Agreement.  This, as 
suggested in article 6(3), might including the setting aside of fishing opportunities for NCPs if 
necessary.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
554 DAFF, above n 529. 
555 Baird Maritime, above n 553. 
556 Daniel Owen, "Practice of RFMOs Regarding non-Members: A Report to Support the Independent High Level Panel to 
Develop a Model for Improved Governance by RFMOs", Cambridge, United Kingdom, February 2007, 8. 
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Article 6(4) provides that the Meeting of Parties can review the ‘participation in fishing 
opportunities of non-contracting Parties’ by taking into account their implementation of 
conservation measures.  Interestingly, this article appears to extend the ambit of the Agreement 
beyond control of CPs, however, the Agreement remains unclear as to what kind of ‘review’ 
might be undertaken and how any restrictions might actually impact upon NCPs.  
Finally, a cooperation provision is inserted in article 17.4 that requires CPs to ‘request’ NCPs to 
cooperate fully in the implementation of conservation measures.  It goes on to provide that 
cooperating NCPs will enjoy benefits from the fishery commensurate to their commitment to 
comply.  In other words, those vessels that cooperate fully might enjoy a certain quota in respect 
of the relevant stocks.    
The Agreement goes into little detail on how a system for boarding and inspection might be 
installed.557  While there is scope for conservation measures to be implemented in this respect, it 
would be beneficial to the Agreement to contain a provision concerning when and how boarding 
and inspections would be expected to take place.  Reference is made in article 6(1) to the 
provision that the Meeting of Parties shall develop ’rules concerning the boarding and inspection 
of vessels operating in the Area’, however, this is contained in a side note to the more broad 
provision relating to monitoring, control and surveillance. 
As discussed in relation to the duties of CPs, article 11(1) establishes that CPs should take 
measures to ensure that they develop and implement a ‘satellite vessel monitoring system’ for 
fishing vessels flying their flag.  The implementation of a vessel monitoring scheme is one of the 
means through which CPs could act to fulfil their concurrent obligation to develop rules and 
procedures for effective monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing activities as mentioned in 
article 6(1).  
It is stated in article 7 of the Agreement that the Meeting of Parties shall establish a Compliance 
Committee to ‘verify the implementation of and compliance with such measures’.  While the 
establishment of the Compliance Committee in itself is not a compliance enforcement 
mechanism, the Agreement does contain a provision to establish a compliance enforcement 
regime.  Article 12(2) of the Agreement states that CPs shall not permit ‘landings, transhipment 
or supply services’ to fishing vessels unless satisfied that the fish on board have been caught in 
a manner consistent with conservation measures. The Agreement does not detail how CPs are 
to establish whether a catch has been caught in consistency with conservation measures. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
557 Clark, E. A. 2010. ‘Compliance Enforcement and the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement’ SIODFA Tech. Rep. 
01/10, at 7. 
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4.8.2  Conservation measures 
 
Having entered into force in August 2010, the SIOFA has yet to establish any conservation or 
management measures to regulate fisheries in the Southern Indian Ocean. 
 
4.8.3 Future compliance initiatives 
There exists a vast range of areas and directions in which the SIOFA could develop its 
management plan for bottom dwelling species.  For instance, the formulation of an IUU vessel list 
would be of great benefit to the area and would bring the SIOFA in line with similar regional 
fisheries organisations that function to regulate high seas fisheries.  Furthermore, the treaty itself 
anticipates that fishing opportunities could be set aside for NCPs under articles 6(3), 6(4) and 
13(3).  However any discussion on this area can only be speculation as the treaty has only 
recently entered into force.   
4.9  Conclusion 
This review has shed light on the compliance conservation measures in place in AusRFMOs to 
provide a point from which comparisons can be drawn in Chapter 5.  It is clear that there is 
significant variation in the number of conservation measures implemented and the topic and the 
detail of these measures. This is, of course, due in large part to the differing ages of the 
AusRFMOs with more recent agreements including the SIOFA and the SPRFMO having yet to 
develop conservation measures in line with their Convention objectives.  
By considering three levels of compliance enforcement; including the founding agreement upon 
which individual AusRFMOs have been formed, formal and informal compliance measures and 
future compliance initiatives, this chapter has provided an in-depth assessment of the methods 
RFMOs can adopt to encourage compliance.  Identifying the mechanisms currently in place and 
those being developed by each RFMO is an essential basis for the effective evaluation of the 
status of each of the AusRFMOs undertaken in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
Current shortcomings in the international fisheries regime and a continuing lack of political will by 
States to preserve ocean resources has increased the need for regional fisheries management 
organisations (RFMOs) to develop new and innovative enforcement mechanisms.558  Despite the 
constant threat posed by non-compliant States, many RFMOs have today developed techniques 
to enforce conservation and compliance with their mandate.  While many of these measures are 
only binding upon RFMO contracting parties (CPs), some are intended to, and do in fact, 
promote compliance by non-contracting parties (NCPs).559  By continuing to strengthen these 
measures and engaging in an effort to promote consistency across the board, the ability of 
RFMOs to tackle non-compliance is maximised.560  
 
This chapter analyses the extent to which compliance enforcement mechanisms have been 
implemented in RFMOs to which Australia is a party (AusRFMOs). Chapter 4 undertook a 
detailed examination of the enforcement capacity of the relevant RFMOs and this chapter 
tabulates these findings in order to analyse the key areas in which AusRFMOs can better 
implement compliance enforcement mechanisms.   
 
Table 2 is designed to assist in identifying key areas in which compliance gaps exist as well as to 
categorise the compliance mechanisms that RFMOs have already implemented.  This table 
allows interested parties to consider how other RFMOs might be addressing gaps that exist in 
their own regime and to compare tactics which may better address compliance. Table 3 
assesses the degree to which each AusRFMO has implemented specific compliance 
enforcement mechanisms to identify, on a broader scale, the areas in which AusRFMOs as a 
group require improvement. 
 
While it is not within the scope of this chapter to analyse how effective individual compliance 
measures might have been, this chapter will assess the extent to which AusRFMOs have utilised 
those compliance enforcement mechanisms available.  This chapter is distinguished from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
558 Carl Bruch and Kathryn Mengerink, 'Policy Brief: Ocean Compliance and Enforcement' (Paper presented at the 4th Global 
Conference on Oceans, Coasts, and Islands: Organization of Working Group on Compliance and Enforcement, Hanoi, 
Vietnam, April 7-11 2008) <http://www.globaloceans.org/globaloceans/sites/udel.edu.globaloceans/files/Compliance-and-
Enforcement-PB-June18.pdf>  
559 Rosemary Rayfuse, 'The Anthropocene, Autopoiesis and the Disingenuousness of the Genuine Link: Addressing 
Enforcement Gaps in the Legal Regime for Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction' (Paper presented at the Fourth J.W.H. Verzijl 
Memorial Symposium on “The Legal Regime of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction: Current Principles and Frameworks and 
Future Directions, University of Utrecht, 21 November 2008). 
560 Bruch and Mengerink, above n 558. 
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performance reviews of individual RFMOs in that it functions to compare the performance of 
AusRFMOs to identify key gaps and areas for improvement in the regional regime. In drawing 
comparisons between AusRFMOs, it is important to note that the RFMOs in question are at 
different stages of implementation, with some of the agreements only recently entering into 
force.561   
 
5.2  Analysis of compliance enforcement in AusRFMOs 
 
Chapter 4 considered the compliance enforcement capacity of AusRFMOs by identifying those 
measures already in place in convention texts and conservation measures. However it also 
recognised future compliance initiatives currently underway in the RFMOs in question. Table 2 
incorporates the findings from Chapter 4 relating to the convention or agreement text as well as 
the conservation measures of the actual RFMO.  The list of compliance enforcement 
mechanisms under consideration is based on those outlined in Chapter 3, Figure 2.562   
 
Table 3 presents a summary of the level of implementation of compliance enforcement in the six 
AusRFMOs under examination.  The allocated status includes consideration of any future 
compliance initiatives underway, as well as compliance provisions and conservation measures of 
the RFMO in question.  This section seeks to demonstrate that a lack of consistency in approach 
across AusRFMOs threatens the effectiveness of individual RFMO compliance enforcement.  In 
this respect, it is proposed that RFMOs should be aware of the work of their counterparts in an 
effort to understand when, why and how certain approaches towards compliance have been 
successful.  
  
The analysis following Tables 2 and 3 below considers the need for more uniform implementation 
of compliance enforcement measures such as trade-related measures and graded sanctions.  It 
reveals significant inconsistency in regard to the level of implementation of graded sanctions and 
argues that so long as trade-related measures are non-discriminatory in approach, certain 
AusRFMOs should work towards adopting conservation measures to give effect to this important 
countermeasure.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
561 The South Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA) has only recently entered into force whereas the South Pacific 
Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) has yet to enter into force.   
562 While 9 key areas for compliance enforcement to be undertaken are listed in Chapter 3, the area of diplomatic demarches 
has been left out of this table. 
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TOPIC CCAMLR IOTC CCSBT WCPFC SPRFMO SIOFA 
Cooperative 
Policies 
Conservation Measure 
10-03 provides that 
where an act of non-
compliance has occurred, 
CPs must cooperate with 
the flag State of the 
vessel to take 
appropriate action. 
Resolution 19/XXI urges 
all CPs and NCPs to 
cooperate to ensure that 
their nationals do not 
engage in or support IUU 
fishing.  
CCAMLR has a ‘Policy to 
Enhance Cooperation 
between CCAMLR and 
Non-Contracting Parties’ 
to encourage accession 
and compliance.   
Resolution 98/05 
provides that the 
Chairman of the IOTC 
should send a letter to 
all NCPs known to 
have vessels fishing in 
the IOTC Area to 
cooperate and become 
members to the 
Commission. 
Article IV of the IOTC 
Agreement provides 
CPs should cooperate 
to encourage any State 
to become a member to 
the Agreement.   
Article V of the IOTC 
Agreement provides 
that the IOTC shall 
encourage, recommend 
and coordinate 
information sharing.   
Articles 13 and 14 of the 
CCSBT Convention 
provide that CPs must 
cooperate to invite 
membership by any 
State not party to the 
Convention if their 
nationals fish for 
southern bluefin tuna 
(SBT). 
Part V of the WCPFC 
Convention provides 
States should 
cooperate to allow easy 
exchange of 
information.  Under this 
section of the 
Convention CPs are 
also required to 
cooperate to establish 
effective mechanisms 
for monitoring, control 
and surveillance. 
Article 19 of the 
SPRFMO Convention 
provides that members 
of the Commission 
must cooperate to 
enhance the ability of 
developing States to 
conserve and manage 
fishery resources.  It 
provides that such 
cooperation should 
occur via the provision 
of financial assistance, 
technical assistance 
and the transfer of 
technology. 
Article 6 of the 
Agreement provides 
that the Meeting of 
Parties should promote 
cooperation among 
CPs to ensure 
conservation measures 
are adopted in a 
manner compatible 
with fishery resources. 
Article 17(4) requires 
CPs to request NCPs 
to cooperate fully in the 
implementation of 
conservation 
measures.  
  
Non-Contracting 
Parties (NCPs) 
Resolution 14/XIX urges 
CCAMLR acceding 
States and NCPs to 
implement the Catch 
Documentation Scheme 
(CDS) as soon as 
possible. 
Article X of the CAMLR 
Convention provides that 
the Commission must 
draw the attention of a 
NCP to any activity 
undertaken by its 
nationals or vessels 
which affects the 
implementation of the 
objectives of the 
CCAMLR.   
 
Resolution 01/03 
provides that evidence 
that NCP vessels are 
fishing contrary to IOTC 
regulations should be 
reported and the flag 
State should be made 
aware.  
Article 15 of the CCSBT 
Convention provides that 
States Parties should 
draw the attention of 
NCPs to the activities of 
its nationals, residents or 
vessels which may affect 
the attainment of the 
objectives of the 
Convention. 
The ‘Conservation and 
Management Measure 
for Vessels Without 
Nationality’ provides 
that such vessels are 
presumed to be 
operating in 
contravention of the 
Convention.   
Article 32 of the 
Convention provides 
that members of the 
Commission must take 
measures to deter the 
detrimental activities of 
vessels flying the flag 
of NCPs.  Such 
incidences should be 
reported to the 
Commission along with 
any action taken 
against NCPs. 
Article 27 of the 
Convention stipulates 
that provisions relating 
to the implementation 
of vessel monitoring 
systems, transhipment, 
market related 
Article 6(4) of the 
Agreement provides 
that the Meeting of 
Parties can review the 
participation 
opportunities of NCPs 
by taking into account 
their implementation of 
conservation 
measures.  
Table 2. Summary of the key compliance enforcement provisions contained in and implemented by Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations to which Australia is a party (AusRFMOs)*  
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measures and IUU 
vessel lists apply to any 
‘state, member of the 
Commission or entity’ 
whose vessels diminish 
the effectiveness of the 
SPRFMO Convention. 
Contracting 
Parties (CPs) 
Conservation Measure 
10-08 recognises the 
right of CPs to take 
action in response to acts 
of non-compliance by CP 
nationals.   
Resolution 25/XXV urges 
all CPs to pursue 
diplomatic and other 
action to encourage 
NCPs to recognise 
CCAMLR conservation 
measures. 
Article X of the 
Convention provides that 
the Commission shall 
draw attention of CPs to 
any activity which affects 
compliance by CP with 
obligations.   
Article XXI of the 
Convention provides CPs 
must ensure they take 
appropriate measures to 
ensure compliance.  
 
Resolution 07/01 
provides relevant 
agencies of CPs and 
cooperating non-parties 
(CNPs) should 
cooperate to 
investigate allegations 
concerning the 
engagement of their 
nationals in IUU fishing. 
Article X of the IOTC 
Agreement references 
the need for CPs to 
ensure they take action 
under national 
legislation to impose 
penalties against 
violations of the 
Agreement.  
 
The ‘Resolution on action 
plans to ensure 
compliance the 
Conservation and 
Management Measures’ 
requires CPs and CNPs 
to submit an action plan 
on compliance. 
Article 5 of the 
Convention provides that 
CPs shall take all 
necessary action to 
ensure enforcement and 
compliance with binding 
measures.  
 
Article 25 of the 
Convention provides 
that no CP shall allow 
vessels to be used for 
fishing species covered 
by the Convention 
unless authorised to do 
so.   
Article 23(5) of the 
Convention provides all 
CPs must take 
measures to ensure 
their nationals and 
fishing vessels comply 
with the provisions of 
the Convention.  
Under Article 24 of the 
Convention, CPs must 
take all necessary 
measures to ensure the 
effectiveness of 
conservation 
measures.  CPs must 
report to the 
Commission on an 
annual basis to 
demonstrate how 
compliance has been 
achieved. 
Under Article 25 of the 
Convention CPs must 
take all necessary 
measures to ensure 
compliance by vessels 
flying their flag.  This 
extends to waters 
under national 
jurisdiction. 
Article 26 of the 
Convention provides 
that port States have a 
duty to take measures 
to promote the 
effectiveness of 
conservation 
measures. 
Article 10 of the 
Agreement provides 
that flag States are 
responsible for any 
breach of a 
conservation measure 
that might occur.  CPs 
are also charged with 
investigating serious 
violations by their 
nationals or fishing 
vessels.   
Article 11 of the 
Agreement provides 
CPs must take all 
measures to ensure 
that their fishing 
vessels comply with the 
provisions of the 
Agreement.  
Article 13 of the 
Agreement provides 
that CPs have a duty to 
enhance the ability of 
developing States to 
conserve and manage 
fishery resources. 
 
IUU Vessel Lists Conservation Measure 
10-07 establishes a NCP 
IUU Vessel List and 
provides that such 
vessels be identified on 
an annual basis.  
Resolution 09/03 
provides for the 
creation of the IOTC 
IUU Vessel List to 
target vessels 
presumed to have 
List if vessels authorised 
to fish for southern 
bluefin tuna under the, 
‘Resolution on 
amendment of the 
Resolution on ‘Illegal, 
The WCPFC IUU 
Vessel List is 
established via the 
‘Conservation Measure 
to Establish a List of 
Vessels Presumed to 
The creation of a 
SPRFMO IUU Vessel 
List is contained in 
Article 27 of the 
Convention. 
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Conservation Measure 
10-02 (2010) requires all 
CPs to ensure their 
vessels are licensed to 
fish in the Convention 
Area. 
carried out IUU fishing 
in the IOTC Area. 
Unregulated and 
Unreported Fishing (IUU) 
and Establishment of a 
CCSBT Record of 
Vessels over 24 meters 
Authorized to Fish for 
Southern Bluefin Tuna’ 
adopted at the CCSBT15 
in 2008’. 
have Carried out 
Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing 
Activities in the 
Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean’.  
Requests and 
Negotiations 
Resolution 14/XIX urges 
CCAMLR acceding 
States and NCPs to 
implement the Catch 
Documentation Scheme 
(CDS) as soon as 
possible.  
Resolution 15/XXII urges 
all CPs to require their 
vessels to land catches in 
States that are fully 
implementing the CDS.  
Resolution 25/XXV urges 
all CPs to pursue 
diplomatic and other 
action to encourage 
NCPs to recognise 
CCAMLR conservation 
measures.  
Recommendation 
03/04 urges three 
specific States (the 
Seychelles, Vanuatu 
and Japan) to 
implement cooperative 
management 
frameworks effectively 
and to continue to 
report to the IOTC in 
this regard. 
 WCPFC Conservation 
and Management 
Measure 2009-11 
provides that any NCP 
with an interest in the 
fishery may request the 
Commission for the 
status of cooperating 
non-member. 
Under Article 8, the 
SPRFMO Commission 
must adopt measures 
to prevent, deter and 
eliminate IUU fishing.  
Article 11 of the 
SPRFMO Convention 
provides for the 
creation of a 
Compliance and 
Technical Committee to 
monitor and review 
compliance. 
Under Article 6 of the 
Agreement, the 
Meeting of Parties is 
charged with drawing 
the attention of NCPs 
to activities which 
undermine the 
objectives of the 
Agreement.  
Article 17(4) of the 
Agreement requires 
CPs to request NCPs 
to cooperate fully in the 
implementation of 
conservation 
measures.  
 
Trade-Related 
Measures 
Conservation Measure 
10-07 provides CPs 
should not take any 
trade-related measures 
against vessels as a 
result of their inclusion on 
the IUU Vessel List. 
However CPs may 
cooperate to adopt trade-
related measures to 
prevent, deter and 
eliminate IUU fishing.   
Conservation Measure 
10-05 provides that the 
Commission is committed 
Resolution 10/10 on 
market related 
measures provides a 
legally binding measure 
to take measures 
against CPs and NCPs 
who repeatedly fail to 
discharge their 
obligations.  In the case 
of CPs, action such as 
the reduction of existing 
quotas or catch limits 
should be first carried 
out before market 
related measures are 
The ‘Resolution on the 
Implementation of a 
CCSBT Catch 
Documentation Scheme’ 
covers all landings, 
transhipments, exports, 
imports and re-exports of 
SBT and requires whole 
SBT be tagged at the 
time of the kill.  
The CCSBT has an 
Action Plan allowing the 
Commission to impose 
trade-restrictive 
measures however this 
Under the 
‘Conservation Measure 
to Establish a List of 
Vessels Presumed to 
have Carried out 
Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing 
Activities in the 
Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean’ 
members may take 
non-discriminatory 
trade-related measures 
to eliminate the 
activities of IUU listed 
Article 8 of the 
Convention provides 
that the Commission 
must adopt procedures, 
including non-
discriminatory trade-
related measures, to 
ensure compliance.  To 
this effect the 
Commission must 
develop processes in 
accordance with 
international law to 
assess flag State 
performance. 
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to taking steps to ensure 
fish is caught consistent 
with international law. 
Resolution 14/XIX urges 
CCAMLR acceding 
States and NCPs to 
implement the CDS as 
soon as possible. 
adopted.   plan is now essentially 
redundant. 
Article 15 of the 
Convention provides that 
Parties should cooperate 
in taking trade restrictive 
measures to deter fishing 
activities for SBT where 
such action could affect 
the attainment of the 
objectives of the 
Convention.  
 
vessels.  
Article 27 of the 
Convention provides 
port States may adopt 
regulations to prohibit 
landings and 
transhipments where 
catch has been taken 
in a manner which 
undermines the 
objectives of the 
WCPFC.  
Article 25(11) of the 
Convention authorises 
the Commission to 
develop procedures to 
allow for non-
discriminatory trade-
related measures to be 
taken against any State 
undermining the 
objectives of the 
Commission.   
Article 27 of the 
Convention contains 
further references to 
the implementation of 
trade-related 
measures. 
Graded Sanctions Conservation Measure 
10-03 provides that 
where an act of non-
compliance has occurred, 
CPs will take appropriate 
action and, if necessary, 
apply sanctions to that 
vessel. 
Article XXI of the 
Convention provides 
sanctions may be 
imposed by States in 
response to non-
compliance by their 
flagged vessels or 
nationals.   
 
Resolution 99/02 
provides that action be 
taken against the 
activities of ‘flag of 
convenience’ vessels 
including denying 
vessels a license to fish 
and refusing landing 
and transhipments.  
Resolution 10/09 
provides that the IOTC 
Compliance Committee 
should develop a 
scheme of sanctions to 
provide greater 
direction in dealing with 
non-compliance.  
The ‘Resolution on 
establishing the CCSBT 
Vessel Monitoring 
System’ provides that all 
CPs and CNPs take 
measures to ensure the 
owners of vessels are 
citizens or legal entities 
within the flag State to 
allow punitive action to 
be taken. 
Article 15 of the 
Convention provides that 
Parties should take 
appropriate measures to 
prevent their registered 
vessels from transferring 
registration to avoid 
compliance with the 
CCSBT.  
The ‘Conservation and 
Management Measure 
for Compliance 
Monitoring Scheme’ 
provides that penalties 
and other actions as 
may be necessary may 
be implemented in 
response to non-
compliance. 
Article 25 of the 
Convention provides 
that where it has been 
established that a 
member vessel has 
been non-compliant, 
States must ensure 
that the vessel ceases 
fishing activities until 
sanctions have been 
Article 3 of the 
Convention provides 
that CPs, the 
Commission and 
subsidiary bodies 
should ensure 
compliance by 
implementing sanctions 
to deprive offenders of 
the benefits to be 
gained from their 
activities. 
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complied with. 
Monitoring and 
Inspection 
Conservation Measure 
10-04 requires CPs to 
ensure that their flagged 
vessels are equipped 
with automated satellite-
linked vessel monitoring 
systems (VMS). 
Resolution 01/03 
provides that vessels 
fishing contrary to IOTC 
regulations should be 
inspected and all 
landings and 
transhipments by the 
vessel should be 
prohibited by all CP 
ports.  
Resolution 99/03 
provides for a control 
and inspection scheme 
to be set up.  
Resolution 06/03 
establishes a vessel 
monitoring system in 
the IOTC Area to 
standardise the 
systems adopted by 
CPs. 
The CCSBT ‘Resolution 
on Establishing a 
Program for 
Transhipment by Large-
Scale Fishing Vessels’ 
recognises the need to 
ensure monitoring of 
transhipment in areas 
beyond national 
jurisdiction.   
The ‘Resolution on 
establishing the CCSBT 
Vessel Monitoring 
System’ provides all CPs 
and CNPs ensure no 
vessels carry out IUU 
fishing activities.   
The ‘Western and 
Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission 
Boarding and 
Inspection Procedures’ 
provide each member 
must ensure that their 
vessels comply with its 
provisions and that any 
harmful evidence 
obtained from such 
inspections be referred 
to the authorities. 
Article 10 of the 
Convention provides 
that CPs must 
cooperate to establish 
mechanisms for 
effective monitoring, 
control and 
surveillance.  
Article 24 of the 
Convention provides 
CPs must take 
measures to ensure 
compliance by 
nationals or fishing 
vessels owned by them 
and investigate any 
alleged violations. 
Article 8 of the 
Convention provides 
that the Commission 
must develop and 
establish effective 
monitoring, control and 
surveillance 
enforcement 
procedures.  
 
Article 6(1) of the 
Agreement provides 
that the Meeting of 
Parties shall develop 
rules concerning the 
boarding and 
inspection of vessels 
operating in the Area. 
Article 11(1) of the 
Agreement provides 
that CPs should take 
measures to ensure 
that they develop a 
‘satellite vessel 
monitoring system’ for 
fishing vessels flying 
their flag. 
 * Table 2 highlights the key provisions relating to compliance enforcement as contained in AusRFMO Conventions and Agreements. It is not intended as an exhaustive list of all the 
provisions relating to compliance enforcement in each AusRFMO under examination.  The judgment made by the author as to how to classify the compliance enforcement 
mechanisms under review is subjective. 	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TOPIC CCAMLR IOTC CCSBT WCPFC SPRFMO SIOFA 
Cooperative Policies       
Non-Contracting Parties       
Contracting Parties       
Vessel Lists       
Requests and Negotiations       
Trade-Related Measures       
Graded Sanctions       
Monitoring and Inspection       
Key for Table 3 
 Implemented or currently implementing 
 Some measures implemented 
 Provided for, to varying degrees, in the founding text of the RFMO  
 Minimal or no measures in place 
Table 3.  Implementation of compliance enforcement mechanisms by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations 
to which Australia is a Party (AusRFMOs)* 
 
* This table analyses whether measures are in place, not how effective those measures are.  Assessments are made based Table 1 but also 
include information relating to future compliance initiatives currently being undertaken by AusRFMOs.   
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5.2.1  Trade-related measures 
The justification for the focus on trade-related measures throughout this thesis is that such 
measures represent one of the few effective, enforceable and legally justifiable mechanisms 
available to RFMOs in their efforts to conserve the marine environment.  In a recent 
publication563 considering the application of countermeasures in environmental violations, Hjortur 
B. Sverrisson notes that the cases that appear the most compatible with the use of trade-related 
measures against States involve the law of the sea and high seas fisheries.564  Without a clear 
and substantive legal obligation to conserve and protect the environment, he suggests that 
countermeasures, in the form of trade-related measures, appear to have been one of the few 
options that have provided some relief for RFMOs.565 
 
However, countermeasures remain a controversial topic in RFMO circles.  This is largely due to 
differences in opinion concerning the scope of application of RFMOs and their enforcement 
capabilities.  Those who disagree with the use of such measures by RFMOs argue that under 
international law, RFMOs do not have the competence to sanction States and it would not be fair 
practice to do so.566  In relation to the application of trade-related measures to non-contracting 
parties, it has also been argued that such action would infringe upon the principle of pacta tertiis 
nec nocent nec prosunt whereby a treaty cannot establish rules or obligations with regard to a 
third State.567   
 
This thesis contends that so long as trade-related measures are consistent with international 
legal principles relating to non-discrimination, there is nothing preventing RFMOs from adopting 
internationally sound measures in this regard. Certain RFMOs have already adopted measures 
to this effect, with the IOTC Resolution 10/10 allowing the Commission to take measures against 
CPs and NCPs who repeatedly fail to discharge their objections.  In order to be adopted 
accordance with the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing568 (IPOA-IUU), it is clear that the adoption of trade-related 
measures should only occur, ‘in exceptional circumstances, where other measures have proven 
unsuccessful to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing, and only after prior consultation with 
interested States.’569  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
563 Hjortur B. Sverrisson, Countermeasures, the International Legal System and Environmental Violations (2008). 
564 Ibid 337. 
565 Ibid. 
566 Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Report of the Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the 
Commission, CCAMLR-XXVIII, Hobart, Australia, 26 October - 6 November 2009, 52. 
567 Ibid. 
568 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, adopted by consensus at the Twenty-fourth Session of COFI, Rome, Italy, adopted on 23 
June 2001 at the 102th Session of the FAO Council. 
569 Ibid paragraph 66. 
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As a result of this provision, RFMOs must exercise great caution with respect to trade-related 
measures and place limitations and restrictions upon their operation to prevent discrimination 
against developing or developed States.570 Certain RFMOs have overcome this hurdle by 
providing that trade-related measures should be carried out in accordance with international law.  
For instance, Article 8 of the SPRFMO Convention provides that the Commission must adopt 
procedures, including non-discriminatory trade-related measures, to ensure compliance.  To this 
effect the Commission must develop processes in accordance with international law to assess 
flag State performance. 
 
Notable academics571 have suggested that today, trade-related measures are central to RFMO 
compliance.  The importance of achieving sustainable global fisheries has forced certain RFMOs 
to attempt to overcome international rules relating to third parties, with such approaches gaining 
support from the provisions of the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA).572   
 
However certain RFMOs, including the CCAMLR, have been slow to accept the implications of a 
trade-related measure aimed at non-compliance. The main reason behind this hesitance appears 
to be a contrast in opinions between CCAMLR State Parties on whether the adoption of such a 
measure would be consistent with international law and the rules of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO).573 
 
5.2.2  Graded sanctions 
 
One of the primary roles of RFMOs is to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing on the high seas, an objective delegated to these organisations 
primarily via the IPOA-IUU. The IPOA-IUU also provides that RFMOs should develop additional 
compliance measures, including graded sanctions, to promote compliance by their members.574  
Paragraph 21 of the IPOA-IUU calls on States to ensure that sanctions are ‘of sufficient 
severity...to deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from such fishing.’575 Indeed, the severity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
570 Rayfuse, Rosemary, Regional Allocation Issues or Zen and the Art of Pie Cutting. 2007. Paper Prepared for Sharing the Fish 
2006 Conference. Available on line  
<http://www.fishallocation.com/assets/pdf/papers/RosemaryRayfuse.> at 15 August 2009 
571 Including Dr. Mary Ann Palma, Director of the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security and Prof. Martin 
Tsamenyi, Professor of Law and Director of the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS) at 
the University of Wollongong, Australia.  See Tsamenyi et al, The New EC Regulation on Illegal Fishing: Implications for ACP 
Countries.  Available on line 
<http://www.thecommonwealth.org/files/187911/FileName/THT56TheNewECRegulationonIllegalFishing.pdf> 
572 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for 
signature 4 December 1995, 2167 UNTS 88 (entered into force 11 December 2001). 
573 CCAMLR XXIX, above n 566. 
574 IPOA-IUU, above n 568. 
575 Ibid. 
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of sanctions imposed for IUU fishing was one of the main issues discussed at a recent meeting 
of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC).576 
 
A range of graded sanctions may be adopted by RFMOs in response to acts of non-compliance.  
Such measures may be targeted towards individual vessels, nationals or non-compliant 
States.577  Sanctions may include prohibiting the importation of products caught by non-
cooperating fishing vessels, refusal to enter into negotiations, denial of port privileges, 
prohibitions on the import of fish and fish products from a certain vessel or certain State, and the 
application of other economic sanctions.578 Sanctions should be transparent and, most 
importantly, consistent, in order to avoid potential or perceived discrimination.579 
 
A recent study entitled ‘Closing Loopholes: Getting Illegal Fishing Under Control’580 found that at 
a regional level, most RFMOs did not consistently assess compliance by their members or 
lacked measures to sanction members for failing to meet their obligations.581 The study 
concludes that while some RFMOs required denial of port services or entry into port for vessels 
known to have been engaged in IUU fishing, the absence of consistent sanctions both within and 
between RFMOs has allowed IUU fishing to continue.582  
 
In a 2010 report for the FAO, Dr. Gail Lugten583 considers the level of cooperation and 
coordination within and between regional fisheries bodies (RFBs).584  With regard to the five 
operational AusRFMOs under examination in this thesis, she reports upon the significant level of 
variation in response.585  Both the CCSBT and the SPRFMO noted that they cooperated with 
other RFMOs at all times.586  In contrast, CCAMLR listed its cooperation specific organisations 
including the Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP), the CCSBT 
and the Regional Fishery Body Secretariats Network (RSN).587  Furthermore, the IOTC 
recognised its cooperation with the WCPFC, the Coordinating Working Party on Fishery 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
576 Martin Tsamenyi, Professor of Law and Director of the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security 
(ANCORS) at the University of Wollongong, Australia, <tsamenyi@uow.edu.au> "Compliance at the 2009 WCPFC Meet" (16 
December 2009) (personal e mail). 
577 Jackie Alder, Gail Lugten, Robert Kay and Bridget Ferriss, "Compliance with International Fisheries Instruments in the North 
Atlantic" in Tony Pitcher, Ussif Rashid Sumaila and Daniel Pauly. (eds) Fisheries impacts on North Atlantic ecosystems: 
Evaluations and Policy Exploration. Fisheries Centre Research Reports 9(5). 
578 Mary Ann Palma, 'Combatting IUU Fishing: International Legal Developments' in Q.Hanich and M. Tsamenyi (eds), 
Navigating Pacific Fisheries: Legal and Policy Trends in the Implementation of International Fishery Instruments in the Western 
and Central Pacific Region (2009) 71. 
579 FAO, above n 574. 
580 The study was conducted by Stefan Flothmann, Kristín von Kistowski, Emily Dolan, Elsa Lee, Frank Meere, Gunnar Album, 
a number of whom have affiliations with the PEW Environment Group. See 
<http://www.sciencemag.org/content/328/5983/1235.full> 
581 Stefan Flothmann et al, 'Closing Loopholes: Getting Illegal Fishing Under Control' (2010) 328(5983) Science . 
582 Ibid. 
583 Ibid. 
584 Gail Lugten, The Role of International Fishery Organisations or Arrangements and Other Bodies Concerned with the 
Conservation and Management of Living Aquatic Resources, FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular. No. 1054, Rome, FAO, 
2010, 25. 
585 Ibid. 
586 Ibid. 
587 Ibid. 
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Statistics (CWP) and Fisheries Resources Monitoring System (FIRMS).  The WCPFC noted its 
Memoranda of understanding with CCAMLR, CCSBT, the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), IOTC and the Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community (SPC).588 
 
It is clear that while certain RFMOs considered cooperation with other RFBs and RFMOs to be 
openly dealt with on a case-by-case basis, others had specific arrangements for cooperation.  In 
the context of non-compliance however, it is clear that this is not a problem peculiar to a single 
RFMO and that each can learn from one another’s successes or failings.  Arguably, if RFMOs 
are able to adopt a consistent approach towards compliance enforcement, their role as 
regulators of high seas fisheries will gain clarity and impact.   
 
These findings are consistent with the results of this thesis which has uncovered significant 
inconsistencies in regard to the level of implementation of both convention and conservation 
measures relating to the use of graded sanctions.  The conventions of certain AusRFMOs 
specifically grant the organisation the capacity to apply sanctions in the face of non-
compliance589 however half of the RFMOs considered failed to raise the question of sanctions in 
their convention text.590  While all three of the more established RFMOs591 examined had 
implemented conservation measures considering the adoption of compliance mechanisms, the 
use of such sanctions was often applied narrowly592 or did not specify the type of sanctions to be 
imposed.593 
 
Better defining graded sanctions and establishing a unified approach to such measures should 
now be one of the primary tasks on RFMO agendas.  These organisations have been hesitant to 
impose any sanctions upon non-compliant States due to perceived discrimination or concerns 
that it is not within the jurisdiction of the RFMO to do so.  However, the development of the IPOA-
IUU, the new Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing594 (PSM Agreement), as well as the inclusion of access to 
sanctions provided for in the mandates of RFMOs should be persuasive in encouraging these 
organisations to enforce their conservation objectives.  The imposition of monetary fines, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
588 Ibid. 
589 Including the CCAMLR, the WCPFC and SPRFMO. 
590 Refer Table 1.  The founding texts of the IOTC, CCSBT and SIOFA fail to specifically mention the use of sanctions in 
appropriate circumstances.  
591 Including CCAMLR, IOTC and CCSBT. 
592 IOTC Resolution 99/02 for instance only allows for penalties to be applied against ‘flag of convenience’ vessels.  
593 For instance, CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-03 provides that sanctions should be applied to non-compliant vessels 
however detail is not provided in this respect.   
594 Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Adopted in 
November 2009 by the FAO Conference at its Thirty-sixth Session through Resolution No 12/2009, under Article XIV, 
paragraph 1 of the FAO Constitution. 
 93 
	  
confiscation of fishing vessels and denial of fishing licences595 should be a common resource 
relied upon by these organisations. 
  
Enhanced communication and information sharing about sanctions between RFMOs is essential 
to improving compliance across the board.596  If it is seen that there is a precedent for the 
adoption of sanctions against a specific act of non-compliance, the logical conclusion is that 
other RFMOs should adopt similar measures.  With the success of IUU vessel lists in RFMOs, it 
is apparent that these organisations are good at adopting specific strategies to target non-
compliance, but that they have difficulties achieving consistency on a broad area such as 
sanctions.  The key then is for these organisations to break-down their options for sanctioning 
non-compliance and develop specific responses to specific problems.  If consistency in this 
respect can be achieved within the RFMO, political pressure may be applied to other 
organisations to follow suit.  
 
5.2.3  Provisions relating to non-contracting parties 
 
International agreements have also sought to address the problems posed by NCPs with the 
2001 International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing597 calling on States Parties to RFMOs to prevent landings from vessels 
flagged to non-members.598  This provision is repeated in the 2005 FAO Port State Model 
Scheme599 by which port States are instructed to deny landing, transhipping or processing of fish 
caught by vessels flagged to a non-party of an RFMO, ‘unless it can be established that the 
catch was taken in accordance with relevant conservation measures.’600 
 
Arguably, in the range of compliance enforcement mechanisms available to RFMOs, the 
measures taken by RFMOs to discourage the vessels of NCPs from undermining the objectives 
of the relevant agreement are of particular significance.  This is because the activities of NCPs lie 
at the heart of the IUU fishing problem: a problem which has been repeatedly cited as the key 
challenge facing RFMOs since its formal recognition at a meeting of the CCAMLR in 1997.601   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
595 Diane Erceg, 'Deterring IUU fishing through state control over nationals' (2006) 30(2) Marine Policy . 
596 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Making Sure Fish Piracy Doesn't Pay", Policy Brief, January 
2006, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/37/35985301.pdf> 
597 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, adopted by consensus at the Twenty-fourth Session of COFI, Rome, Italy, adopted on 23 
June 2001 at the 102th Session of the FAO Council. 
598 Ibid paragraph 63. 
599 Model Scheme on Port State Measure to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, FAO, Rome, Italy, 2007. 
Available on line <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/a0985t/a0985t00.pdf>  
600 Adriana Fabra, 'The Use of Port State Measures to Improve Fisheries Compliance' (Paper presented at the Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: 2nd Chatham House Update and Stakeholder Consultation Meeting, 2006) 5. 
601 Australian Institute of Criminology, Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing (2010) 
<http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/rpp/100-120/rpp109/08.aspx> at 2 January 2011 
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One of the key mechanisms by which RFMOs can seek to improve compliance by NCPs is by 
developing cooperative policies and schemes to encourage participation.602  To this effect, the 
CCAMLR,603 IOTC604 and the CCSBT605 have all adopted framework provisions or conservation 
measures to the effect that their respective Commissions will notify a NCP if its nationals or 
vessels have been acting in a manner which affects the implementation of the objectives of the 
RFMO.  Yet more than mere acknowledgement of such behaviour is required if RFMOs are to 
effectively address the problems caused by the vessels and nationals of NCPs.   
 
In this respect, the SPRFMO has adopted significant framework provisions which require 
members of the Commission to take measures to deter the activities of vessels of NCP States.606 
Furthermore, article 27 of the SPRFMO Convention provides that the measures adopted by the 
RFMO relating to market measures, IUU vessel lists and transhipment will apply equally to CPs 
and NCPs.   CCAMLR Resolution 14/XIX urges NCPs to implement the Catch Documentation 
Scheme (CDS) and article 6(4) of the SIOFA Convention provides that the opportunity for NCPs 
to participate in a fishery will be reviewed if they fail to implement the provisions of the 
agreement.  
 
The ability of RFMOs to address the problems posed by the activities of NCP nationals and 
vessels is limited in that there remains an open debate as to the extent to which an RFMO can 
impose upon the sovereignty of non-members.  The principle that international agreements can 
only apply inter partes has restricted the breadth and scope of RFMO conservation measures. 
The SPRFMO has sought to overcome this challenge by implementing the approach forwarded 
in the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement.  Under the SPRFMO Convention, certain 
management measures apply to any ‘state, member of the Commission or entity’ whose vessels 
diminish the effectiveness of the SPRFMO Convention.  Such forward-thinking should be 
applauded, however, it is yet to be seen whether this approach will delay the ratification of this 
agreement.  
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
602 Fabra, above n 600, 8. 
603 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, opened for signature 20 May 1980, 1329 UNTS 48, 
(entered into force 7 April 1982), article X.	  
604 IOTC Resolution 10/03 provides that if a NCP’s vessels are fishing in contravention of the Convention the flag State will be 
made aware.	  
605 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, opened for signature 10 May 1993, 1819 UNTS 359, (entered 
into force 20 May 1994), article 15. 
606 Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean, opened for 
signature 1 February 2010, article 32.  
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5.3  Conclusion 
 
The compliance enforcement mechanisms implemented by RFMOs have in many cases 
provided a significant contribution to improving the regulation of high seas fisheries.607  It has 
been demonstrated that AusRFMOs have adopted a wide range of compliance enforcement 
mechanisms but that more needs to be done particularly in the field of trade-related measures, 
graded sanctions and provisions relating to NCPs if compliance enforcement is to gain strength.   
 
Tables 2 and 3 reveal significant inconsistencies in terms of the degree and extent to compliance 
enforcement mechanisms have been implemented in AusRFMOs.  While certain RFMOs might 
have recognised the need for action on a specific compliance problem within their framework 
agreement, it is often the case that this recognition has not been given effect via the 
implementation of conservation measures.  
 
This thesis argues that the compliance enforcement techniques of RFMOs alone cannot 
effectively tackle the challenges posed by non-compliance.  A lack of consistency in the 
implementation of compliance enforcement mechanisms across AusRFMOs demonstrates that 
the regional regime would benefit from a more uniform approach.  However it can also be said 
that significant steps have been taken by most RFMOs in relation to the implementation of vessel 
lists and monitoring, control and surveillance.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
607 For instance, IUU Vessel Lists have been demonstrated to be effective in contributing to combat the mounting pressure of 
IUU fishing on increasingly vulnerable fish stocks.  Kristin Gunnarsdottir von Kistowski, 'Do RFMO IUU Vessel Lists Work? An 
Assessment of Compliance and Effectiveness' (Paper presented at the 5th International Forum on Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, London, United Kingdom, 2009). 
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CHAPTER 6 
UTILISING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION TO STRENGTHEN REGIONAL 
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
As outlined in previous chapters, cooperation lies at the heart of regional fisheries management. 
The requirement that flag States cooperate via regional fisheries management organisations 
(RFMOs) derives from articles 117608 and 118609 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (LOSC).610  Together these articles create the ‘duty to cooperate’ in taking measures to 
conserve and manage high seas fish stocks.611   
 
This chapter addresses the question of how non-contracting parties (NCPs) as well as 
contracting parties (CPs) to RFMOs might be compelled to better comply with their commitments 
under the LOSC and cooperate to conserve high seas fish stocks.  It tackles this question by 
examining the relationship between RFMOs and international dispute resolution mechanisms 
and suggesting an option whereby the duty to cooperate could be tested to determine its scope 
and application. By considering the hypothetical situation whereby an RFMO might bring a 
request for an advisory opinion before, for example, the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea (the Tribunal), this chapter sheds light on the potential for the duty to cooperate to be 
clarified.   
 
First, international debate concerning the duty to cooperate and the need for clarification of this 
duty is examined to determine whether there exists international support for action to be taken in 
this regard.  Secondly, the chapter considers the practical jurisdiction and standing requirements 
that would need to be satisfied if an advisory opinion were to be brought and the final section 
poses some potential questions that could be addressed.  It is proposed that bringing an advisory 
opinion on the duty to cooperate represents a legitimate and reasonable option to be considered 
in the global effort to achieve greater cooperation in respect of regional fisheries management.  
   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
608 Article 117 of the LOSC provides, ‘[a]ll States have the duty to take, or to cooperate with other States in taking, such 
measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas.’ 
609 Article 118 of the LOSC provides, ‘States shall cooperate with each other in the conservation and management of living 
resources in the areas of the high seas. States whose nationals exploit identical living resources, or different living resources in 
the same area, shall enter into negotiations with a view to taking the measures necessary for the conservation of the living 
resources  concerned. They shall, as appropriate, cooperate to establish subregional or regional fisheries organizations to this 
end.’  
610 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into 
force 16 November 1994). 
611 Elise A Clark, 'Strengthening Regional Fisheries Management: An Analysis of the Duty to Cooperate' (2011) 8(1) New 
Zealand Journal of Public and International Law (in press). 
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6.2  Strengthening RFMOs via international dispute resolution 
 
Drawing upon the duty to cooperate contained in the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (the LOSC) and numerous other international fisheries agreements, this chapter 
analyses the relationship between RFMOs, the duty to cooperate and the Tribunal.   It builds 
support for an advisory opinion to be bought by an RFMO by examining the history of cases 
before the Tribunal, the legal standing of RFMOs and the type of questions that such an advice 
may consider.  It concludes that the Tribunal represents a legitimate option for an advisory 
opinion to be bought by an RFMO to improve compliance with conservation measures.  
 
6.2.1  Support for an advisory opinion 
 
A growing body of literature and cases demonstrate support for the proposition that the duty to 
cooperate should be tested in the interests of improving flag State responsibility.  This chapter 
proposes that a RFMO should be the entity to challenge the operation of this important duty and 
that such a challenge could occur via the bringing of a case before the Tribunal.  In support of 
this proposition, Judge Tullio Treves of the Tribunal has noted that, ‘cases against a flag State for 
non-compliance with its responsibilities are possible and may be useful in clarifying the scope of 
such responsibilities, as well as the consequences of non-compliance.’612  The history of cases 
before the Tribunal can shed some light on the circumstances in which the duty to cooperate 
might be clarified. 
 
In 2000, Chile bought a case before the Tribunal on the basis of the conservation provisions 
contained in articles 116 – 119 of the LOSC.613  Chile’s complaint was in regards to the failure of 
the then European Commission (EC) to ensure that Spanish vessels were acting in compliance 
with these conservation provisions.614 Chile’s concern lay with the activities of these vessels 
when fishing in the waters near the Chilean EEZ which it argued were not accurately reporting 
catches to the competent organisation.615  
 
Interestingly, this case also had the potential to be the first bought before the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) on the intersection between environment and trade rules under a multilateral 
environmental agreement.616  However the case did not progress with either the Tribunal or the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
612 Expert Workshop on Flag State Responsibilities: Assessing Performance and Taking Action, United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in cooperation with Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 25-28 March 2008, Vancouver, Canada 12. 
613 Case Concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean 
(Chile v European Union) [2001] 40 ILM 475. 
614 Michael W Lodge et al, Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: Report of an 
Independent Panel to Develop a Model for Improved Governance by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, (2007) 
79. 
615 Ibid. 
616  World Trade Organisation, Relationship between the WTO and MEA Rules,  
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_neg_mea_e.htm> at 9 September 2011. 
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WTO by an order dated 16 December 2009 the Tribunal held that the case should be removed 
from the Tribunal docket after the interested States committed to negotiating a new agreement 
for the conservation of swordfish.617  
 
In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases,618 whereby a request for provisional measures was sought 
by Australia and New Zealand against Japan, the duty to cooperate to conserve southern bluefin 
tuna (SBT) stocks was bought before the Tribunal.619 It was argued by Australia and New 
Zealand that the ‘Experimental Fishing Programme’ (EFP) that Japan wanted to undertake would 
threaten already depleted stocks of SBT.620  On this basis the applicants argued that the 
cooperative provisions of the SBT Treaty, which is signed by the interested parties to the 
dispute,621 contained a specific duty to cooperate in regards to highly migratory species.  
 
In prescribing provisional measures, the Tribunal held that Japan should not conduct the planned 
EFP unless with the agreement of the other parties and that all parties should continue 
negotiations with a view to ensuring the conservation of SBT.622  However most significantly for 
the purposes of this chapter, a joint declaration by Vice-President Wolfrum and Judges Caminos, 
Marotta Rangel, Yankov, Anderson and Eiriksson held, inter alia:623 
 
In the circumstances, a reduction in the catches of all those concerned in the fishery in 
the immediate short term would assist the stock to recover over the medium to long term.  
Article 64 of the Convention lays down, as stated in the order, a duty to cooperate to that 
end. 
 
These cases demonstrate that the duty to cooperate can provide a legitimate foundation for a 
fisheries dispute to be bought before an international adjudicative body.  Support for this 
argument is also found in discussions undertaken at international fora in recent years.  
 
A proposal for an advisory opinion to be bought on the duty to cooperate is considered in 2007 
Chatham House report entitled: ‘Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisations’624 (the Chatham House Report).  The Chatham House Report 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
617 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 'Case on Conservation of Swordfish Stocks between Chile and the European 
Community in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean' (Press Release, 21 March 2001).  Available on line  
<http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html>.  
618 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan) (Provisional Measures) [1993] 38 ILM 1624. 
619 Howard S. Schiffman, 'The Southern Bluefin Tuna Case: ITLOS Hears Its First Fishery Dispute' (1999) 2(3) Journal of 
International Wildlife Law & Policy  5. 
620 Ibid.  
621 The Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, which had been signed by the three countries, came into 
force in May 1993.  See Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, About the Commission (2010) 
<http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/about.html> at 5 September 2010. 
622 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, above n 618. 
623 Joint Declaration of Vice-President Wolfrum and Judges Caminos, Marotta Rangel, Yankov, Anderson and Eiriksson.  See 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan) (Provisional Measures) [1993] 38 ILM 1624. 
624 Lodge et al, above n 614. 
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examined the potential for an advisory opinion to be brought before the Tribunal by a RFMO with 
sufficient support from its CPs.625  The question of whether RFMOs would be authorised to 
request an advisory opinion was also discussed at the sixth regional workshop of the Tribunal in 
South Africa.626  Judge Tafsir Malick Ndiaye of the Tribunal noted that this question and other 
questions relating to the role of RFMOs have reoccurred at different workshops of the 
Tribunal.627  He suggested that the protection and preservation of the marine environment and 
‘liability questions relating thereto’ are matters for advisory opinions, in addition to the question of 
IUU fishing.628   
 
The potential for a dispute on the duty to cooperate to be bought before the Tribunal was raised 
at a meeting convened by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (UNFAO) in 
2008.  The meeting, entitled ‘Expert Workshop on Flag State Responsibilities: Assessing 
Performance and Taking Action’629 (the FAO Expert Workshop) was convened in Vancouver, 
Canada.  Here it was suggested that a ‘model case’ could be bought for the purposes of 
clarifying the legal status of the duty to cooperate and the conditions needed to avoid losing a 
case on this matter.630  The notion of a model case was discussed in detail, including the 
question of which organisation might have standing to bring such action.631   It was commonly 
agreed that RFMOs would be well placed to take such action.632  Participants observed that 
developing international case law could achieve more, and proceed more quickly, than creating 
yet another international legal instrument to address the problem of non-compliance.633 
 
With growing theoretical support for a case or advisory opinion on the significance of the duty to 
cooperate, this thesis will now turn to examine the practical requirements which would need to be 
satisfied for an action to proceed.  
  
6.2.2 Jurisdiction and standing  
 
The Tribunal is open to States Parties to the LOSC634 and to entities other than States Parties in 
any case expressly provided for in Part XI of the LOSC or pursuant to any other agreement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
625 Ibid 81. 
626 Tafsir Malick Ndiaye, 'The Advisory Function of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea' (2010) 9 Chinese Journal of 
International Law paragraph 67. 
627 Ibid paragraph 71. 
628 Ibid paragraph 89. 
629 FAO Expert Workshop, above n 612. 
630 Ibid. 
631 The general consensus of the FAO Expert Workshop was that a State would have to demonstrate its standing to bring the 
case, or alternately, a group of States could come together as joint claimants under a declaration of common interest.  See 
Expert Workshop on Flag State Responsibilities: Assessing Performance and Taking Action, United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in cooperation with Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 25-28 March 2008, Vancouver, Canada 74. 
632 FAO Expert Workshop, above n 612, 11. 
633 Ibid.  
634 LOSC, above n 610, article 291(1).  
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conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal.635  In this regard, it is clear that when considering who 
might have standing to bring a contentious case before the Tribunal, international organisations 
such as RFMOs might be included.  The Tribunal has jurisdiction, ‘over any dispute concerning 
the interpretation or application of this Convention which is submitted to it’636 and in the event of 
a dispute as to whether the Tribunal has such jurisdiction, the matter can be settled by a decision 
of the Tribunal.637   
 
The question of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in regards to an advisory opinion is somewhat 
more complex.  Advisory opinions are non-legally binding638 and they are generally utilised by 
States to seek clarification upon a point of law.  There remain two key unanswered questions that 
must be addressed in considering bringing a request for an advisory opinion: 1) Does the full 
Tribunal have advisory jurisdiction? 2) If the Tribunal does have the sufficient advisory 
jurisdiction, can a State submit a request for an advisory opinion? 
 
These questions will be addressed in order.  First, it would appear on the surface that the 
advisory function of the Tribunal cannot be exercised by the full chamber under article 191 of the 
LOSC and article 40 of the Statute of the Tribunal (the ‘Statute’).639  The advisory jurisdiction of 
the full Tribunal is not expressly provided for under either the LOSC or the Statute, however, at 
the same time, neither the LOSC nor the Statute expressly prohibits the advisory function of the 
Tribunal.640  However article 138, which considers the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to provide an 
advisory opinion of a legal question, was inserted into the Rules of the Tribunal in 1996.  This 
provision reads as follows: 
 
Article 138 
1. The Tribunal may give an advisory opinion on a legal question if an international 
agreement related to the purposes of the Convention specifically provides for the 
submission to the Tribunal of a request for such an opinion. 
2. A request for an advisory opinion shall be transmitted to the Tribunal by whatever body 
is authorized by or in accordance with the agreement to make the request to the Tribunal. 
3. The Tribunal shall apply mutatis mutandis articles 130 to 137. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
635 Ibid article 291(2). 
636 International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, Proceedings and Judgments - Competence (2008) 
<http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html> at 12 September 2009. 
637 Ibid. 
638 Ndiaye, above n 626, paragraph 62. 
639 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Annex VI to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994). 
640 P Chandrasekhara Rao and P Gautier, Rules of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: A Commentary (2006) 
393. 
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This provision suggests that the Tribunal may hear an advisory opinion in certain circumstances 
and is supported by other provisions of the Statute including article 21.641  In this regard, it could 
be argued that an advisory opinion falls under the broad jurisdiction granted to the Tribunal.642 
 
Mr. Doo-Young Kim, Deputy Registrar of the Tribunal, has argued that the Tribunal may issue an 
advisory opinion if certain requirements are met;643 an attitude in line with a general movement in 
favour of the advisory jurisdiction of the Tribunal.644  Indeed, Judge Ndiaye has suggested that in 
the past, the Tribunal has had the support of many States in asserting this jurisdiction,645 
however, it appears that it will be a matter of waiting until a request is submitted on behalf of a 
State before this question can truly be tested. 
  
The second question to be considered is what kind of ‘body’ may submit a request to the Tribunal 
for an advisory opinion.  Article 138 contains certain requirements which must be met prior to an 
international agreement gaining sufficient standing to submit its request.  These may be listed as 
follows:646 
 
• there must be an international agreement; 
• the agreement must be related to the purposes of the LOSC; 
• there must be provision within the agreement for submitting a request for an advisory 
opinion to the Tribunal; and 
• the request must be of a legal nature. 
 
This provision appears to allow for international organisations such as RFMOs to submit a 
request for an advisory opinion before the Tribunal if they have fulfilled these requirements.  
Ideally, all RFMOs should have some standing arrangement for seeking advisory opinions from a 
suitable judicial body on legal questions arising in the course of its work.647  It remains unclear, 
however, whether States may submit requests for an advisory opinion in the same manner via a 
bilateral agreement for example.648   
 
Mr. Kim posits that, in light of the flexible approach adopted under article 138(2) of the Rules, 
States may seek an advisory opinion from the Tribunal via an international organisation created 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
641 The Statute, above n 639, article 21. 
642 Chandrasekhara Rao and Gautier, above n 640, 394. 
643 Doo-young Kim, 'Advisory Proceedings Before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea as an Alternative Procedure 
to Supplement the Dispute Settlement Mechanism under Part XV of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea' 
(2010) 4 Issues in Legal Scholarship: Frontier Issues in Ocean Law  4. 
644 Ndiaye, above n 626, paragraph 63. 
645 Ibid paragraph 65. 
646 Ibid paragraphs 77, 78, 79 and 80.   
647 Lodge et al, above n 614, 81. 
648 Kim, above n 643, 1. 
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by an agreement for the purpose of requesting an advisory opinion before the Tribunal.649  Other 
commentators support this view and argue that both agreements between States or between 
States and international organisations would be considered ‘international agreements’ for the 
purposes of article 138 of the Rules.650 
 
6.2.3  Potential questions for consideration  
 
This section considers some of the potential questions that might arise if an advisory opinion on 
the duty to cooperate were to be brought before the Tribunal.  This discussion is not designed to 
provide a comprehensive account of the uncertainties surrounding the duty to cooperate and it 
does not go into detail on the elements outlined.  Instead, it is aimed at identifying aspects of the 
duty that remain uncertain and suggesting areas upon which clarification might be sought in the 
form of an advisory opinion.  It is proposed that if, as Judge Tullio Treves of the Tribunal has 
himself noted, the general reluctance of States to enter into court disputes with other States is to 
be overcome, continuing debate on the topic will be critical to the success of any action on the 
duty to cooperate.651  
 
6.2.3.1 What are the legal responsibilities and obligations of States Parties to the LOSC 
with respect to the cooperative provisions contained in articles 117 and 118? 
 
While broad in scope, this question would request the Tribunal to provide clarification of the 
specific content of the duty to cooperate.652  In the first and only advisory opinion heard by the 
Tribunal before the Seabed Disputes Chamber,653 the questions presented to the Chamber were 
phrased in similarly broad terms.  The FAO Expert Workshop noted that some specific criteria for 
determining flag State responsibilities in general might include: 
 
• participation in and compliance with relevant treaty regimes; 
• participation in and compliance with the conservation and management measures of 
RFMOs; and 
• the effective adoption and implementation of domestic legislation.654   
 
Additionally, the Chatham House Report provided the following broad description of the duty: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
649 Ibid 4. 
650 Chandrasekhara Rao and Gautier, above n 640, 394. 
651 FAO Expert Workshop, above n, 612. 
652 Ibid 10. 
653 Case No. 17, Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the 
International Seabed Area (Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber), is currently before the 
Tribunal’s Seabed Disputes Chamber.  
654 FAO Expert Workshop, above n, 612. 
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It has two aspects: positively, to seek to reach agreement with others concerned, and, 
negatively, to refrain from taking unilateral actions whether or not agreement has been 
reached. The positive element of seeking to reach agreement was explained by the 
International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases: ‘[the parties] are 
under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotiations are meaningful, which 
will not be the case when either of them insists upon its own position without 
contemplating any modification of it’ (ICJ Reports 1969, paragraph 85(b) of the Court’s 
judgment).  The negative element has a bearing on the legal situation when a dispute 
arises between States or when a member of an organization votes against a proposal 
that nonetheless attracts the necessary support to be adopted as a decision. In both 
situations, the duty to cooperate described above still applies, and it imposes limits on 
the nature and scope of any unilateral action that a disputant or an objector may take.655 
 
Taken in a fisheries context, this definition may provide some useful guidance on the question of 
what the legal responsibilities of States might be in regards to the duty to cooperate.  The 
Chatham House Report’s consideration of the positive and negative elements of the duty has 
special application in regards to the work of RFMOs.  For instance, it could be the case that 
States are under a positive duty to seek to reach agreement on the conservation of marine living 
resources of the high seas via RFMOs.  Similarly, an advisory opinion might be open to 
suggestion that States are under an obligation not to block the passing of conservation measures 
which have the support of the majority in annual meetings of RFMOs.  
 
6.2.3.2  What act or omission on the part of a flag State might constitute a breach of the 
duty to cooperate in the conservation of the living resources of the high seas under 
articles 117 and 118 of the LOSC? 
 
The notion that a systematic or continuing failure to comply should act as an indicator of a breach 
of flag State responsibilities was raised at the FAO Expert Workshop.  Here participants debated 
the notion that ‘systematic patterns of failure’656 should be an indicator of problems in flag State 
compliance. 657  Moreover, the Workshop noted that a ‘model case’ on the duty to cooperate 
would involve a flag State who had a systematic track record of irresponsibility.658  Participants 
here agreed on the need for better definition of effective flag State control so that such patterns 
of failure could be identified.659 This idea is also supported by the final report of a second joint 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
655 Ibid. 
656 FAO Expert Workshop, above n 612, 8. 
657 Ibid 8. 
658 Ibid. 
659 Ibid. 
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meeting of the tuna RFMOs (Kobe 2)660 in 2009, which noted that sanctions should be bought 
against flag States that repeatedly fail to comply with their obligations or responsibilities.661 
 
As States give effect to their duty to cooperate under international law via participation in 
RFMOs, a failure to participate in, or to become a member of, a relevant RFMO might constitute 
a breach of the duty to cooperate.  In 2006, the report of the Ministerially-Led Task Force on 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing on the High Seas662 suggested that a number of 
criteria should be considered when determining whether a flag State had met its fisheries related 
obligations.663   It found that a responsible flag State will be expected to implement the obligation 
to cooperate by ratifying and participating in RFMOs.664  Even if such States have not accepted 
the terms of the LOSC or those of other significant international agreements, the duty to 
cooperate is still said to exist under customary international law and may be applicable to all 
States.  
 
6.2.3.3 What possible action might be taken against a flag State found to be in breach of 
the duty to cooperate contained in articles 117 and 118 of the LOSC? 
 
At Kobe 2, it was recognised that uncooperative flag States should be held liable via the use of 
non-discriminatory sanctions.  These sanctions should be applied to CPs and NCPs alike and 
could ultimately lead to the suspension of vessel and flag State fishing rights in the convention 
area of a RFMO.  These comments indicate a willingness to accept the notion that flag State 
jurisdiction does not imply flag State immunity and that fishing rights are conditional.  This notion 
is consistent with contemporary academic comment that where a State fails in its duty to 
cooperate in conservation and management measures, it forfeits the right for its nationals to 
participate in the freedom of fishing.665   
 
If, as foreshadowed above, RFMOs were to establish their own regulatory authority to decide 
matters including a breach of the duty to cooperate, it is submitted that trade-related measures 
represent a realistic and appropriate avenue for redress.  Most RFMOs have legal standing to 
take such measures, or at least to enable governing bodies to take trade related measures, 
against uncooperative flag States.666  Indeed, Kobe 2 recognised trade-related measures as a 
valid tool for addressing uncooperative flag State practices.  At this meeting, the IOTC 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
660 Report of the Second Joint Meeting of Tuna RFMOs, San Sebastian, Spain, June 29 – July 3, 2009. 
661 Ibid 2. 
662 High Seas Task Force (2006). Closing the net: Stopping illegal fishing on the high seas. Governments of Australia, Canada, 
Chile, Namibia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, WWF, ICUN and the Earth Institute at Colombia University. 
663 Ibid. 
664 Ibid. 
665 Ibid. 
666 Richard Tarasofsky, 'Enhancing the Effectiveness of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations through Trade and 
Market Measures' (Briefing Paper 07/04 Energy, Environment and Development Program, Chatham House, 2007). 
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recognised the need to take action by ensuring that trade-related measures could be applied to 
any entity whose actions were considered to undermine IOTC conservation measures.667  Such 
measures were said to include limiting access to port facilities, preventing transhipment of IUU 
caught fish at sea and restricting imports.668  
 
Finally, another option that has been raised as an incentive for flag States to cooperate with 
RFMOs is that of compensation.  The costs associated with fishing responsibly, including those 
incurred by legal fishing operators such as lost revenue as a result of lower quotas as well as 
those incurred by responsible flag States through their membership to an RFMO, are great.669  
As such, CPs to an RFMO that act in compliance with conservation measures may be 
considered ‘injured’ by the actions of a non-compliant flag State allowing IUU vessels to fish.  In 
such a case, it can be argued that there is a failure by the flag State to meet the duty to 
cooperate and compensation for the consequences of this failure should be paid.670  
 
6.3  Conclusion 
 
While the collective strengthening of compliance enforcement mechanisms in RFMOs will 
arguably assist in deterring the activities of non-compliant States, unless the inherent 
weaknesses of the international fisheries regime are also addressed, RFMO compliance 
enforcement can only extend so far.  This chapter has submitted that an advisory opinion on the 
duty to cooperate under the LOSC represents an opportunity to enforce the work of RFMOs by 
clarifying States’ international obligations.   
 
This chapter has examined how the duty to cooperate, and its legal potential, has been 
discussed at international fora in recent years. The possibility of an RFMO bringing an an 
advisory opinion on the duty has been forwarded and it has been shown that a RFMO could have 
the requisite legal standing and jurisdiction to bring a case. Finally, by giving weight and 
enforceability to the conservation measures developed by RFMOs, it has been demonstrated 
that a favourable decision could have a great impact on the effectiveness of regional fisheries 
management.  
 
This chapter has argued that if the duty to cooperate were found to require States Parties to the 
LOSC to actively participate in RFMOs, uphold the conservation measures of RFMOs and their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
667 Kobe 2, "Progress of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Concerning the Course of Action Adopted in the First Meeting of 
Tuna RFMOs", ITOC Secretariat, June 24 2009, Doc. No. TRFMO2-018/2009 3. 
668 Ibid. 
669 Matthew Gianni and Walt Simpson. (2005). The Changing Nature of High Seas Fishing: How Flags of Convenience Provide 
Cover for Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing. Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 
International Transport Workers’ Federation, and WWF International 61.	  
670 Ibid. 
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objectives, this has significant implications for the strength of the regional regime.   The Tribunal 
has been shown to represent a legitimate option for an advisory opinion to clarify the scope of 
the duty in an effort to improve compliance with the conservation and management objectives of 
RFMOs. 
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CHAPTER 7 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that with the introduction of the United Nations Convention of the 
Law of the Sea (LOSC)671 in 1982, the ability of regional fisheries management organisations 
(RFMOs) to deliver results has become more critical than ever.  In the last decade, many high-
profile critics672 have stepped up the pressure on RFMOs to have a real impact on global 
fisheries which has, in turn, led to an obsession with performance-based assessment.  There is a 
clear demand for results from these highly politicised and sensitive organisations that fight a 
continual battle against themselves to make progress in the field of fisheries conservation and 
management.  
 
This thesis has contributed to the wealth of information currently being collected on the 
performance of these organisations by analysing the ability of RFMOs to encourage greater 
compliance from both contracting and non-contracting parties.  It has examined what compliance 
enforcement mechanisms exist in RFMOs to which Australia is a party (AusRFMOs) by exploring 
the history of the development of the law of the sea regime and the creation of the role of 
RFMOs.  This thesis demonstrates that the voluntary nature of the law of the sea undermines the 
effectiveness of the regional regime.  The reasons behind non-compliance within RFMOs have 
also been investigated to better understand how conservation measures can be strengthened to 
promote future compliance. 
 
This thesis has identified a lack of political will on the part of flag States to implement compliance 
enforcement as being one of the key threats to the ability of RFMOs to function effectively.673  It 
submits that unless or until this situation is overcome, and RFMOs are able to implement 
effective and enforceable conservation measures, they will be prevented from fulfilling their role 
under international law. This chapter outlines the key findings of this thesis and proposes some 
positive steps that RFMOs can take to address the problem of insufficient political will.    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
671 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into 
force 16 November 1994). 
672 See, for example: Michael W Lodge et al, Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: 
Report of an Independent Panel to Develop a Model for Improved Governance by Regional Fisheries Management 
Organizations, (2007); High Seas Task Force (2006). Closing the net: Stopping illegal fishing on the high seas. Governments of 
Australia, Canada, Chile, Namibia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, WWF, ICUN and the Earth Institute at Colombia 
University; Gail Lugten, The Role of International Fishery Organisations or Arrangements and Other Bodies Concerned with the 
Conservation and Management of Living Aquatic Resources, FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular. No. 1054, Rome, FAO, 
2010.  
673 Denzil Miller and Marie Jacobsson, 'Fisheries Management and Good Governance: Global, Regional and National 
Legislation and Regulation' in J Sundberg (ed), Fish, Trade and Development (in press) 12. 
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The first section of this chapter summarises the key findings of Chapters 1 through 6 to establish 
a foundation for the general conclusions reached in the second section of this chapter.  The latter 
section outlines some general conclusions which can be drawn from this thesis.  It is 
demonstrated that on a broad level, there is a need for more effective cooperation between 
members of RFMOs and RFMOs themselves in the area of compliance enforcement. 
 
7.2  Thesis Summary 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
This chapter introduced the concept of flag State jurisdiction and the problems posed by the 
founding concept behind the law of the sea regime: the freedom of the high seas.  It provided a 
list of RFMOs currently in force and demonstrated the different geographical locations and fish 
species regulated by RFMOs on a global scale.   This introductory section highlighted the fact 
that prior to the conception of the LOSC in 1982, regional treaties were largely aimed at 
cooperation for the purpose of maximising the profits to be derived from the fishery concerned.    
 
This chapter submitted that the embodiment of the duty to cooperate in the LOSC and other 
associated agreements is the pivotal factor in the contemporary conservation role of RFMOs.  By 
examining the relevant provisions of the LOSC, the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement 
(UNFSA), the FAO Compliance Agreement, the FAO Port State Measures Agreement and the 
International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing (IPOA-IUU), the chapter submitted that in the contemporary international regime, the role 
of RFMOs has changed dramatically.   
 
Chapter 1 also functioned to provide an outline of the objectives, structure and significance of 
this thesis.  
 
Chapter 2 – Non-Compliance: The Problem of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
 
Chapter 2 considered a key challenge that is common to all RFMOs: illegal, unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing, in order to introduce the problem of non-compliance. Starting from the 
proposition that IUU fishing is an issue which encompasses much more than the mere act of 
fishing itself, Chapter 2 explored the topic by identifying four key causes of IUU fishing including: 
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• the overcapacity of fishing fleets, 
• the declaration of the 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of coastal States, 
• the inherent weakness of the international regulatory regime, 
• the ‘common pool’ nature of the world’s fish stocks. 
 
The problem of ‘flags of non-compliance’ (FONC) and its relationship to IUU fishing was then 
examined.  The role of ‘front’ companies in IUU fishing operations was analysed, along with the 
complex issue of how to penalise the true owners or beneficiaries of such fishing. The 
environmental impact associated with by-catch from IUU fishing, as well as the impact these 
activities have on developing State economies, was also explored.  
 
Next, the question of why States do not comply with the conservation measures of RFMOs was 
examined.  Adopting a theory which identifies two basic principles to explain why States choose 
to implement international laws, it was argued that the perceived illegitimacy of the declaration of 
EEZs as well as the lack of sanctions for acts such as IUU fishing has contributed to the failure of 
international fisheries regulation.  
 
Finally, this chapter analysed the impacts on non-compliance on the regional regime.  It argued 
that without sufficient political will on the part of flag states to secure fisheries for future 
generations, the ability of RFMOs to encourage sustainable fishing practices will be limited. 
  
Chapter 3 – Compliance Enforcement Mechanisms 
 
The third chapter of this thesis outlined the range of compliance enforcement mechanisms 
available to RFMOs to tackle the problem of non-compliance.  It identified three categories of 
mechanism (including policies, approaches and countermeasures) and outlined nine practical 
compliance enforcement techniques.   
 
The first category considered in Chapter 3 was that of RFMO policies which can take the form of 
cooperative policies, as well as policies aimed at contracting parties (CPs) and non-contracting 
parties (NCPs).  
 
The second category of compliance enforcement mechanism examined was that of diplomatic 
measures.  Diplomacy was shown to represent a key tactic RFMOs could utilise to extend 
invitations to non-contracting parties as well as alert them to the non-compliant activities of their 
vessels.  The chapter considered the use of vessel lists by RFMOs as a diplomatic avenue in the 
sense that such lists enable RFMOs to ‘name and shame’ listed vessels. Other diplomatic 
approaches considered included requests and negotiations which may be utilised by RFMOs to 
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make specific representations to non-compliant States. Lastly the potential for diplomatic 
demarches to be issued to persuade States to fish responsibly was considered.  
 
The final category of compliance enforcement mechanism examined in Chapter 3 was that of 
countermeasures.  It was argued that when taken in conformity with certain requirements, 
coercive measures may be justified.  As a vital tool available to RFMOs in the fight for 
compliance, trade-related measures were considered to be the largest remaining category of 
countermeasures available.  However, this section also considered the potential for graded 
sanctions to allow RFMOs to refuse, suspend or withdraw the authorisation of a vessel to fish 
where there has been a serious violation. Lastly, monitoring and inspection mechanisms were 
also considered for their potential to be evoked by States where a member State has failed to 
effectively control their vessel.  
 
The chapter concluded that there exists a range of compliance enforcement mechanisms 
available to RFMOs which might assist in achieving better levels of compliance but that such 
measures will only be available if agreement can be reached by member States.   
 
Chapter 4 – Compliance Enforcement in AusRFMOs 
 
The fourth chapter of this thesis analysed each of the six AusRFMOs under examination to 
identify the compliance enforcement mechanisms contained in their founding agreements and 
their conservation measures.  The analysis also included consideration of any future compliance 
enforcement initiatives being undertaken.  Comprising the data collection section of this thesis, 
this chapter paved the way for the analysis undertaken in Chapter 5. 
 
Chapter 4 also functioned to provide an insight into the background of each AusRFMO.  It was 
argued that the historical factors surrounding the creation of AusRFMOs was relevant to an 
analysis of the ability of these organisations to implement and agree upon effective compliance 
measures.  This background information utilised information available from performance reviews 
as well as material made available on the web sites of AusRFMOs.  
 
Starting with the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR), the chapter highlighted key compliance enforcement mechanisms in the form of 
conservation measures, including trade-related measures, IUU vessel lists and promoting 
compliance by the vessels of both CPs and NCPs. Importantly, the work of CCAMLR’s 
discussion group on the Development of a Compliance Evaluation Procedure (DOCEP) was also 
noted as being among the future compliance initiatives of the organisation. 
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Regarding the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), it was highlighted that the RFMO retains 
a special relationship to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO).  It was 
submitted that significant conservation measures relating to compliance have been implemented 
by the organisation, including resolutions relating to the vessels of NCPs, trade-related measures 
and the creation of the IOTC IUU vessel list.  It was argued that while the full implications of 
provisions relating to trade-related measures are yet to be seen, the creation of a Catch 
Documentation Scheme (CDS) might assist in the development of IOTC compliance measures. 
 
Next, the provisions of the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) 
were examined.  It was noted that the CCSBT aims to ensure the conservation and optimum 
utilisation of southern bluefin tuna, however, this RFMO has encountered significant compliance 
issues in the past.  Following the findings of the CCSBT performance review, several new 
resolutions were implemented relating to transhipment and vessel monitoring.  At the 
Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the CCSBT, the Extended Commission raised the need for, inter 
alia, improvement of transhipment monitoring and better systems to provide information to port 
States. 
 
The section relating to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) 
highlighted the political situation in which the RFMO was formed as being a significant factor 
affecting its compliance enforcement capacity.  The organisation has yet to undertake a 
performance review, however, the text of the agreement includes many important provisions 
relating to ecosystem-based management and the precautionary approach.  The WCPFC has 
also implemented conservation measures relating to boarding and inspection, IUU vessel lists 
and control of vessels without nationality.  
 
Finally, two fledgling agreements, the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisation (SPRFMO) and the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA) were 
considered for their potential compliance enforcement capacity on the basis of the provisions in 
their founding texts.  While the SPRFMO has yet to enter into force, it was noted that progress 
had been made in the founding text of the Agreement relating to compliance enforcement.  The 
SIOFA entered into force in August 2010 and while is not an RFMO in the traditional sense, it 
was considered for its ability to provide a foundation from which compliance enforcement 
mechanisms might be developed. 
 
Chapter 5 – Analysis of Results 
 
The fifth chapter of this thesis has tabulated the findings of Chapter 4 to better articulate areas in 
which AusRFMOs have made progress.  The first section of the chapter divided the compliance 
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enforcement measures in place in AusRFMOs into eight different categories including: 
cooperative policies, non-contracting party policies, contracting party policies, vessel lists, 
requests and negotiations, trade measures, graded sanctions and monitoring and inspection.  
These eight categories are based on the types of compliance enforcement outlined in Chapter 3.  
 
Table 2 takes account of both compliance enforcement mechanisms in place via conservation 
measures, as well as compliance measures enshrined in the founding agreements of 
AusRFMOs.  It summarises the key compliance enforcement mechanisms contained in and 
implemented by AusRFMOs and lists the relevant provisions.  Table 3 presents a summary of 
the level of implementation of compliance enforcement in the six AusRFMOs investigated.  The 
allocated status includes consideration of any future compliance initiatives underway, as well as 
compliance provisions and conservation measures of the RFMO in question.   
 
This chapter demonstrated that a lack of consistency in approach across AusRFMOs threatens 
the effectiveness of individual RFMO compliance enforcement.  Without a common 
understanding of the reach of RFMOs and their ability to impose sanctions and enforce their 
conservation measures, RFMOs will continue to struggle to implement their respective 
mandates.  In this respect, it was proposed that RFMOs should be aware of the work of their 
counterparts in an effort to understand when, why and how certain approaches towards 
compliance have been successful. 
  
The analysis following Tables 2 and 3 considered the need for more uniform implementation of 
certain compliance enforcement measures.  It revealed significant inconsistency in regard to the 
level of implementation of graded sanctions and argued that so long as trade-related measures 
are non-discriminatory in approach, certain AusRFMOs should work towards adopting 
conservation measures to give effect to this important countermeasure. This chapter also 
considered the need for a stricter approach to non-compliance by NCPs.  
 
Chapter 6 – Utilising International Dispute Resolution to Strengthen Regional Fisheries 
Management 
 
The purpose of Chapter 6 was to consider how clarification of certain provisions of the 
international regime might be better explored to strengthen RFMOs.  Drawing upon the 
relationship between RFMOs and the duty to cooperate as articulated in previous chapters, the 
discussion assessed the potential for an RFMO to bring an advisory opinion before the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (the Tribunal).   
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Utilising support from a growing body of literature and cases relating to the duty of States to 
cooperate to conserve marine living resources, the chapter argued that the duty to cooperate is 
no longer a ‘toothless tiger’ and that RFMOs would benefit from greater exploration of its 
meaning under the LOSC. The chapter also recognised standing and jurisdiction as being 
relevant issues which would need to be addressed if a RFMO were to bring such a case or 
advisory opinion before the LOSC.  The chapter concluded that if the RFMO has made provision 
for submitting a request for an advisory opinion to the Tribunal, the requirements for a RFMO to 
submit a case would be fulfilled.   
 
Finally, the chapter provided a practical insight into the benefits to be derived from such a case 
or opinion by outlining some potential questions that might be clarified.  Clarification of the legal 
responsibilities of States parties to the LOSC, possible actions against States in breach of 
specific RFMO provisions as well as what acts or omission might constitute a breach are 
questions which could all form the basis of an advisory opinion.  The chapter concluded that 
while compliance enforcement mechanisms represent a vital option available to RFMOs to 
improve compliance rates, without support for the work of these organisations from international 
law, the effectiveness of these measures will be limited.   
 
7.3  General conclusions 
 
This thesis has shown that the enforcement of compliance with management measures of 
RFMOs is pivotal to ensuring that these organisations fulfil the role envisaged for them under 
international law.   It has demonstrated that non-compliance, particularly in the form of IUU 
fishing, is one of the most significant threats facing good fisheries governance and conservation 
attempts today.674   In the process of identifying the current compliance enforcement 
mechanisms in place in AusRFMOs, this thesis has reached numerous conclusions.  These 
include:  
 
a) The adoption of trade-related measures by AusRFMOs is essential to effective 
compliance enforcement; 
b) There exists significant inconsistency in the type of and degree to which compliance 
enforcement mechanisms are currently implemented by AusRFMOs; 
c) A perceived lack of legitimacy associated with the compliance enforcement capacity of 
AusRFMOs has limited the ability of these organisations to enforce their mandate; 
d) As a result of (c), AusRFMOs are struggling to  fulfil the role envisaged for them under 
international agreements; and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
674 Ibid 12. 
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e) RFMOs may benefit from clarification of the duty to cooperate via recourse to an 
international adjudicative body such as the Tribunal. 
 
To expand upon these conclusions, it is clear that for RFMOs to reach their full potential as high 
seas regulators, they must first unite in the fight against non-compliance and ensure consistency 
is achieved in respect of their approach to and sanctions for non-compliance.  A lack of 
consistency in approach across AusRFMOs threatens the effectiveness of individual RFMO 
compliance enforcement. In this respect, it is proposed that RFMOs should actively review the 
work of their counterparts in an effort to understand when, why and how certain approaches 
towards compliance have achieved success. 
 
This thesis has concluded that the individual compliance enforcement mechanisms of RFMOs, 
particularly trade-related measures can be a powerful tool to regulate the activities of flag States.  
However, it has also concluded a perceived lack of legitimacy associated with the compliance 
enforcement capacity of AusRFMOs has prevented these organisations from fulfilling their true 
role as envisaged under international agreements.  In this respect, it is imperative that States 
come to recognise these organisations have the power, jurisdiction and standing to penalise 
States that do not comply with their regime.   
 
This thesis has provided a legal argument in support of RFMOs as having the power to 
implement sanctions under international law.  It has argued that if RFMOs continue to be viewed 
as merely cooperative in function, this undermines the significant developments that have been 
made via the creation of international instruments such as the UNFSA and the IPOA-IUU.   
RFMOs must be able to assume an active enforcement role in a modern fisheries context if they 
are to have any real impact on non-compliant States. 
 
Those States who are opposed to the adoption of effective compliance enforcement in RFMOs 
are relying upon an outdated view of the supremacy of State sovereignty in a global climate of 
increasingly declining fisheries resources.  RFMOs are operating in a legal environment, ‘that 
reflects the on-going tension between the state sovereignty and international communitarian 
models’;675 however this conflict must no longer prevent these organisations from adopting 
legally sound mechanisms to enforce conservation measures. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
675 Rosemary Rayfuse, Regional Allocation Issues or Zen and the Art of Pie Cutting, 2007. Paper Prepared for Sharing the Fish 
2006 Conference. Available on line  
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 115 
	  
The final conclusion of this thesis is that RFMOs may benefit from clarification of the duty to 
cooperate via international dispute resolution. This conclusion is founded on the interrelationship 
between RFMOs and the duty to cooperate as forged under numerous international agreements. 
It is submitted that in the absence of a clear legal obligation to cooperate, regional fisheries 
organisations will continue to suffer from a lack of political will to resolve the problems caused by 
flag State non-compliance.   
 
There are a number of practical steps that RFMOs, and AusRFMOs in particular, can take to 
address the implications of the conclusions this thesis has reached.   First, it is clear that 
uniformity in approach to compliance enforcement is vital to the overall impact of these 
organisations.  RFMOs must make a concerted effort to, ‘cooperate with other RFMOs with 
similar interests in order to coordinate actions’:676 a process which will benefit greatly from 
regular review of compliance practices. 
 
It is also submitted that as a matter of urgency, all AusRFMOs should seek to implement a 
conservation measure sanctioning the use of trade-related measures to address the actions of 
non-compliant States.  It is argued that such measures must apply equally to both CPs and 
NCPs.  In order to overcome the primary barrier to such measures being implemented: a 
perceived lack of legitimacy associated with the implementation of compliance enforcement by 
RFMOs, a paradigm shift must occur to allow RFMOs to fulfil their intended role under 
international law.  
 
Nevertheless, certain RFMOs are taking positive steps to address the current failings of the 
regional regime. The series of meetings coordinated by the tuna RFMOs677 represents a vital 
opportunity for these organisations to discuss differences in approach to compliance 
enforcement and seek to ensure more uniform practices in future.  Further to this, the adoption 
by almost all AusRFMOs of IUU vessel lists represents the potential for RFMOs to learn from the 
successes of one another. Finally, both current and future performance reviews undertaken by 
RFMOs continue to challenge the compliance enforcement capabilities of these organisations. 
 
It is often suggested that RFMOs have failed in their task to prevent the overexploitation of high 
seas living marine resources,678 however such claims ignore the reality that RFMOs are 
essentially a product of State action.  As Professor Martin Tsamenyi observes, ‘[a]t this stage, it 
is doubtful whether international law has developed sufficiently to hold flag States responsible for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
676 Adriana Fabra, 'The Use of Port State Measures to Improve Fisheries Compliance' (Paper presented at the Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: 2nd Chatham House Update and Stakeholder Consultation Meeting, 2006).  Available on 
line <www.illegal-fishing.info/uploads/Fabra.ppt> 
677 For details see: Report of the Second Joint Meeting of Tuna RFMOs, San Sebastian, Spain, June 29 – July 3, 2009.	  
678 Michael W Lodge et al, Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: Report of an 
Independent Panel to Develop a Model for Improved Governance by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, (2007) ix.  
 116 
the transgressions of vessels flying their flags.’679  As such, the biggest change that must occur 
in order to ensure that flag States are held accountable for their actions on the high seas is a 
perceptual change: a shift in thinking.  For RFMOs, this means that States must accept their 
enforcement capacity and enable them to preserve global fish resources for future generations.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
679 Martin Tsamenyi, Professor of Law and Director of the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security 
(ANCORS) at the University of Wollongong, Australia, <tsamenyi@uow.edu.au> "Compliance at the 2009 WCPFC Meet" (16 
December 2009) (personal e mail). 
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